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May 31, 1967 | 1 -ὐτ ΓΈ ς Cs Putnam "REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET FOREIGN, POLICY'/ Ade ᾿
A soureé who has furnished reliable information in the past has prepared a document entitled "Reflections on Soviet Foreign Policy."
The author of this document has had over. forty years' experience in the international communist. movement ,. has held lengthy discussions with leading figures in the international communist movement, and had personal discus ‘sions with top leaders of the Communist Party of the a Soviet Union over a. number’ of years. He is widely respected in the international communist movement for his political | acumen. The following are salient points ‘in this wn ἢ
No matter what position Soviet leaders adopt, belligerent: or peaceful, the. guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy is national self-interest. Through the use of "proletarian internationalism,” the Sovicts attempt to keep other communist parties in line; however, the principles of internationalism.are never allowed to interfere with the best national interest: of the Soviet Union. Even the struggle with Communist China is based on national ESE ι φῇ.
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: δὰ part EA TSO, Soviet Union has succeeded) f εξ : ΤΕΣ: extent, in branding the. United States agPan ggressor for its actions in Vietnan. “Soviet aa people are genuinely aroused over the wars in, Ne Vietnam and the Soviet Union is under prdssire to také. necéssary steps to relieve the preSsuré on
wk forth Vietnam. While Communist China has been 15] luctant to cooperate with the Soviets in the a: ransport of Soviet materiel to North Vietnam
through Communist China, it too is under pressure Totton ον κι, frém other communist countries to change tactics. cht τ Th ἐξ bie ressure under a common cause may force,
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"REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY"
Communist China and the Soviet Union to reich some accord with respect to aid for North Vietnam,
While all evidence indicates communist countries no longer bow to the commands of the Soviets as they once did and nationalism is making inroads in the communist world, it would be folly to presume that the communist community of nations is breaking up. The United States should develop a policy to deepen the rift between the so-called satellites and the Soviets by wedken~ ing theixy dependence on the Soviets. These countries should be treated as autonomous nations for they too jealously guard their national sovereignty even after so many years of domination by the Soviets.
The world hag three communist centers of influence at this time: Moscow, Peking, and. ᾿ Havana, Cuba. United States foreign policy should andeavor to force comparisons by indigenous con~ munist parties with neighboring capitalist countries. In such comparisons communist states
_ always suffer. Cuban demands for immediate revolutions in Latin America are causing a split with the Soviets and alienating the communist parties of South America, The United States should accuse the Soviets of spreading armed conflict unless they show by deeds that they do not. Gndorse thesé denands for revolution, The United States showld initiate action in foreign policy rather than rely only on reaction,
A copy of the docurient is enclosed, It should be ‘noted that the views expressdd in the document are those of the author alone and are not opinions or evaluations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The document has not been edited. ἷ
Enclosure NOTE: See memorandum C. Ὁ, Brennan to W. C, Sullivan, Captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," dated 5429/67, prepared by RCPsdmk.
Classified " since unauthorized dis- Closure of this information could result in the identification of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and
such revelation could a in grave damage to the Nation,
« Dw
ἘΠΕῚ ΞΟΡΙΟΝΘ ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY"
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of ” the FBI. [ft is the. property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency; ah it and it roateeent are yt} Li Sty -ggtsiderrs 1 777 ---
PENCLOSOK
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION BASIC POLICY OF SOVIET UNION Public Statements of Soviet Policy—-Peace
Paramount Elements of Soviet Foreign Policy: United States-Soviet Relations and Avoiding World War ἢ
soviet Concern Over West Gexmany
PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS: KEYSTONE OF SOVIET POLICY
Historical Precedents -
Soviet Pursuit of National Interests Through Relations with Anti-Communist States
Khrushchev Removal. Related. to National Interests
Soviet Split With China Based Upon National interests
Soviet National Interest Takes Precedence Over "Internationalism"
Importance of "Internationalism" in World . Communist Movement, and Soviet Use of This Policy to Advance Soviet National Interest Domestic Factors Affecting Soviet National Interests ,
Soviet Failure to Solve The Crisis in Agriculture. . ΝΙΝ ΝΕ _ Additional Strains on Soviet Economy : Foreign Aid, Arms Race
Necessity of Communist "Example" of Abundance in Soviet Union
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ΝΣ Θ ς O Sri Survival of Soviet Leadership Requires Solution ἡ of Economic Problems 15
Soviet Young Leadership and Youth 15
Patriotism and Peaceful Desires of Soviet
People--~Can United States. Exploit by Appeal i
to Theix National Interests? - 17 SOVIET SUPPORT OF "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"
While Basic Policy is Peace, Soviet Union Endorses "Wars of National Liberation" 18
"Wars of National Liberation"--Roots and
Countermeasures 19 . Lessons of Wars of Liberation (Spain, Korea): ‘ Soviet Union Not Directly Involved 2} VIETNAM
Soviet Union Wants Vietnam Peace But Must Give Aid to North Vietnam 22
Recent Increase in Soviet Militancy Noted on Vietnan, But Fear of War's Spread Remains: 23
Propaganda Advantage to Soviet Union as “ Result of United.States' Involvement in | , Vietnam 24 Reaction of Soviet Pedple to Vietnam War 95
Pressure on “Soviet Union Regarding Vietnam-- From East Europe; From China : 25
Possibility of Soviet- Chinese Agreement to Aid. North Vietnam 26
Possibility of International Brigade for. . Vietnam, 27
Necessity of-United States' Presence _in Vietnam 27
EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS
Nationalism Rampant _ 28
soviet Efforts to Exploit Nationalism to Further Communism
soviet Reverses Bue to Nationalism
Breakup of East European Communist Monolith
Soviet Recognition of Effects of Nationalism
Eastern Europe Asserting Independence Fr Soviet Union
om
31
ISSUES AND METHODS FOR EXPLOITATION OF EAST EUROPEAN
NATIONALISM Not Open Anti-Soviet Campaign.
A Closed Society Opens Slowly
Approach~-Impression of Honoring Independence
Examples--Hungarian. and Czech Attitudes
Gradual Relaxation of Restraints: in Eastern
Europe Ε Exploiting the Opening Door to the West NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA | SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
Entire World Communist Movement Weakened
Sino-Soviet Differences: Charges and Counter-.
charges
Advantage to United States From Split “Chinese Splitting Activities ~ Cuban Splitting Activities
Resistance of Communist Parties to any New "International"
National Interests Produce "Many. Roads t Communism"
Methods of Exploiting Split 4 for United States’
Advantage Three 'Centers": Moscow, Peking, Havana
Meeting the Cuban Threat in Venezuela - iii -
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42 43 44.
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SOVIET-CUBAN SPLIT IN LATIN ANERICAN COMMUNISM
Castro Fans the Flames of Revolt ᾿ 00 Utilizing the Split for United States Advantage 50 Communist Party of Brazil Under Pressure 51
Issues in the Propaganda War: Cuban Dictator- Ship; Trade Unions" Right to Strike; Cuban
Interference 52
Exploiting the Split to Curb Influence of
Both Cuba and Soviet Union 93° é
- iv - . CONS IRENTIAL
INTRODUCTION
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The question of United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is a very broad one, This very posing of the problem is one-sided, for the question must also be asked: what is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its attitude towards the United States? This paper will try to put forward some ideas and attempt to answer some important questions in relation to foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union and other countries calling themselves socialist and which are now in the Soviet camp in one degree or another. This. document is not a paper for a Ph.D. or for public discussion. Actually, the ideas put forth are based upon decades: of ‘study. and, experi-. ences, brought up to date, resulting: Exon contacts and travel over a period of years, including discussions with Soviet leaders and studies abroad through recent weeks in 1967. Every country calling itself socialist, except Albania, was actually visited and sessions held with the leadership. No "authorities" on this subject will be cited to "prove" a point.
BASIC POLICY OF SOVIET UNION
Public Statements of Soviet Policy - Peace
Past experience within the world communist, ‘movement makes manifest the lesson that party resolutions. and speeches of leaders must be treated very seriously. To use an old cliche, ‘one must "take them at their word.""' This does not mean that communist leaders are in the habit of disclosing secrets or taking anyone into confidence regarding important problems and their solutions. This would especially apply to questions relating to foreign policy: Yet, regardless of the still pre- vailing methods characteristic of 2 closed’ society, the communist leadership of the Soviet Union must state the general policy aims of a given historical period in order to mobilize the population for the carrying out of tasks in the sphere of international affairs and/or in the solution of economic and social problems within their own society. They do not always give the facts to their people, but.they -do indicate the road that must be traveled. In doing this; they must take’ into consideration the attitude of the people. They can control or suppress ideas or
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IN
- "peace" is a part of the daily, almost ritualistic salutation of
Pravda, the official Soviet Party organ, on April 7 and 8, 1967,
5: COPALTTAL
opposing points of view, they can sometimes enforce obviously . unjust codes and rules; but all of these things can only be
done if they have the main body of the population agreeing
with them or at least sympathetic to the basic goals.
In his opening remarks to the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which took place March 29 through April.8, 1966, Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, after stating the need for speeding communist construction, placed the question of current Soviet policy as follows:
"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has taken into consideration all the complications of the world situation in elaborating the course of the Party and the state in foreign policy; it has been guided by the vital interests of the peoples’ of the Soviet Union and by the desire to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of communism and socialism in the countries of the world socialist commun ity and . to prevent the unleashing of a new world war."
| Despite a lot of verbiage, lip service to the ideas ~ of international solidarity or proletarian internationalism, and more words about loyalty to the cause of the struggles of the people of the world, the main emphasis was on the effort to avoid war. The Soviet people can easily understand the following: '"...The Soviet Union consistently advocates normal, peaceful relations with capitalist countries and a settlement of controversial interstate issues by negotiation, not by war." No matter what else the leadership says, the Soviet people under- stand the essence of these last words. And this is why the word
the average Soviet citizen, This same general policy was reaffirmed and restated as current policy in editorials on the front page of
on the occasion of the First Anniversary of the XXIII Congress.
The foregoing is not meant to portray the Soviet Union as a pacifist state when one considers its Communist Party of nearly thirteen million members and a Young Communist League of more than twenty million members, which both function as organized and disciplined paramilitary organizations, in every sense of the word, plus a powerful military establishment equipped with modern weapons, including nuclear weapons. Nor must peace slogans be interpreted literally in disregard of increasing Soviet armaments and ambitions as they relate to Europe, and particularly as they may relate to the United States. However, their policy for
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a
peaceful coexistence as repeatedly enunciated by the Soviet
leadership (which they claim beginning with Lenin and ex- tending into the days of Nikita Khrushchev and now repeated by the new leadership of Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosygin) should be interpreted as their basic "unalterable" policy.
In their own words they consider the policies of "peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems" as. an integral part of the class struggle. The emphasis, however, is not on armed struggles but is on ideological and economic competition.
ῥ Paramount Elements of Soviet Foreign Policy: United States -
Soviet Relations and Avoiding World War
. Relations with the United States are in the center of foreign policy of the USSR. Everything that the Soviet Union does in the global field takes into consideration the role of the United States. This is not only a current or temporary policy. It is basic that the USA is the central focus in USSR world relations. It matters little whether they reach an agreement with France or engage in discussions with Great Britain; the important thing as far as the Soviet Union is concerned is the aims and attitudes of the United States. How to stabilize relationships with the USA and avoid a global conflict, particularly a nuclear war, is constantly discussed in Soviet society, The Soviet. leaders do-not hide this aim, They speak to their people quite frankly and openly about this aim. While it is. trte that the Soviets always present the United States as the villain--the imperialist troublemaker that is engaged in intrigue of some sort or another (and very often in this anti-American propaganda they take liberties with the truth)-~they nevertheless would like to reach some kind of ~ accommodation with the United States that would mean stability in foreign relations. They say that there are really only two powers that can determine the fate of the world at. this stage in history~-the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would like to avoid a general conflict or a collision
' with the United States in particular.
a
Soviet Concern Over West Germany
The Soviet leadership also fears the possibility of a two~front war and looks upon China as a powerful enemy by whom they will be confronted sooner or later; nevertheless, they believe that the chief enemy is still in Western Europe. The present strategic perspective of the USSR and some of their allies is the possibility of a major military confrontation between the United Statés and West Germany on the one side and the USSR and its allies on the other side, Even in their public speeches at so important a gathering as the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they spoke of the bilateral military alliance of the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, charging that this is a peculiar sort of alliance or partnership in which each wants to use the other for his own designs and that both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany seek to aggravate tensions in Europe. "These designs, whatever the motives of the partners may be, are spearheaded against the USSR and other socialist countries, against peace and security in Europe and the whole world.” This is what Brezhnev said in his report to the Congress. Therefore, the Soviet leaders say that they will never agree or reconcile themselves to the West German militarists, with the support of the United States, receiving nuclear weapons.
Under present world conditions there seem to be no readily apparent avenues by which the United States can change this attitude of the Soviet Union which looks upon the United States as "the instigator of all aggression" in every part of the world, Perhaps an agreement or treaty concerning the pro- liferation of nuclear arms when adopted can lead to more confidence and trust in United States policy, not merely on the part of the Soviet Union and their allies but also in some other countries, even some that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion, who are also still fearful of a war of revenge launched by West Germany. North Atlantic Treaty Organization governments may deny this but an objective examination of the real thinking of the masses of people in Europe and Britain will show that there is greater fear of German strength than of the danger of communism,
~ PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS: KEYSTONE OF SOVIET POLICY
Historical Precedents
No matter what slogan leaders use, no }
s the Soviet matter the maneuvers, belligerent or -peacefulmthey. always keep ! - , -4 - CON L ‘ . , , " " . “oe ν " ᾿ re ond , : , - i
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in mind the national interests of the USSR, and this is borne
out by an examination of Soviet policy over a period of many years,
In the first few years of the Soviet Revolution Soviet leaders openly spoke of international aims and talked about carrying the revolution by force to other countries, and this did happen, There were revolts in Hungary, Germany, and in the Far East, including China, all these with Soviet aid, The defeats suffered in these countries, the inability of the Communist International to rally the working classes in other parts of the world to follow the example of the October Revolution of 1917, and the economic chaos and famine resulting from these setbacks, caused Lenin to take another look at the prospects of world revolution and place the emphasis on economic development. Some of the present ambitious, industrial plans were given to the Bolshevik Party and to the Soviet, Government in embryo form by Lenin,
After Lenin's death, the struggle within the Soviet Party and Government between Stalin and Trotsky was related to this question of "permanent revolution," now vulgarized by the Chinese. The Trotsky thesis was rejected, and the Stalin concept of “building socialism in one country" was policy until World War II, After the Trotskyist concept of "exporting revolution" was defeated, the ambitious Soviet five-year plans were initiated, But even prior to that, the Soviets tried to reach agreements, and did succeed in reaching agreements and Signed treaties with many states in Europe and other countries on different continents. The Communist International, always an instrument of the Soviet Union, and other organizations like the Red International of Labor Unions, etc., ereated by the Soviet Union, were at the same time working to subvert society in other countries.
. But in all of these activities, the Soviets never gave up their national interests. The Soviet Union received
the unqualified endorsement of the world communist movement
for all its policies. The justification was that since the
Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world, encircled by enemies on all sides, it must receive the unconditional support of communists everywhere, even if Soviet aims hurt other countries. Communists in all countries, including the United States, were
the chief apologists for the Bolshevik terror and oppression of
-5- CONPRORETTAL
the population in the Soviet Union. Then, as now, the Soviets never consulted the other communist parties when they adopted policies that were in their own national interests. The Liquidation of the kulaks, the big purges that took place under Stalin, were justified or camouflaged with the use of interna- tional revolutionary slogans that these terror campaigns were necessary to “defend the only socialist state” against aggres- Sive imperialism, ;
When the Soviet State deemed it necessary to reach an understanding with Hitler Germany, they did not consult any communist party, On the contrary, they submitted to the demands of Hitler and even sacrificed many militant communists in Poland and Germany so that they could reach this agreement with the Nazis, The Soviet-Nazi pact, however, did’ cause .a ἡ cleavage in the communist movement, but it was only temporary. For the communists at that time, still organized in the Communist international, saw in this pact a peaceful intent, namely, to . combat the tallied imperialists" who had ibetrayed" their agree- ments with the Soviet Union. In the Communist Party, USA, the shock was so great that the American communist leaders at that time tried to convince the membership that obviously there must have been some "secret clauses" in. the Soviet-Nazi pact because the Soviet Union would never sign an agreement with the Nazis that would sacrifice revolutionary principles, etc. The Soviet . Union through the use of demagogy about "proletarian internationalism and. "peace" did ‘keep the majority of the then existing communist parties in line, When the American communists used the slogan “the Yanks are not coming," this was giving aid and comfort to the ~~ hational ambitions of the USSR under the guise'of peace, When the Soviet Union ‘was attacked by Hitler Germany, the United States communists answered Stalin's appeal by demanding immediate aid to the USSR and intervention on the side of the Soviets.
The restating of this question is necessary in order to emphasize again and again that regardless of the international trimmings in Soviet documents or Slogans the national interests of the USSR come first, When World War II was coming to an end and the Soviets sent their armies into the neighboring states and set up puppet regimes, it was still with the same aim; the strengthening and protection of Soviet interests. ‘This very ~ nationalism of the Soviet Union led to contradictions and the subsequent loosening of the hold that they had upon what have come to be called the "satellites." To emphasize this question
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of national interests, it is well to remember that Stalin did not give unqualified support to the Chinese Communist Party. It was only when the Chinese communists were moving to take power despite the Soviet Union, that they received some aid from the Soviets, Even after the establishment of communist rule in'China, Stalin held out against concessions to the Chinese, It was’only much later that the Russians agreed to give back part of Manchuria and Port Arthur to the Chinese, Whatever agreements were signed with the satellite socialist states, they were always favorable to the USSR, whether it concerned economics, boundaries, or military matters, : ς
Soviet Pursuit of National Interests Through Relations with Anti-Communist states |
The Soviet Union has relations with many countries including countries that are still in a very unsettled state, countries that have problems with their neighbors and countries that suppress their communists. Yet, relations between the Soviet Union and these countries have very little to do with ideology, or liberty, or legality, or freedom for communist parties. To this day, Egypt does not permit a communist party, yet the relations between Egypt’ and the Soviet Union remain normal, There is no legal communist party in Algeria. When the Algerian Government of Ben Bella was overthrow, the Soviet Union did not break with the Boumedienne Government. When the communists of Iraq were executed and thrown into prisons by the thousands, the Soviet Union did not break with that government. When Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana, the Soviet Government con- tinued its relations, even though they used the words of Nkrumah aS an excuse for not breaking off diplomatic and economic rela- tions. Despite the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of .com- munist sympathizers in Indonesia, the Soviet Government has not broken relations with the Indonesian Government though they did recently -send a diplomatic protest objecting to the campaign of ~anti-communisn. "
Khrushchev Removal Related to National Interest
; When Khrushchev was removed from leadership of .the Soviet Party and Government, the Central Committee of the Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union at that time took into con- Sideration the feeling of the Soviet people--their grievances.
‘- 7 - CONE TAL
against the Soviet Government and particularly against Khrushchev. The Soviet people, whose standard of living was being slowed down, attributed their problems to the Khrushchev foreign aid "giveaway program.” The man on the street was of the opinion that Khrushchev was giving away food, machinery, and other things that should be used or consumed by the Soviet people. In this way they believed. he was neglecting their national interests. The opinion generally among the Soviet population was that Khrushchev was paying more attention to international adventures than to the solution of pressing domestic economic problems.
If the people did not feel that their immediate interests or national interests were being neglected or sacrificed without receiving something more tangible in return, it is doubtful that the present leadership could have taken over.
Soviet Split with China Based Upon National Interest Ὁ ro
When the Soviet Government reached the point where they were ready to engage in a political struggle with China, it was based upon national interests rather than ideology. Of course, in the polemics that ensued only ideology was stressed. But it ‘is recalled that the sharp division actually took place first around the questions of nuclear weapons and huclear war, and second, around the Soviet relationship with or effort to reach an agreement with the United States. This is not a mere abstract deduction. For years prior to the open announcement of differences,’ the Chinese demanded that the Soviets give them nuclear weapons, or give them the industry so that they could create their own nuclear establishment. The Soviet Govern- ment, for policy reasons related to the world situation, did not wish to create another nuclear power on its own borders. It did not matter to the Soviet Union that this power, the Chinese People's Republic, was in. communist hands., In their appeal to the communist parties. of the world, the Soviets used the argument that Chinese recklessness would lead to world nuclear ‘conflict. and that the Soviet concept of the possibility for "peace in our time" and the idea of "peaceful coexistence" are quite different than the Chinese theory that there can be no peace until in-
- perialism is destroyed everywhere. It ‘was in the defense of
peace and the avoidance of global nuclear war that the Soviets tried to rally world opinion, and first of all the world communist movement, against China. The theory. first raised at the XX Con- gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that “war 15 not
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fatally. inevitable" was debated and accepted by the eighty~one parties meeting in Moscow. The Chinese were very bitter about the Soviet Union trying to reach an accommodation with the. United States, They had really believed that the Soviet Union or Khrushchev at the Camp David meétings with Eisenhower had betrayed the interests of China and reached an accommodation - with the United States, Subsequently, the debates and quarrels. had once again indicated that the Soviet Union placed its national interests and influence first, and that the Chinese did likewise in response to the Soviets.
Soviet National Interest Takes Precedence Over "Internationalism"
. The average communist is in a state of bewilderment and almost disbelief 85 ἃ result of this basic quarrel and particularly the Chinese-demands for boundary revision, Com- munist ideclogy has consistently stressed the international aspects of the movement. Communist dogma rejects "bourgeois nationalism," yet every communist state has some problem. affecting its national interests in relation to ‘some other communist state, not only in relation to capitalist states,
The conclusion that must be drawn in the present world situation is that even for the socialist states, beginning with the Soviet Union, China, Romania, Yugoslavia and others, the question of nationalism, or national sovereignty as some call it, plays a most important role, It.may be said that this nationalism or national self-interest supersedes their “proletarian interna- tionalisn, "no matter how loud the denial.
Importance of "Internationa lism" in Worid Communist Movement, and Soviet Use of This Policy to
Advance Soviet National Interest
Nevertheless, in placing the problem of national interest first, the influence and power of communist interna- tional ideology cannot be dismissed. Internationalism is still an important part of Marxism-Leninism, and in conditions of ; struggle, especially where the communists do not have state power, it is expected that communists from the so-called "oppressor - nations" will subordinate their national interests to those of the so-called "oppressed nations" in the struggle against im- perialism. On the domestic scene, this means that communists in
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CoORMSTERT IAL
the United States, no matter to which wing they. belong~~the
pro-Moscow or the pro-Pek sing or the pro-Cuban-~-must struggle against their own government, their own people, to help the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, or Ghana, or for that matter any other country that is fighting against imperialist oppression, The expression of this concept can be observed in a more concrete way in connection with the struggles in the USA, Australia, etc., against the war in Vietnam.
The ideas of "internationalism" are probably more widespread in the Soviet Union than in any of the other com- munist countries, ‘The Communist Party of the Soviet Union camouflages. its drive for national advantages and its national interest under the banner of “proletarian internationalism." This: ‘is a traditional holdover from the days when the Soviet Union was the only communist state* and all parties used the
‘same slogan, “Defend the Soviet Union." (This slogan is no
longer used--it is not dignified for such a big power to permit its use. Such a country not only defends itself but is capable of defending others. Therefore, “International Solidarity" is the substitute Slogan.) . |
The Soviet Party leadership works hard at this internationalism with very deliberate goals and aims. This propaganda work is carried on not solely for the purpose of strengthening its leadership and one might say its hegemony over the international communist movement. "Internationalism"™ is also utilized in defense of its foreign policy. This is how national interests can be placed before the people of the Soviet Union and the people of other countries as "unselfish policies." The internationalism expresses itself nowadays chiefly around the question of peace. Were it not for this Gesire for peace on the part of the Soviet people, it would be very difficult for the Soviet Party to utilize the banner of internationalism almost as it did in the old days. ° Because. the Soviet Union is the most powerful country in the so-called "socialist community," "the protector" of the other states against "aggressive imperialism," it gives them possibilities to use the phrase "international solidarity."
* The term "communist state" is not being used here in the theoretical sense as thethighest stage of society wherein the
communist program states "From each according to his ability,
to each according to his needs." It is used here only in the sense of designating that these are countries which are led by communist parties and are striving for this goal.
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In the report to the last Party Congress, Brezhnev stated that in the previous year the leadership of the Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union had met with the leadership
of sixty communist and workers parties and with two hundred delegations. This is how they strengthen their international influence. But the Soviet communist léadership has another
very practical purpose in strengthening its ties with the rest of the worldwide communist movement on every continent. First, they retain their ideological influence and loyalty by arriving ~ at common conclusions or aims. Second, they strengthen the fifth column in every country even though the hold of the Soviet Party and Government is not as strong as in the past over the other parties. They nevertheless find ways and means and methods to retain the loyalty of these various parties. They are satisfied if they reach agreement on most of the political problems and do not push for one-hundred percent endorsement of Soviet policy. They emphasize the "equality" of parties and they gen-. erally get the leadership of other parties to speak for them as if the policies of the Soviet Party and Government were their own policies arrived at on the basis of their own national needs.
It is known that they also use very practical methods to. retain their hold on the international, conmunist movement
besides political influence. These include ideological indoc-
trination; that is, the various parties send people: to schools
of all sorts in Moscow. The Eastern Europeans send people for ; training not only in the universities and scientific institutions and industry, but to the military academies as well. A good part of the work and studies of all these institutions deal with ideological problems and international indoctrination, Even “the students from the less developed countries who come to the special schools like Lumumba University and other schools must
take ("voluntary") courses in Marxism-Leninism, The other
socialist countries do the same things on a smaller scale to influence foreign parties. In each of these communist. controlled countries we can find hundreds, if not thousands, of people from all over ‘the globe studying, working, or participating in some
of. their Cultural and industrial institutions. These governments not only try to influence these people but try to utilize indi- viduals. to act in their behalf as a fifth column, as propagandists for the ideas of communism, and some individuals are utilized as espionage agents. -
- il - ; CONF IBRLIAL
Domestic Factors Affecting Soviet National Interest
The Soviet people have gone through two World Wars
in this century and years of civil war. At the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders admitted for the first time in actual figures the enormous casualties that they suffered in World War II. The Soviet people in this last half century have not known the real meaning of freedom and peace, They had a few years of "plenty" or "prosperity" in the middle thirties. They stil] refer to that period as the "golden years." At the end of World War II, most of the European part of the Soviet Union had been destroyed,
Most of their cities were totally or partially leveled and they had to rebuild practically from scratch. In the rebuilding process they made enormous sacrifices in carrying out. the ambitious postwar policies of Stalin. They made further sacri- . fices in holding on to the satellite states. that border the USSR or at the time were the forward bases of Soviet power, Although it is true that for years they took tribute from these countries, it is doubtful that they received as much as they put into some of these countries who even built industries with Soviet help that they never had before.
_ The satellite countries, too, with a few exceptions, suffered immensely as a result of destruction in World War ΤΊ and occupation by the Hitlerite Armies, and the task of recon- struction was accomplished largely with Soviet aid at the expense of sacrifices of the Soviet people. Even today the Soviet people, who are better off materially speaking than they ever were, resent the better-clothed and better-fed people in some of the other socialist states. Very often one can hear the remark of a Soviet citizen, “If we didn't send our meat to Hungary or if we didn't send our textiles to Bulgaria, we would be as well-fed and better-clothed than they are."
The Soviet leadership is therefore trying first of all to improve the living standards of its people. This is now visible in many ways-~improved housing, more goods, better methods | of: public feeding, more attention to quality, etc. Yet, the Soviet people and of course the Soviet leadership feel that the USSR is still materially insecure.
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soviet Failure to Solve the
Crisis in Agriculture
While the Soviets have solved numerous industrial problems and have been able to increase productivity, they have failed to reach the utopian goals (divorced from reality) set by Khrushchev in the seven~year plan that was to pave the road to communism surpassing the USA. The most pla-
' guing problem of all, up to now, is the failure to solve the
crisis in agriculture, It may mean nothing to an American
if for one reason or another he went into a supermarket and could not buy a few pounds of flour, but Russian history and tradition see hunger in the background when they cannot obtain flour to do theirovn baking. The prohibition of Matzho baking for.the Jewish Passover until recently was due to this strict
‘rationing of flour rather than contempt for a religious ritual.
It was only last year that the Soviet Government released flour in bulk form to be sold in the stores for some important holi- day. This sale of flour was considered a good and happy omen by the Soviet people. Hunger was no longer stalking in the background symbolically speaking.
This is not meant to imply that the Soviet people are starving--this is not go. They have enough of the basic com- modities. There is no rationing, although there may -be many things in short supply and miich of this. is most often due to poor transportation and bad distribution, But the fact remains and the Soviet people know it and the wide world knows, that
during the last number of years the Soviet Union has had to
import grain. From time immemorial grain was considered equal to gold (if not nore so) in both old and present-day Russia,
Last year the USSR produced a bumper harvest due to favorable weather conditions and improved organization. After discarding the erratic experiments of Khrushchev, the ‘Soviets are just beginning to solve this enormous agricultural problem. There is no need to repeat or list the measures they have under- taken to solve this problem, noting only in passing that there is great stress on scientific agriculture, on daily material incentive, prices, pay, pensions, housing, conservation, etc,
Of course, the building up of a giant fertilizer industry takes high priority. Americans who are used to surpluses and even payment for reduction of planted acreage cannot easily grasp the plaguing problems that the Soviet Union faces due to a back-
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Additional Strains on Soviet Economy: Foreign Aid, Arms Race ‘
Soviet help to the developing states, ASia and Africa and other parts of the world, is also a big strain. But to retain its influence in the communist camp, as well 2S in world competition with the United States, the Soviet Union, even if it gives aid in measured amounts, cannot and Will not let go. The strain would lessen if the Soviet Union would spend less on armaments but this they will not do. On the contrary, since Khrushchev, although their boasts about bigger negaton bombs have decreased; the building of armaments goes on. How to lessen these strains--how to satisfy. the material needs of their own people--these questions are con- stantily being discussed by the Soviet leadership, Soviet national interests require a "breathing spell" from the fears of a big war. The people want this and that is why the USSR assumes a posture with emphasis on the removal of tensions. This posture is not always the same. From time to time the Soviet leadership takes a more belligerent stance even within the context of the policy of peaceful coexistence. This. new posture is a "dialectical" combination of efforts for peace and threats against the imperialists. .
Necessity of Communist "Example" τι of Abundance in Soviet Union
The present leadership, as the Khrushchev leader- “ Ship before, believes that the influence of communism cannot spread unless’ they are able to prove by an abundance of material things that communism is superior to capitalism. In their argument with the Chinese, the Soviet leaders always use the necessity of building up at least one socialist country to serve as an example that would be convincing to the working people , from Western countries, not only to people in the United States but even to people in more backward countries, This necessary example is to show that materially socialism can do. just as well if not better than advanced capitalist countries. But the Soviets have not been able to do this up to now, although ‘they have been making marked progress. Compared to a decade = = — ago, it must be admitted that despite many ‘difficulties and failures they have moved ahead.
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Survival of Soviet Leadership Requires Solution of Economic Problems
Preceding the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there was a struggle for leadership in the Soviet Party, and in a one-party state this means the con- trol of the Soviet Government. The Brezhnev forces won. When the question was posed as to how long this leadership could remain in power and retain the confidence of the Soviet people, knowledgeable Russian Party members would say that the test will come in the solution to the pressing economic problems. The leadership that solves these problems and continues to im- prove the standards of living of the Soviet people will remain on top. If this leadership does not solve these numerous inter- national and domestic problems, they could be. ousted as Khrushchev was. ᾿ .
The Soviet leadership is constantly straining to solve these, numerous domestic problems in industry and agriculture. Now they are experimenting with new methods of planning, produc- tion and price schedules, These things-are in the forefront in the Party organization, in the trade unions, in the press, radio, television, in education, etc.
These problems and their solution cannot be separated from the Soviet efforts to work out a cooperative relationship With the other socialist states. . Just as the Soviet leadership cannot "command" its own people as in the-days of Stalin, they cannot command the smaller Eastern socialist countries in the same old way.’ Instead, they try to convince and exhort,
Soviet Young Leadership and Youth : ΄ ΄
Up to this time, it can be said that the younger generation of leaders in the Soviet Union has followed the lead of the present leaders. Although it is known that there is a struggle going on in the Soviet Union between the genera~ tions, and available information and facts indicate that this struggle is going on constantly, it has been resolved temporarily by bringing some younger people into the leadership of the govern- ment and the party. How long this unity of the generations can go on, or how long this new leadership will follow in the foot- Steps of the old in retaining at least a surface unanimity after ἃ policy is agreed upon, is hard to say. This depends on both economic and political factors.
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As already stated, the present leadership of the Soviet Union will be measured by the degree of their success. in solving economic problems. They will also be measured by . their ability to stabilize the. political situation interna- tionally. This is not to suggest that their domestic, situation is unstable. As long as they are able to place the danger of war in the background and strive for normalizing relations with other countries, the present leadership will not be. challenged. But. it is well to remember that prior to the . AXITI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. some of this leadership favored more militant and aggressive action on the international front. Generally they favored more arm- ° aments and an armed direct military confrontation against the United States in Vietnam, There were even grumblings against . any effort that would lead to negotiated disarmament. These.- younger leaders may have now concluded that they overestimated their strength, but they constantly show a greater belligerency than the older experienced’ present leadership. Some of these
‘younger leaders favored a tightening of controls over the people,
the limiting of dissent or freedom of speech. These young leaders favored for a time reverting to the control-like methods of the police.
It is necessary to make a distinction between the |
. younger leaders and the youth in the Soviet Union, The masses
of youth have grown up in the -post-Stalin era, They are :ashamed= of what took place in their country during the Stalin period: They have developed a broader outlook regarding the rest of the world, They are more educated and better acquainted with what's happening outside the Soviet Union. It can be said that they have developed in a limited sense a democratic outlook. . They : are also the ones who understand the sacrifices -that would have
to be made in the event of a nuclear war. Among these youth.
are individuals, even groups, that fight for a more liberal.
cultural and literary outlook. The younger poets who are most
often condemned by the leadership for running away with the reins
are symptomatic of this present youth. To cite an example,
there is the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko and others. It 15: no
longer a secret that most of the literary circles were against.
the use of the courts to condemn the writers Yuli Daniel and
Andrei Sinyavsky. There were even-protest meetings —in-Moscow,—--- — — There were secret round-robin petitions circulated. The con~
demned writers' works Were mimeographed and distributed. It
is only the continued threat of force and reprisals that keeps
the jid upon the literary and artistic world in the USSR. They
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went through a complete reorganization in literary journalism in an effort to stem the progressive and liberal trend. They turned the Literary Gazette which was a daily into a biweekly.
At the time when it appeared there was going to be a struggle between the present older leadership and the younger leadership as: represented by Aleksandr N, Shelepin, a member of
the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet youth understood what would happen if the Shelepin forces in the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union came out on top. ‘There was even talk. about ‘possible resistance in demonstrations if that group would persist and once again use the old methods of Stalinist repression. This discon- tent of the youth reached the ears of the party and its jeadership and this made it possible for them to hold back these younger, militant but nationalist leaders.
There is a youth problem in the Soviet Union. In many respects it is similar to the problems of youth we face in the United States. This younger generation does not exhibit the same discipline as the older generation. They know very little about revolutionary struggle, They are only interested in immediate _ problems--their education, their profession, and increased material things. However, by no means can it be said that the youth has abandoned Marxism-Leninism or Soviet nationalism. It would be. naive to interpret this "youth rebellion" to mean that. The children in the Soviet Union take their Marxism-Leninism with their milk, in a manner of speaking. In the kindergartens and the very first grades, they are taught the. meaning of the revolu- tion and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, Even the youth organiza-~ tions are named after Lenin, like the "Leninist Pioneers" or the "Leninist Komsomol," etc. But these youngsters are not the fanatical revolutionaries of the Bolshevik type.
Patriotism and Peaceful Desires of Soviet People--Can United States Exploit by Appeal to Their National Interests?
There is, however, one thing that must be kept in mind in dealing with the Soviet people, that is,—that even if the people oppose some particular policy of their government, they do believe that their government is actually fighting for peaceful coexistence. It can even be said that they are the
pressure that moves this leadership to try to reach accommoda- tions with other countries and to:live in peace, particularly
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with the United States, It is correct to state that the Russian leadership responds to the desires of their people on this ques- tion, .
The Soviet people have gone through a lot of suffering during their fifty years since 1917, beginning with the long period of civil war and extending through the wars that followed. They have suffered invasion and the destruction of a good part of their country and its people. Even if the Soviet Government did not keep the past alive, especially the Nazi invasion, the Majority of Soviet citizens would not forget this, for most have lost members of the family in the war or suffered greatly during the German rule. The people want peace and do not want to repeat the experience and sufferings of World War II,
The Russian people have a traditional sense of ‘patriotism; they believe in their country and would fight for . their country, if they thought it was threatened. But the Soviet people will be moved by their self-interests, and if the United States should want to point to some wrongdoings of the Soviet " Government, it must in the clearest terms show that that govern- ment is responsible for creating a certain atmosphere that leads to wars or to a situation that could lead to the abrogation of world peace. In this sense one appeals to the people to protect their national. interests without violating their patriotic feelings: ᾿
; SOVIET SUPPORT OF “WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"
While Basic Policy is Peace,
Soviet Union Endorses "Wars
of National Liberation"
In fighting for its interests, the Soviet Union, in keeping with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, endorses revo- dutionary movements throughout the world and gives aid to these _ revolutionary movements and to governments that have established themselves either through obtaining independence from colonial rule or winning independence through armed struggle. All the” ᾿ τ resolutions of the Soviet Party, as resolutions of communist parties the world over, consider the "wars of national Liberation"
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as a part of the general revolutionary struggle, and they are pledged to give aid to these movements as long as they are anti- imperialist, In carrying through this policy, the Soviet Union separates what they call wars of national liberation and wars for independence from the concept of general war. They attempt to show that there is no contradiction between the effort to avoid a world war and at the same time to help carry on wars
of national liberation.
The Soviet leadership has concluded that nuclear wars can be devastating and may result in the annihilation of human civilization’. They incessantly claim that they are the only state defending the people of the world from catastrophe by fighting for peace and against nuclear war. In their rela~ tions with other countries, socialist and capitalist, even where they have military alliances as in Eastern Europe, they always
‘emphasize that world peace is paramount, Wars of liberation,
though they have to be supported, are secondary, and while they do not accept the ideas of "limited wars" except insofar as
they mean wars of liberation, in their inter discussions they establish a limit wherever there is a real danger that the local conflict could broaden into a conflict between big powers-~—- especially between the Soviet Union and the United States. At such a point (actually a form of "brinkmanship") they would be prepared to reach some compromise. This was the case in the
_ Cuban confrontation when the United States compelled the Soviets
to remove their missiles. It was not only. a question of being handicapped strategically but also the féar of a global conflict
and its consequences. It can be said that. the population of the
Soviet Union was not prepared for such a conflict, and when _ Khrushchev agreed to the compromise ‘over the protests of Fidel Castro, this served the Soviet national interests and took into
consideration the feeling and understanding of the Soviet people
and the people of the other Eastern European countries.
"Wars of National Liberation"-——-Roots and Countermeasures
Those who are willing to face reality can see that such class wars of "liberation™ are destined to spread or occur in: various parts of ‘the world. This being so, the question of greatest importance to the United States is how to prevent the communists, from taking over. Can an armed force from another country, even the United States, put down such insurrections at all times? The communists see these wars as "inevitable"
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and therefore they are prepared for them. They prepare for them by using the native population to fight their own battles. These "rebels" have roots in the native soil and among the population, and thus they weaken the charge of "invasion" or "ageression. " The big task that faces the United States, if
it is to preserve its world influence and safeguard its own national interests, is to foresee these "inevitable" situations, to study the social and political problems more carefully ir each given country, to try to find leadership that speaks for. the people, for the most numerous sectors of the population.
A leadership must be found that speaks for those who ἡ have real grievances and who have been oppressed, It follows that such people lose nothing when they fight for issues and things that will be of benefit to themselves, their people and their country. This cannot be a mercenary army. Volumes have ‘been written about guerrilla warfare, and fanatical maniacs like Ernesto "Che" Guevarra and Fidel Castro see in this type of warfare the answer to all problems. But the truth is that the guerrilla army is only as useful and powerful as its “ indigenous roots, If such bands or armies or groups have no Support from the local population, no matter under what flag they fight, they will be confronted with the same problems. faced by United States forces in many villages in Vietnam--they sometimes find it hard to distinguish between enemy and friend. Of course, this is a big question and there are many prior problems to be solved-in each and every country.
. If Latin America is to serve as an example, it must ‘be evident at the outset that it is impossible to solve every problem, Yet, no problem Will be solved. if the United States does not take the lead in developing a cadre that understands its own country and the national interests of that particular ‘country, that will not only make promises, but with. American aid will bring about some genuine, deep, social changes in the structure of that society to uproot the remnants of feudalism or semi-slavery, In this way not only do people fight their own battles but viewing the matter from a national viewpoint the United States can husband its own national manpower and resources and increase its influence among allies fighting for. the same aims, Such phrases as "freedom," "democracy," - "the free world," ete., will take on a new and fuller meaning. Some of these phrases have a very real meaning, but the
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population in the backward countries of the world will not
be mobilized on this basis. When the peasant in Brazil cannot even lay claim to half an acre of land, to talk to him about “free enterprise" is like talking to the wind.. Merely winning a landlord or paying off some general or colonel to fight on one's side will not increase one's influence. it may make it possible to hang on, momentarily, but eventually the problems facing the population will have to be solved. .In one form or another they will try to solve these problems by forming guerrilla bands or using other terrorist means. They may call for help or receive voluntary help from a Castro, but this help comes from a system totally ὁ antagonistic to the democratic way of life.
Lessons of Wars of Liberation (Spain, Korea): Soviet Union , ᾿ Not Directly Involved _ ; ᾿
There are some lessons for United States political and military strategists to be drawn from these many wars beginning with the war in Korea. World society is so split up and constituted today that more wars of the type now being fought in Vietnam will erupt, perhaps on different continents Simultaneously , and strategic lessons are imperative, not merely in the area of military aspects but also in the areas ‘of political and social problems.
During the 1930's a civil war was fought in Spain in which the ‘communists used an international brigade, Thousands of Americans traveled overseas as volunteers, as did British, Germans, Panamanians, Canadians, Yugoslavs, etc. The Russians who were there were only "advisers." The Soviets were mere ly suppliers of arms, and from time to time they contributed their military know-how. But Soviet. manpower in great numbers did not become involved in this war. ‘The Soviets did not have many more tight ing men in Spain than there were Americans,
In the war in Korea, most of the arms were supplied by the Soviet Union, The Soviet Union did not put any soldiers ; in the field to fight, They were ina better position. strategically. _. -..-in Korea-than they are now in Vietnam for they border on North Korea and have adjacent ports, But no Russians were actually fighting in North Korea, The Chinese stepped in with the so-called :
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"volunteer" army only. when their national interests were seemingly threatened, The Russians in deference to Chinese interests permitted their "volunteers" to go in. This did
not hurt the USSR--by supplying arms and supplies they let
the North Koreans and Chinese fight for, their own interests and those of the USSR, At the same time the United States was involved in a bloody war while the Soviets turned their atten- tion to efforts to gain advantages in the West. They were not involved directly; the Chinese and the North Koreans carried the ball for them, ᾿
Wherever civil war breaks out or there is some other conflagration, the Soviet Union sends advisers and aid, but they try not to get involved with their own manpower. An immediately apparent application of this observation in the contemporary situation is obviously United States involvement in Vietnam, The logical. corollary is the important question of how fast the United States can build a government and an army in Vietnam so that the Vietnamese can do théir own fighting. They will need aid and advice for perhaps a long time but that~ is different than fighting for them. Certainly, other lessons of equal consequence can be gleaned for current application: from a study of these wars of liberation in the past.
VIETNAM ,
soviet Union Wants Vietnam Peace But Must Give Aid to North Vietnam
‘Keeping in mind Western Europe, Germany first of all, the Soviet leaders are in favor of bringing an end to the war in. Vietnam in order to remove the possibility of being dragged in either by the Chinese or by escalation on the part of the United States. The war in Vietnam is used as an excuse and as- a reason for the failure to reach accommodation with the United States in other fields, whether diplomatic, trade, or the solu-~ tions to-other troubles in the world.
‘However, in view of their conflict with China and in- view of the demands of their allies in Eastern Europe for Soviet defense, particularly against Western Germany, the Soviet Leader- ship cannot help but continue to give aid to Vietnam as proof of their loyalty and leadership of the socialist camp against
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imperialism. The leadership of the other socialist states
has been quite critical of what they have termed “inadequate aid" given to Vietnam in this conflict. ‘When the United
States first sent large contingents of troops to Vietnam,
some of the leadership in the Eastern bloc demanded a more militant resistance on the part of the USSR. It now appears that the Soviet Union has convinced their allies that what-
ever they are doing, as limited as it may seem, is in accordance. with the wishes and desires of the North Vietnamese and. the Chinese and for these reasons they could do no more, They also have convinced their partners in Eastern Europe that a confronta- tion with the United States in the Pacific or Southeast Asia would weaken the Western front and it is in this area of the world that the USSR and the East European socialist states are most interested at the present time.
Recent Increase in Soviet Militancy Noted on Vietnam But Fear of War's Spread Remains
A more militant attitude regarding Vietnam and a more vehement anti-United States campaign can be noted emanating from the USSR in the last few weeks. This may be due to many. things happening in the world that can be interpreted by the communists as a spreading discontent or a "radicalization" of the masses--the election results in France, the anti-United States demonstrations during the Vice President's trip, the struggles in Greece, in Spain, the riots in Aden, the setback of the Government in Japan, the efforts of the West German - Government to talk to the East German leadership, the racial strife in the United States, the continued strikes in the United States, the continued demonstrations against the-war in Vietnam, etc,-~all are taken into account and measured, The Chinese Situation is also a contributing factor in this "flexible" pos- ture of the USSR. Yet the changing tactical position of the Soviet leadership does not mean 10 15 abandoning its main line,
Discussions with the main Soviet leadership reveal that they did not want this conflict in Vietnam to spread, and that after the spread they used their influence as much as they could, to ‘contain the war in Vietnam, to prevent it from spreading. If the Soviet Union was not involved in a serious conflict with the Chinese, they would probably consider the war in Vietnam as
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"a diversion" that keeps the United States occupied and "bleeding." But what the Soviet Union worries about, and this they discuss Quite frankly with their friends, is that the Chinese are making an effort to involve the Soviet Union and the United States in “a war, a direct confrontation, The Soviet leaders fear that once the United States‘and the Soviet Union would become involved in fighting each other, the Chinese would wait for both powers to weaken themselves and then move in to assert their will at a moment opportune to them.
Propaganda Advantage to Soviet Union as Result
of United States' Involve- ment in Vietnam
The United States involvement in Vietnam has given communists the world over, to begin with in the Soviet Union, | ᾿ a big propaganda advantage. They have to a large extent suc- ceeded in convincing people in many parts of the world that the United States is the "aggressor" in the world, that the United States has become a "neo-colonial" power, that the United States is using the most modern weapons to “suppress” peoples who .are ᾿ fighting for "independence," and that its methods are as "brutal if not- more so than those of the Nazis. It may not be pleasant to hear this, but a good part of world opinion believes this.
No ‘matter whom one talks with in different parts of, the world, many believe that the- United States is responsible for the war in Vietnam and that the United States does not hesitate to. burn, bomb, and destroy people, especially people of another color. This belief has grown since the United States sent itito Vietnam . hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who carry the chief burden of the war. Some of these falsehoods are not only the result of communist propaganda, The lack of consensus in the United States about the war in Vietnam causes people in Europe, Latin America, and other countries to believe even the most exaggerated and violent propaganda of the communists, —
When the United States and the Soviet Union .signed the treaty against atmospheric nuclear testing, this took away a powerful propaganda weapon from the communists, who until ‘that time were posing as the only ones who-had concern for..the | -- human race and its survival. But with the spread of the war in Vietnam, communists once again were able to rally large sections of the people of the world, even those who do not believe in
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communism, even some anti-communists, pacifists, social demo- erats, and others, against the United States, The Soviets have succeeded in convincing their own péople, who are greatly concerned about the war in Vietnam, that the responsibility
of spreading the war falls upon the United States and that the United States is endangering the peace of the world.
Reaction of Soviet People to Vietnam War
The war “in Vietnam has aroused the Soviet people. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Govern- ment for the first time in many years were able to mobilize large masses of people to demonstrate. These demonstrations may be organized, but they are nonetheless genuine. The United States is really looked upon as the aggressor attacking a defenseless people. Soviet experience during World War II, the bombings they suffered, the scorched earth, etc., is the transferred image in Vietnam, The constant Soviet propaganda against the United States as "imperialist aggressors" keeps this feeling alive among the Soviet citizenry. But above ail, the Soviet people fear that the war will spread and lead to a nuclear catastrophe,
Yet, the Soviet people : aré still able to separate one. policy from another and retain their respect for the United States. This is also true among the intellectuals as weli as
, among the educators and industrial executives.
Pressure on Soviet Union Regarding Vietnam--From East Europe; From China
it is not easy for the Soviet Union to play a pacific role in connection with the war in Vietnam. Just as the United States raises the problem of living up to its "commitments; τ so do some of the allies of the Soviet Union raise the same question from their point of view, "Will the Soviet Union allow a socialist state to be bombed out of existence or be destroyed by another powerful capitalist state? If this is permitted, we may be next." There is. this kind of pressure on the USSR, This pressure was reflected in conversations with the leadership of Poland in late 1966. The Polish leadership would not even listen to. American communist suggestions’ that this war in Vietnam can be
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settled around a peace table. They would not even agree to a tactical gesture whereby Ho Chi Minh or any of the other North Vietnamese leadership might say, "All right, we are going to talk," albeit placing some conditions, but at least answer and Say that North Vietnam is interested in peace, The East German Party (the Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and Government | were of the same frame of mind although not as belligerent as the Poles, Then there are the Chinese constantly shouting
about Soviet "collusion" with the United States. This situation makes it tactically difficult for the Soviet Union to use initiative, to use pressure upon the Vietnamese, on the subject of peace in Vietnan, or even to maneuver. It is known that when members of the Communist Party, USA asked the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union leadership to relay to the leadership of North Vietnam the suggestion that they might for "tactical reasons" suggest to President Johnson that they would agree to talk peace, the Soviet leaders would not even undertake to deliver this message although they agreed with it. The Czech communist leadership agreed to convey this message of the Ameri- can communists, which of course was ignored by the Vietnamese. At the present time, the Soviet leadership uses Vietnam as the chief reason (but keep in mind the other major reason--West Germany) as the excuse for not being able to reach any worth- while agreements with the United States,
Possibility of Soviet-Chinese Agreement to Aid Vietham
Recent press dispatches indicate some agreement between the Soviet Union and China to expedite the movement of arms to Vietnam, There are also news items about new trade discussions. It is difficult to assess as yet whether these reports have substance or not. The Soviet press still continues to feature the struggle in China without reference to anything new. Only.
a few months ago the Soviet leaders complained that Soviet- Chinese trade is negligible, almost nil, although they signed new pacts months before (1966) which the Chinese merely ignored.
It is hard to say what the Chinese will finally do in the world communist movement regarding the war in Vietnam, Just as the Soviets are subject to pressure from their allies and communists in all countries about their insufficient involvement in the war in Vietnam, so the Chinese are subjected to pressure from the Soviet Union and from commuhists all over
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the world. This may compel the Chinese to make some bold
moves to give more aid to Vietnam or even to make some more belligerent gestures that could be interpreted as anti- imperialist and anti-American, thus aggravating the situation in Southeast Asia. It would not be surprising, however, if the Chinese and Russians reached some accommodation on Vietnam, The March, 1965, "consultative" conference in Moscow, though not an overwhe lming success, was nonetheless a victory for the Soviets in that: they lined up the world communist movement on this one issue--unity and aid to Vietnam,
Possibility of International Brigade. for Vietnam
There is still a big debate going on in world com- nunist ranks about sending volunteers to Vietnam, The Vietnamese
‘do not want a pure Chinese volunteer army in the ir. country. In
time such a volunteer army could mean occupation of Vietnam by China, There are historical reasons why the Vietnamese would
not want a pure Chinese volunteer army, even if ostensibly for -
the defense of their country. The Chinese have vetoed Soviet volunteers’ and other international volunteers. Soviet advisers
to Vietnam as of recent date are counted and allowed into Vietnam
in very limited numbers. There could be a situation, however,
when under the pressure of the war, the Vietnamese will request
some smaller socialist states such as Cuba or Tanzania, ete., to send volunteers. In that case it is possible that an international volunteer army made up of communists and their sympathizers (like the International Brigades in Spain) may be organized. But this, too, in the last analysis would depend upon the attitude of China. - A volunteer army “in numbers could not come into Vietnam by any ᾿ other route, except by land or air routes through China, unless
the Soviet.fleet is involved. Such a move by the Soviets is.
unlikely for they want to avoid a direct clash with the United
States, especially if the Chinese remain neutral or continue" close control of the land route.
Necessity of United States. Presence in Vietnam .
“At this stage it would be most advantageous for-the - - = United States, if at all possible, to prevent a Chinese involve- ment in Vietnam. If it is possible to solve some military problems in connection with the war in Vietnam without taking on the — Chinese, it would ‘help avoid throwing the Russians and Chinese together. . The United States cannot consider just pulling out of
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Vietnam, Pulling out of Vietnam, as experience in the contem~ porary world amply demonstrates, would leave most of Southeast Asia in the hands of a powerful China. But the United States cannot to its advantage at this time get involved in other so-called wars of liberation while it is fighting in Vietnam,
EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS
Nationalism Rampant
The phenomenom of nationalism (which theoretically seems to be alien to Marxism) has become an overriding factor even in the ranks of communism, It is not limited to the con-~ munist countries. There are nationalist eruptions on every continent, including North America, if we but. listen to the rumbles in Canada, Many of the struggles taking place in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, no matter what form they take, have some essence of nationalism. This is especially true in the countries that in the past had a colonial status. These countries are still attempting to assert. their nationhood and this problem is even more aggravated if there are some racial questions apparent,
Effects of Nationalism. on
United States Image ~~
There was a time in contemporary history when the United States was almost universally looked upon as an anti- colonial country. Whereas, almost every country in Africa, Asia, and Latin America could point to Great Britain, to France, at one time to Germany, Belgium, Holland, and others, and eall them imperialist colonial powers, they could never say this. about the United States. Even in old China the United States never claimed extraterritorial rights although every other big: power at some time did have such rights.
During the period of World War II the United States
was looked upon as a_liberator, The United States sent its
troops to free many of the occupied countries in “Asia, Africa, Europe, etc, For a time, most countries rightfully recognized that the United States fought for their freedom and helped them
to obtain the status of independence, The British may not have liked it, the French may have resented it, others may have wished that the United States took another position, but the fact remains that the United States had won for itself standing among these
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_ people that were emerging as independent nations. in recent
years, however, particularly in Asia and Latin America, the United States has been slandered with the canard of "neo- colonial power." In some of these underdeveloped countries
the United States has formed alliances with the aristocracy
and “oligarchs"; the communists call these "exploiting classes." This charge has hurt the United States image. Even though
these charges are totally false, the fact must be recognized ‘that the United States is seen as a different image among these people than Americans see themselves.
Soviet Efforts to Exploit Nationalism to Further Communism
The communists, to begin with the leadership of the. Soviet Union, - have had to take note of the development of nationalism in many parts of the world, They have decided that they can utilize this nationalism for their own ends. Theoreti- cally they make a distinction between what they term "bourgeois nationalism" ahd “progressive nationalism." In countries that have only. a small working class population, they assume that the middle classes and professionals will take control, not by them-. selves but with the aid of the middle or poorer strata of the peasantry and of course with an assist from the working class. The communists try to direct this national feeling and the desire for independence against “imperialism,” Even if a former mother country offers*aid, the communists interpret this as neo- colonialism, Communists pretend to offer aid "without strings attached" to retain their influence.’ But in every case they try
to utilize nationalism to further the aims of communism,
When a big country such as the Soviet Union is involved in an aid program, they protect their national image first οὗ all. The first lesson of this kind was driven home at the time of the negotiations with Egypt on the Aswan Dam. The. Soviet Union utilized that situation td drive a wedge into the Arab world and this resulted in encouraging other revolutions, most of them aimed ‘against the West. The Soviets did not get any apparent ideological concessions, but they did get the foot of communism, Soviet communism, in. the-door to the Arab world and the Middle East.
As stated before, in most of these countries, the com- munist parties have been Suppressed, but they nevertheless spread their influence among certain sections of the population, ‘The ‘Soviet Union ‘encourages industrial construction, giving aid that at least in the future may make it possible for some of the mili- tant leaders, such as Nasser to make concessions to the people,
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and thus strengthen their nationalist consciousness and anti- Western tendencies, subsequently developing into militant | anti-imperialism., The Soviet Union is also able to control
the communists of these countries and make them follow a tactic in keeping with the policies of their own particular govern- ment (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) so that they do not “rock the boat." Here, again, the Soviets are thinking of their own interests and how this given situation will strengthen them. They are not interested -in merely strengthening a local group or faction of comnunists.
Soviet Reverses Due to Nationalism
But all has not been clear sailing for the Soviet Union on the turbulent sea of emerging nationalism, Just as the United States has had to contend with certain rebuffs and misunderstandings of its motives on occasion, and a lessening of its influence in some parts of the world, so too communists are worried about the same problem. This emerging spirit of nationalism has corroded their influence. In some instances they. had to suffer humiliation. There is nothing much they can do about this. This was the case in Guinea, in Tanganyika, and later in Ghana, where Soviet and other communist advisers were told to stop meddling. and get out. The Soviets made con- cessions and remained, at least Still retaining a diplomatic relationship, waiting: for future ‘opportunities. But this nationalist spirit has hurt the "socialist camp."
Breakup of East European Communist Monolith
If a few years ago it was correct, especially at the time of Stalin's rule,to call some of the countries of Eastern Europe "satellites," it would be incorrect to give this flat designation to most of these ‘countries now. Nearly twenty | .years ago, Yugosiavia broke the iron bonds of Soviet rule and fought bloody battles to retain its independence, This was something new in the communist movement. It had never happened before. Communists who believed the dogmas of Marx and Lenin could never have dreamed that such a thing would happen. -But - not only did Tite's Yugoslavia strike the first blow against the monolithic rule of Moscow, it also. set an example that shook the communist world at that time to its very foundation, It was
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a blow from which Moscow has never recovered even to this day. some time elapsed before other countries tried to do the same. This is the meaning of the rebellions of the fifties in Poland, Kast Germany, and Hungary, although the communists retained control. But Moscew lost and dare not clain that it rules or even leads the socialist camp.
When the polemics between the Soviet communists and the Chinese began, the Soviets charged that the Chinese encouraged the Poles and Hungarians to take advantage of the situation by demanding more independence from the USSR, Although China is not a small power in the political sense and must be put into the category of a big power, the Chinese severence of "class ties" to the Soviet Union has the same roots as the other nationalist explosions in various parts of the world including those in Eastern Europe. The relationships between each socialist country are supposed to be different but they are not. . These countries have no open bdérders though they call themselves "socialist! and “internationalist." It is more difficult to travel from one socialist country to another than from a capitalist country to. any one of these countries, Their visa, passport, and currency restrictions in no way reflect "internationalism," Even com- munists visiting these countries. are looked upon as "enemy aliens" unless they are of the same nationality or part of an official communist delegation,
There are sharp and constant rivalries between each of these states. In private discussions party leaders of one or another socialist country will talk contemptuously about another--Czech versus East German, East German versus Romanian, Hungarian versus-Romanian, and on some occasions one or all give vent to anti-Soviet feelings purely from a national point of view. Romania's relations with the Soviet Union and the other East European socialist states is one of the clearest of recent -nationalis feuds. Its relationship with China, despite the attitude of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, is an example of independence and its economic advantages for Romania. Despite the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, nationalist feeling and rivalry persist. The Romanian and
Soviet Recognition of Effects of Nationalism
At the XXIII Congress: of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev spoke about the "world socialist system" and its inf luence on world events. He talked about it as a great
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achievement of the working class and declared that the world socialist system has not only grown substantially stronger
but has developed a good "fraternal relationship." He em- phasized that this relationship is generally based upon Marxism-Leninism, mutual support for each other, the prin- ciples of "equality , " non-interference and mutual respect
for each other. But he underlined that the Soviet Government and Party's relations with the other communist and workers parties of the-socialist community, as he called it, have become better, closer, and more cordial. Brezhnev went on
to explain that the USSR has friendship and mutual assistance pacts with each of these socialist states. When talking about the theories of building of socialism,Brezhnev pointed out that there are "basic laws" of socialist construction that
are "common" to all countries and that these laws are well known and have been tested in practice. (Here parenthetically it must be noted that when the first split between the Chinese and the rest of the socialist camp took place, the Chinese
at the eighty-one party meeting vehemently denied that there are such "basic laws" of "socialist construction," But if Brezhnev or the Soviet communists were to deny the so-called basic law of socialist construction, they would also have to deny the theories of Marxism-Leninisn. )
But the Soviet commiinists have. learned some thing about this real world where the nationalist feeling is growing. Despite his assertion of the growth of "internationalism," Brezhnev pointed to the following important fact: "Nevertheless, as the socialist countries develop, they are constantly coming up against new problems engendered by the realities of life in all its complexity and variety. It stands to reason that there are no ready-made solutions to these problems, nor can there be any. The development of the world socialist system, therefore, requires a constant creative approach, on the tried and tested basis of Marxism-Leninism, to the problems that arise, it requires the pooling of experience and opinions.” Then Brezhnev amplifies that the leaders of socialist states have businesslike contacts, political consultations, they negotiate, they have friendly meetings, Sincere talks, they pool experiences and opinions, and in this way in good time they are able to..profit from each other's practical experiences and activities and this is “of heip to the entire socialist system. Brezhnev emphasizes the "variety" of experiences and the need for cooperation to serve each other's hational interests. But the thing that stands out in.this relationship is that the national interests of this or that . given country is paramount. ΄
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It is true that in summarizing this problem Brezhnev puts some stress on "international solidarity” and the community of interests of all these parties and states, and he talks about the need for strengthening the cohesion of the "Socialist com- munity." But it should be emphasized that the Soviets have not lost sight of the conflicting national interests. In order to continue their hold and their present relationships with these countries they give concessions to the "variety of problems" and "different roads" to solutions of problems in the different countries. In fact, this is recognition that there is a split in the ranks of communism, It is true that some countries like the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, or Poland do not always agree with some aspects of Soviet policy, yet they do not always turn each one of these problems into a big issue because there is that paramount question of security against the arising nationalism of West Germany and the fear of a war of revenge, And it is this seeking of security "against the common
enemy" that sometimes serves to minimize the differences that
exist between each one of these countries and all of them in relation to that big power, the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe Asserting independence from Soviet Union
it would be wrong to imply that this community of Socialist states is breaking up, but it is a fact that each country is now acting with some initiative and doing more things, more independently, than they did a few years ago. They no longer bow to the commands of the Soviet Union as they used to. On the contrary, very often they stand up and speak about their differences quite openly. Not only Romania and Yugoslavia, but others such as ‘Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, at one time or another, have discussed with others. their economic differences with the Soviet Union, their political differences, and differences about culture and art. Some émphasize differences in traditional attitudes toward democracy, forms of government, even different attitudes toward the church. Sometimes they even discuss different attitudes toward countries ‘such as the United States, Great Britain, or any other Western country. Many, and varied examples can be cited to show how this growing independence is asserting itself.
ISSUES AND METHODS FOR EXPLOITATION OF EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALISM
Not Open Anti-Soviet Campaign
What needs to be emphasized is how to utilize this
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effort of the present United States Administration to build "bridges" can best be advanced if it is not started as an open “anti-Soviet” project. These East European countries | Will not even step on to these bridges because of their military, economic, and other relationships with the Soviet ‘Union if they think the United States approach is based chiefly on this premise. The objective has to be to win these countries and people to the side of the United States or to weaken the hold that the Soviet Union has upon them, But fundamentally this policy cannot be framed in an Vanti- Soviet" context, —
e A Closed Society Opens Slowly
In some of these countries American art, theater, ‘and movies are very popular and are shown freely. Sometimes
a gesture on the part of some commercial body or social organization in the. United States has more effect than months of general propaganda on the air waves, ᾿
It is important to keep in mind that the communists not only govern a closed society, but that their party organi- “ation is actually the most secret of organizations. This. neans. that most of the decisions of their leadership except those shown in meager form never come out in the open. Their debates are rarely published openly unless in a polemic against a person or policy. Such guarded security is not pried open overnight. It is not realistic to expect that some of these organizations such as communist parties that run governments Will make concessions overnight. (There are other parties in some of these ruling coalitions such δ the Social Democrats . and the Christian Democrats, but the .fact remains that it is: the communists that control the government and are the ruling exist)” even though in some countries some other parties do exist
For example, a children's hospital was built in Krakow, Poland, with United States counterpart funds. When it was dedi-
_ cated, in spite of the fact that United States funds. built it,
some of the United States representatives to the dedication were - refused visas by the Polish Government and comparatively little publicity or credit was given to the United States among the , masses of Polish people. How could United States influence be expressed since they keep such things from the public? Yet Something of great use to the Polish people was done and they
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cE undoubtedly appreciate this. One must be tactful, modest, and patient. Young United States diplomats must learn from the other side--they must eschew arrogance because they repre- Sent a big power. Ways can be found to let the Polish people know that the American people made such a contribution as in ‘this case cited. ‘The Russians built projects in Cambodia and Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and other countries; somehow or other they were invited to the dedications of these projects and the people of these countries know that the Russians built these projects. Their techniques must be studied in order to train people who stick to principles yet at the same time are-flexible. The United States can get "credit" even when the communist party tries to Shut them out. The communist states are still governed as a closed society, even though the democratic expressions of the people and the opportunities for democratic expression are growing and the people are ‘be- ginning. to talk back--and they GO. The authorities cannot do any thing about this.
Approach--Impression of Honoring Independence
In approaching each country, the United States must think of them, or at least convey to, them the idea that the United States thinks of them, as "independent," and that it wants to deal with them as that particular country. No other government but the United States Government and theirs is involved, Czechoslovakia should not be looked upon in the same way aS Hungary. Once these governments get the feeling that they are being dealt with as equals, then there- can be raised other problems related to other countries, even the USSR. These countries do not want to be considered satellites," yet at the Same time they do not want the Soviet Union to look on them with hostility, as moving away to join another camp. Therefore, the question of independence as a separate state, even if within the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic . “Assistance, is very important, ‘This is no small matter,
Examples~-Hungarian and . Czech Attitudes ΄
This jealousness of the air of national sovereignty can be detected in the following cases. When the. Hungarians settled a few problems with the United States, they boasted about it. The Russians did not like this but it gave the Hun- garians a feeling that they "solved" some problems..on their own.
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‘The last complaint of the Czechs was that they have no written
agreements on trade with the United States at all, And when some agreements were worked out last summer, the United States Government negotiators said they were all ready to sign in a day or two, but the United States representatives never initialed these documents, and the negotiators never came back. The Czech Government wondered whether the United States was serious or wanted concessions to make the Czechs look bad in the eyes of the Russians. The Czechs talked the same way about the reciprocal air travel agreement. They said that they have reservations and were, therefore, initialling the agreement
on a month-to-month basis, The United States never explained these problems and the Czechs held back because of suspicion and "fear" of the Soviets. The Czechs state that they are not being treated as equals by the United States and therefore will
not rush to sign binding agreements. ER Bing Se reements
‘Gradual Relaxation of Restraints in Eastern Europe . "
In Poland the government has been trying for years to curb: the church, the only non-communist organized. body and opposition to the communists. Yet, the church goes on and even carries through demonstrations that have an anti-government meaning, The only time the communists succeed in winning the people to their side is when the church touches an issue (Germany) that the people particularly resent as being anti-national, Furthermore, the intellectual community in Poland has really hever surrendered to the communist party (the Polish United Workers Party). . The youth in the universities have not been bridied and the peasantry in the main holds to its private land and the coliectivization process has bogged down, Why mention these problems? ‘ Because these prove that Polish Society is not monolithic and can be reached--provided the average Polish citizen isnot expected to cheer for the United States against what they consider to be their national interests. This means keen analyses and a lot of tact to advance the interests of the United States,
There are similar situations in Czechoslovakia and
in Hungary. The communist regime in these countries too had to bend and allow the people to express themselves. It is no
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CONSSRENTIAL small thing for the Czechs to allow Austrian (non-communist) newspapers into the country.. The mass tours to border coun- tries by Hungary and the reverse flow of tourists is not only because of the need for foreign exchange although that is
important. But more important is the fact that they cannot keep their Society locked in, There are possibilities to
advance United States interests in these new situations,
The reorganization of industry on the profit and incentive basis makes it more possible for the people to. ex- press themselves. This is true in most of these countries, including the USSR. The party can no longer dictate as it once could. To meet the needs of modern industry the com- munists have to use more or less democratic forms of persuasion-- they have to work according to laws and rules. In the: past the communist party would dictate to-a bank, a factory, or any social or cultural organization, but they cannot do these things any more, Unless the communists are tactful, they meet resistance and sometimes are met with complete passive boycott or a "silent" revolt. The communists may,close a magazine or fire an editor but they must keep in mind the result of this action on the people. Sometimes the action has the opposite effect from what the party leadership desired. They are-using dictatorial methods less and 1655, '
Even in the Soviet Union they are faced with the problem of activating the governing organization form known as the-"Soviets." These*Soviets are organized on a local, regional, city, and national basis. The Soviets do meet but up to now all they do is vote for motions, but there is rarely discussion, debate, or the use of any initiative in these bodies. At the XXIII Congress there was a big discussion on this subject. President Nikolai Podgorny and others of the Soviet leadership made reports on how’ to give life to these Soviets, how the Soviets can begin to function: as parliamentary institutions, that would initiate proposals, carry on debates and reject proposals when they are not good, Since the XXIII Congress, many articles have appeared in the Soviet press on how to “democratize" these bodies. This change is true not only in
the Soviet Union but more so in other countries such 4s Poland,
Czechoslovakia, even in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Romania, etc. This "evolution" is something to think about and analyze.
Exploiting the Opening
Door. to the West
How can the United States put forward ideas that’ can
find reflection in this or that country's society? it can be
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said that the door has been pried open a little-~let the United States continue to criticize and at the same time recognize the new. These are not simple things for govern- ments to do. As a result of the disclosure about the
Central Intelligence Agency, there may be some temporary ‘setbacks. It may.make things difficult for everybody involved in diplomacy and propaganda. The communists may become more εἶ Suspicious of Americans coming to their countries for any reason.. This is not in reference to tourists, but to exchange students, professors, lecturers and industrialists. There are
some opinions that we should liberalize our exchange progran,
for we have more to gain and the communists have more to lose
if the program is enlarged. ‘The people they will send to the
United States are students or professors and some undoubtedly
are convinced communists. But they will bring back from the
United States something about the American way of life that
cannot be conveyed to them in any other way than by letting
them see things with their own eyes. This is not to advocate
that the United States let its guard down and let them all in-~-
the United States must continué to be careful and vigilant.
- The trade union delegations, most of whom are un- doubtedly picked party members, do not always express their “jnner thoughts" in their own soéieties. When these trade unionists come here they will be talked to by other trade unionists. They will be asked questions such as "What kind of trade unions do you have in Russia?", "Here is my paycheck, see what I earn, ete.", "These are our social benefits, ete.", "What protection do you have if something happens to you on the job?" How does their system really compare to that of the United States? Perhaps there are. some published studies about wage standards, productivity, labor protection laws, etc., written by an authority on such matters. This author, if he is not known to be anti-Soviet, can really make an impression upon visitors from the Hastern European countries including
the USSR,
Those who know life in these countries are ‘convinced that the United States system would come out on top in such a comparison. There are numerous possibilities to take advantage of the loosening ties in the communist world and their movement, Labor conditions is only one avenue of approach,
There used to be talk of the Soviet empire. It is not a ‘Soviet empire any more as it was under Stalin. But even if these countries are still tied to Moscow, the ties have become quite loose compared to 1946. But they have not yet opened up théir society. When ἃ foreigner has to fight for a newspaper as most do when they visit there, or tune in to BBC
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or the Voice of America ‘in order to get the news, one can't call these communist countries open societies. But there are more and more opportunities, especially among the new generation, who have no ax to grind that is in'’the past,
or any quarrels with the United States that touch upon their Gaily life,
NATIONALISM ‘IN LATIN AMERICA
There is a growing nationalism in Latin America, It would be foolish to deny this. This growing nationalism comes not from the big land owners or the wealthy of these countries, nor from the generals or colonels either, ‘but arises chiefly from the middle classes and intellectuals who are looking for identity as a "class" representing all their people, Some of these elements, including the political leaders as well as tradesmen, will try to play off Soviet oifers against the United States, “utilizing” both sides just as some countries in Europe and the Middle East utilized the “danger of communism" to wring concessions from the United States, The military dictatorShips will want to add to their armaments also by utilizing the bogey of communism even if they have to exaggerate this danger. In this way also, honest nationalists may try to gain by setting the Soviet Union against the United States, But the United States should pay attention to someof these politicians or spokesmen of these middle classes. If the United States does not understand this problem of class relations and shifts in Latin America and set a realistic goal to protect United States national interests in alliance with the majority, it may just walk into a quagmire ,whose ‘depth may not be fathomable,.
Experience has shown that ‘the gap between the rich and the poor in Latin America is very great, and that the people look upon the rich as selfish traitors who will not defend the interests of their country, neither from communism nor from foreign involvement (and this means the United States). There are sections of the population who are not taken in by the communists; these are not communist-minded, they have no special class interest, they do not have dealings with the communists, but are developing a new nationalism with pride in their country ~-they want to develop their own country. _ These groups will utilize the new "relation of forces" in the world to set one country against another or to wring concessions from the United States. These things have to be viewed very realis- tically and not from the narrow viewpoint of a military solution
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only. The danger lies in momentary solutions without the backing of the people. Such solutions only postpone things while the revolutions take root and the antagonistic feelings toward the United States grow. A realistic approach that can stop communism and cement relations between these ‘countries and the United States is dependent on the involvement of the people in their own problems.
=
SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT f
Entire World Communist Movement Weakened
The split in the world communist movement is real and deep. This. split began with the breakaway of the Yugoslav League
κῸΟΣ Communists and Yugoslavia from the communist camp in the late
1940's. The split was further deepened when the excesses of | the Stalin terror were disclosed. Students of international communism cannot dismiss these prior events, The communist movement in almost every country began to decline at that time, and lost more influence after the XX Congress disclosures, and lost even more influence during and after the events in Hungary when the revolt of the people Was put down by force with Soviet intervention,
Despite the number of organized communist parties in existence today in nearly one hundred countries, the communist movement was never so divided. Though here and there a communist party may Show some strength and influence, ‘as in the recent -French elections, on the whole most of the communist parties have ‘been weakened by this worldwide split. It can be said that the entire international communist movement, which includes the countries. governed by communist parties, has been weakened as a result of the collision between the soviet Union and China. However, these splits’ were’ minor compared to the split of the Chinese Party from the world communist movement which really began in 1958,
Sino-Soviet Differences: __._ _ Charges and Countercharges
There is hardly any need to explain how the Sino-Soviet dispute has affected Soviet foreign policy. The struggle between China and the Soviet Union is fot going to be solved in the very . near future, if it is ever solved. They may reach temporary small
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agreements on this or that question, but it is doubtful that any international meeting of communist parties or socialist states can resolve the clashing interests between. China and the Soviet Union, Of course, it is difficult at this stage
to interpret the meaning of Mao's words "A war may throw us together again." This he raised in discussion with KoSygin and Shelepin in Peking in 1965. The Chinese differences
with the Soviet Union relate not only to state problems but also to problems concerning the communist parties. We. do
know that Mao aimed his chief blow in the "proletarian cul- . tural revolution" against the cadre of the Communist Party of China because they’ did not follow him, If the Chinese pursue Mao's present tactic of splitting every party, turning this
or that faction into a pro-Peking grouping or party, an inter- hational meeting of communist parties would not embrace China
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nor those parties and groups that follow the Chinese line, This continued split is bound to aggravate relations between the two important, parties-~the Soviet and Chinese, Not only that, it will aggravate the situation with the allies ° of the Soviet Union, not only in Eastern Europe but aiso in Asia, The Chinese are determined to take over Mongolia either in the form of an alliance or through an aggressive invasion and occupation, The Mongolians, of course, are resisting this pressure from China and the Soviet Union is unreservedly committed to the defense of Mongolia. ‘Thousands of Soviet — military advisers and-troops are in the Mongolian People's Republic. There are some other countries in Asia who though they may not completely be in the Soviet camp, nevertheless, are sympathetic to the USSR because they fear China and look to the Soviet Union for aid and protection. (North Korea and to
a lesser degree North Vietnam).
_ Just as the Chinese cast doubt on the Soviet attitude toward the United States and charge the Soviet Union with "betrayal" of the cause of anti-imperialism, so in turn thé Soviet Union casts doubt upon China and its attitude toward ‘the United States. The Soviets charge the Chinese with "talking" ‘a great deal about fighting imperialism but actually doing nothing to fight it. They point to the Chinese tolerance of the British © and -the Portuguese in Hong Kong and Macao. They accuse the Chinese of hindering and sabotaging aid to Vietnam. They say that China opened the gates for United States troops to invade and bomb Vietnam. They go back to the statements that Mao and Chen Yi made to Edgar Snow and to the foreign press in 1965 and 1966 that
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China would interyene only if China was invaded or Chinese sovereignty threatened. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union also uses the fact that China hag up until now not permitted the establishment of Soviet air bases and depots for arns and fuel storage on Chinese soil near the North Vietnam border as further "proof" that the Chinese are not- "sincerely" interested in the fate of Vietnam.
But more than that, the Soviets see dire "plots" being hatched, aimed at the Soviet Union by the United States and the present leadership of China. They refer to the hundreds of sessions that have been held between the Chinese -and American representatives in Warsaw, and remark that not once did they issue an official communique. "Never do they say what they talk about," challenge the Russians. The Soviet Union also charges that a certain section of American capital is already examining -the possibilities of the Chinese market and trying to determine a "price" that China would accept to reach some accommodation With United States at the expense of the Soviet Union, General discussions about China in American forums, conferences, maga- Zines, or congressional committees are referred to by the Soviet press and its leadership as "United States plots" aimed at the USSR, - :
- The Soviet leadership also says that the Chinese are in close cooperation with the Bonn Government against the USSR. They even charge that the intelligence agencies of China and West. Germany work together to expose communists in other coun- tries of Europe. And, finally, the Soviet Party points to the Mao Tse Tung leadership and charges them with abandoning the theories of Marxism-Leninism and substituting "Maoism"™ in its place, These charges are capped with the charge that China is splitting the socialist camp. ͵ ᾿
Advantages to United States From Split '
᾿ Since the antagonisms between China and the’ Soviet Union aré quite aggravated and will remain so for a long time, it would be best if this struggle between these two powers continues. Any tactic of discord to keep them preoccupied with their own problems and struggles would weaken both the USSR and China while the United States harbors its strength. The United States would then be in a better position if history and the situation require that it take a stand. There is no reason why the United States cannot "deal" with both of these powers if such advances United States national interests. This
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position of the United States is not based upon favoring or fighting this or that ideology. Certainly the United States does not favor the Marxism-Leninism of the Moscow variety
or the Sinofied Marxism of Mao. Both of these ideologies are antagonistic to the United States and to the democratic world. But a stand can be taken on questions that strengthen or weaken United States national interests. As ‘these national interests are strengthened or weakened, the United States affects and ‘influences the entire world. Safeguarding national interests | is not in contradiction to the role the United States has to play on a global scale. Just as the communists do not admit peaceful coexistetice of ideology, the United States does not compromise its ideology while guarding its national interests.
Can it be said then that the international conspiracy is therefore no longer a threat? It is wrong to draw such a conclusion, While the lack of an “International” and the con- tinued split has weakened this conspiracy, grave portent lies in the existence of a number of "centers" that would like to lead this worldwide conspiracy or to lead it on a "continental" or "regional" basis,
Chinese Splitting Activities
The Chinese leadership is building a world center. The Chinese have created a split in every communist party, In some parties they may only have a small group or a faction, but no matter, the small group or faction gravitates around — China and is supported by China ideologically and materially. These groups carry on their work against a particular govern- ment or institution in keeping with the demands and slogans of China. In some parties the pro-Chinese faction or group is - very powerful: This is true not only in some of the Asian socialist countries, in Korea and Vietnam, but it is also true outside the socialist orbit. For example, the pro-Peking faction in India is said to be stronger and in the last elections came. out even ahead of the official pro-Moscow Communist ‘Party of India.
The Chinese use exactly the same methods as the Soviets in- trying to influence or retain a-hold on the communist parties all over the world. Even in the United States this is known to be a fact, for the Chinese influence not only ‘the Progressive Labor Party which calls itself communist and does not hide its affiliation with Peking, but also some so-called “non~communist" organizations or associations. Such publications
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as the National Guardian, the Monthly Review, Minority of One, the Far East Reporter, Spartacist, Hammer and Steel, etc., are under the influence and in the grip and pay of Peking. ‘Some of the guerrilla bands that operate in a number of countries in Latin America received their first training in China and were sent back in a conspiratorial manner to split the various parties and to impose upon them a policy of armed struggle.
Cuban Splitting Activities
In the Americas, Castro is now playing the same role as the Chinese. played in the early 1960's. Castro has openly stated that he wants hegemony over all the parties in Latin America and that they must submit to the will and demands of Cuba. Since he did not have his way, he organized factions _ and groupings in a number of Latin American parties. Even the big parties in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Guatemala) are no longer united. When "Che" Guevarra left Cuba it was said that his mission was to organize these factions in guerrilla units and carry out the slogan of turning the Andes into the Sierra Maestras of the Americas. We know that Castro in a dictatorial manner has virtually liquidated the old Communist Party of Cuba, that some of the most powerful leaders of the old Communist Party in Cuba have been exiled,. jailed, or demoted, The few that remain occupy posts that are of little significance in the governing of Cuba, Fidel Castro,since he has takeh over that party, has placed his young followers into every position of importance. . Castro has challenged not only the communist parties of Latin America’ but also the international communist movement including the Soviet Party. He is using the same phraseology as the Maoists in China use, that is, that most communist parties are not revolutionary, He has recently served notice that he _ will work with and unite with every group, whether it is communist or not, that wants to "make revolution," He coined the phrase - that "it is the business of revolutionaries to make revolutions." The majority of parties in Latin America have suffered splits but in the main, especially the bigger parties, they have not submitted to Castro's dictates. The conference of Latin Américan parties that is scheduled to be held in July, 1967, it is rumored, - Will not be held since most of these parties, as Pablo Neruda indicated during his last visit to the United States, want neither to endorse Castro at this time nor openly condemn the Cuban revo- lution, the first of its kind in the Western Hemisphere.
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.
Resistance of Communist Parties, to Any New "International" ᾿ ΄
‘The split in the world communist movement is going to continue for a long time. There are some communist parties, like those in Scandinavia, for example, who have become . totally "neutral" and unaffiliated, The Italian Communist Party has up to now resisted the formation of an international organization of. communists. The Italian conmunists and some other communist parties of Europe do not even fayor an inter- national meeting of communists at this time. If it were not for the war in Vietnan, it would be almost impossible at this time to call together an international meeting of communist parties, The fight to support Vietnam against the United States and the fight for peace does to some degree bring these communist parties together and may at some time in the future, if not this year perhaps next year, lead to an international meeting. But the split in the world communist movement is real and will continue. ᾿
Most communist parties. will now admit that it is no longer possible to bring the Chinese back and obtain unanimity in the world movement and that there are other reasons for con- tinuing to operate without an international authority or center, _The Soviet Party is even ready to admit that an international ‘center cannot be organized and-perhaps a world center like the old Communist International or the Cominform is not needed. But periodic international meetings that draw up resolutions and adopt a common line would be useful and necessary. ‘The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has already taken steps to organize
‘its own international "center." It has organized the "Institute for World Labor: Relations" employing a’ staff of three hundred fifty people, This Institute (the name of which has also: been variously translated by Novosti Press Agency as "Institute of International Workers Movement" and "Institute of International Working Class Movement) has already held its first conference on April 12, 1967, which was attended by many important leaders
“ἢ of communist parties and at which papers were read from leading
communists from- throughout the world, including one by Gus Hall,
* General Secretary, Communist Party, USA. This Institute is now
-making contacts and dispensing-funds to build its-authority inter- nationally. Should a world united center come into being, this Institute can always be of use or an appendage.
Why is it that most parties resist the formation of another international or even an ihternational meeting? A
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number of communist parties: in capitalist countries, while giving allegiance to the idea of international solidarity
and the need for a common front to fight for peace and against imperialism, do not want to submit to the hegemony or influence of a foreign power, The communists in the western world have ‘been branded as foreign agents. In many cases they: are called Soviet agents or Chinese agents, etc. Some of the bigger parties like the Italian or French, as well as some of the Scandinavian parties, feel that the reason for their inability to increase their influence and to gain the support of the masses is due to the feeling among the people that the communists are Stooges of a foreign power, and in many cases closely Linked
with espionage activity or activities not in their own national interests. Some of the parties having been affiliated with the
old International from its very beginning, feel that this is the opportunity to shake loose the chains of foreign control. These parties, although pledging loyalty to Marxism-Leninism in general, - begin with a program that they believe advances their national interests. They hope in one way or another to win a bigger following and eventually even obtain power or participate in the government with other socialist groups. This is why some of the same parties do not want the orgahization of an International.
National Interests Produce "Many Roads to Communism’
'The communist parties from the Western countries have for tactical reasons abandoned the old: dogma of armed insurrection, Even the revised -communist doctrine about the two ways to power, the peaceful and non-peaceful, is outmoded. The Western traditions dictate that they piace the emphasis on the peaceful and parliamentary way to communism. Marxism-Leninism does not allow the complete exclusion of the armed or non-peaceful road. But practical politics dictate differently. Most parties want to formulate their own doctrine. It is now fashionable. to speak of the "British road ‘to socialism” or the. "Italian road to: socialism," etc, Many communist parties have given this name to their programs, For this reason, a number of parties do not want an International, Some of these parties also want to close’ the gap between themselves and the social democrats in order to realize their ambition of participation in government. They know that if somehow or other the label of. foreign agent sticks, they cannot hope to participate in government even in unity with the social democrats,
This situation in the world communist movement is of importance to the United States. When communists speak of a |
struggle against "imperialism" they mean firstwof all she United | “= 46 - . CONF TAL
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‘States. In the last international statement issued by the eighty-one party meeting of communist parties held in Moscow in December, 1959, the only power that they named was the United States and they branded the United States as the "gendarme of the world." it is evident that a disunited communist conspiracy is better for the United States and
the entire world, .
Methods of Exploiting Split for United States Advantage
The United States should learn to take advantage of this situation. First of all, the United States should help to deepen the ideological split and find forms to parti- cipate in communist debates in order to-defend democracy. It should be shown that there cannot be a variety of roads to socialism and that a belief in the "theory" or dogma based ‘on the so-called "scientific laws," which say that despite variations the general laws apply to all countries, means that ‘one must follow others and go against one's.own ‘national interests--the interests of the people.
Next, there should be utilized broad propaganda appeals to the party membership of the various parties showing why they are rejected by the masses of people; that whether they were conscious of it or not they were pawns of the Soviets or the Chinese or some other foreign power all under the guise of a "noble aim," that is, the achievement of socialism. The technique of comrarison can be utilized to good advantage for this purpose, When talking to European countries, this propa- ganda should show the inadequacies of the Soviet type of socialism or: the Polish brand, or the Czech brand by. compari- sons to the standard of living of nearby countries. in Europe.
The comparison should be to the standard of living in Japan,
if talking about the people in Asia, or comparison to the more advanced countries in Latin America if talking to the Cubans
or other Latin American countries whose workers or peasants look to Cuba as an example. in some instances articles or stories should be very skillfully planted that praise this or that leader of a communist party; for example, the leader of the
- Swedish Communist Party_is now. the most ostracized and condemned person in the Soviet Union. But the Swedish communist leader- ship has succeeded in influencing the Norwegians and’*to a large extent the Danes have gone through a split in the communist party.
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The split-off group in Denmark is more powerful than the official group that retained the title communist party. Exposure of foreign communist conspiracies should be inten- sified, even if they cannot now be called totally a Moscow conspiracy. The splinter groups (leftist) tend to become more hostile to free society and more pliant tools in, the hands of the Chinese or-the Cubans.
Three "Centers": Moscow, Peking, Havana
The world is now confronted with at least three communist centers. The Soviet Union still is the most power- ful and influential of these centers and still retains the allegiance of more parties and people than the others. Never- theless, it is necessary to point out that those who listen to or work in keeping with the lines of Peking or Havana or Moscow are working against their own countries, against the best interests of their people, and they can no more be a "free agent" working with Peking than they can be working with Moscow. Many communists of different countries will pay heed to such appeals, If these things are done directly in the name of the United States at this particular juncture in history, they are handicapped to start with,minly because of the war in Vietnam and the successful propaganda of the communist powers, as well] as the communist parties and their followers and pacifists all over the world, But this course must be pursued with persistence because the situation is bound to change and most ordinary people who belong to a communist party almost instinctively do not want to act against the best interests of their own country. if there is a split in the peace movement in the United States, it will be because of this.
Meeting the. Cuban Threat in Venezuela
In meeting the Cuban threat, perhaps as it affects
the struggles in Venezuela, a review might be given in coopera- tion with someone who knows the communist party of what happéned to the Communist Party in Venezuela, of what happened after .the dictatorship was overthrown, and how the communist party had optained its legality and dia utilize the democratic processes that were available to them. ‘When they used it briefly, they were able to influence the working class and other sections of
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‘the population. But when they embarked upon an adventurous
road, influenced by a foreign power that supplied the weapons and ammunition which killed Venezueclans and harmed their country, the communist party lost its influence among the people and hurt the struggle of’ those who are fighting against dictatorships and for democracy in other countries of Latin
'- America,
This may seem like an "appeal" to the communists, but it is well to remember that the Communist Party of Vene- zuela is split into two factions, that both groups are trying to win the allegiance of the youth, and that Fidel Castro is personally responsible for the split and the attacks against an imprisoned and "martyred" leadership. Many Venezuelan communists therefore resent Castro's and Cuba's "interference,"
‘ Why not utilize this "resentment" to hit at Cuban communism?
The Communist Party of Venezuela has dissipated Lis influence; the working peovle did not follow it or join in the campaign of terror. The resistance of the government and the people broke the back of the armed struggle, The Communist Party of Venezuela wants to change tactics but Fidel Castro wants them to serve Cuban interests instead, He tries to take over their organizations through, his own agents (Douglas Bravo). The university has been closed down as a terrorist
‘headquarters--the youth is disillusioned and’ the majority of
the Communist Party of Venezuela feels the sting of defeat. The Communist Party of Venezuela leadership is conducting a worldwide campaign ‘against Fidel Castro's methods and is receiving support from most of the communist parties in Latin America,
Since the Cuban threat in Latin America is important to the United States, it would serve United States interests to encourage those who are fighting Castro and his terrorist bands. Many Venezuelan communists and sympathizers will listen.
- The Communist Party of the ‘Soviet Union supports the official
Communist Party of Venezuela and will not directly give arms to the Castro wing. The deepening of the split is to the. advantage of the United States even if communists have to he
-utilized to disarm the. fanatical Castroites in Venezuela. In
the appeal to the Venezuelans, there is the theme of the - worsening conditions in Cuba which can be emphasized--the con- tinued terror under virtual slavery with no benefits coming to the working man or peasant. The standard of living in
‘Venezuela, though not high, can be compared to the poorer con-
ditions in Cuba since Fidel. The question is how to take advan- tage of the split in the ranks. of communism.
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SOVIET-CUBAN SPLIT IN LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISM
Castro Fans the Flames of Revolt .
The biggest problem next to the war in Vietnam is that in Latin America. In a number of countries in Central and South America there are symptoms of revolt and the beginnings of guerrilla warfare. The roots of this discan- tent are well known to the United States. For this reason the United States is trying hard economically, politically, and socially to get at the root cause of poverty and oppres- Sion in Latin America. Castro is working just as hard to fan the flames of discontent and revolt-—-to organize the poor against the United States, to inflame the youth and the middle classes against "Yankee imperialism," But while Castro has the economic support and still receives arms from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, there is a growing split . between these countries and Cuban communism, The Soviet Union and other countries will not permit themselves to become instru- ments in Castro's hands, The USSR will ‘continue to trade and establish relations with as ‘many countries of Latin America as they can. Castro's shrill cries of condemnation will not. stop the USSR from pursuing its own national interests. The Soviet press may demand the freedom from prison of Gilberto Vieira, the Colombian leader of the communist party, but at the same time they will sign agreements with the Colombian Government. They will not repudiate Cuban communism but the socialist, bloc will not be led into armed adventures in Latin America.
Utilizing the Split for United States Advantage
For the United States this split between Castroism
and the Soviets is most important and should be utilized in a way which lessens the danger of guerrilla wars in Latin America, and which at the same time holds the Soviet and Chinese communists back or reduces their influence. Because of the growing and widening split between the-other Latin American _ parties and Castro, and the cooling off of the fraternal "partnerships" between the communist bloc and Cuba, the. United States is in a position to expose the. Castro failures. The — United States is also in a better position to use political pressure on the USSR and its lesser allies to stop aiding Castro or fall victim to the charge that they, too, are spréading the.
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armed conflict into Latin America, The United States can demand that the USSR show by deeds that they do not endorse the Cuban adventures. In using the word "demand" it is
not placed in a belligerent manner--more as an exposé and pressure,
The USSR will not send arms directly to the various guerrilla bands. In keeping with their general. policy of avoiding a hot war, they will not do this, especially after the failures in Cuba and Venezuela, They cannot at this stage control these guerrilla movements, and therefore they Will not assume the responsibility of arming them, Of course, © if the USSR is placed in a position where they have to publicly repudiate Cuba or some of the other guerrilla movements, they will not do this. Since Vietnam, they will avoid the
charge that they have "betrayed" a socialist revolution ora
war of Jiberation, If they can retreat while saving face and at the same time recéive the support of some other com- munist parties in Latin America, they will do so.’ They will do this, not because the United States wants them to, but because they will not involve themselves in a situation that would endanger their main policies.
Communist Party of Brazil Under Pressure
At the present time it is important to watch the large communist parties in Latin America... They will influence the Soviet position in this area of the world, The Communist Party of Brazil (Moscow oriented) will hold a party congress soon, Although Luis Carlos Prestes, the leader of the Communist — Party of Brazil, was the first to split with Castro regarding tactics in Latin America, he may Onder pressure of thé Brazilian situation (the defeat. of Joao Goulart and the outlawing of the communist party) revert to the line of guerrilla warfare. It is not unusual for communists to change tactics: and resort td devious maneuvers. The Chinese and Castroites have split the Communist Party of Brazil and set up their own groups, bands, and parties, This pressure may cause Prestes to regroup his forces: and once again utilize his old title as the "Knight of the Jungle" to organize a guerrilla war, ᾿
The Soviet Union in such a situation may offer aid, even if indirectly, They would then once again draw closer to Castro or give him the task to deliver the arms, They might do this also to avoid permitting the Chinese to step in and arm
their own bands that would be anti-Soviet from the very beginning..
w
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Issues in the Propaganda War: Cuban Dictatorship, Trade Unions Right to Strike, -Cuban Interference
In the light of the foregoing, the propaganda war in Latin America takes on new importance. ‘Consideration might well be given to developing the propaganda war around certain salient. issues:
1, Emphasizing the differences between Castro and the other communists of Latin Amer ica and the world;
2. The deepening rift between Castro and the USSR;
3. Exposing the Soviet Union for its duplicity, hiding behind the cloak of Castro to help guerrilla bands, while at the same time preaching ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries":
4, The Soviet Union by arming castro ("The .island of Cuba is sinking into, the sea by the weight of armament," according to one leading Soviet) is starting an arms race in all Latin America,
' Can such a campaign in Latin America lead to good results, favorable to-the United States?, It can, if recognition is given to the social and political evils that exist in these countries. The solution does not lie in war, even if such a war is led by Castro. Castro is held in contempt by the leadership of the USSR and by communist leaders in most communist parties. Exposure of Castro as an adventurer and dictator (he is still afraid of a democratic election) would receive a sympathetic
ear among those who believe in peace and.the democratic practices. The Communist Party of Chile had to face up to this. question-and gave Castro some sharp answers when he criticized their parlia- mentary efforts, their united front and Pablo Neruda's participa- tion in literary discussion with United States writers. The Chileans were applauded by nearly all Latin American parties
and Latin American intellectuals for this stand not so long ago.
. in the Latin American propaganda battles, the technique of talking to the people must be mastered. Some countries, not ali, can stand comparison with communist Cuba. Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, and perhaps others can be used as examples.
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The liberty to strike is the most precious thing for a trade unionist. The Castro regime has outlawed strikes as have all communist dictatorships. Strikes and insurrections are synonymous for Fidel Castro. Venerated old trade union leaders (not.of the Batista gang) have been ousted and perse- cuted. Opinion makers in the United States have knowledge of these facts. Without défending the terroristic dictatorships in some of these countries, comparisons can ‘be made on this subject of the right to strike as it applies under the condi- tions in the above-named countries as opposed to present-day Cuba. The Latin American concept of "strike" is different than the North American concept and therefore for that very reason it is a subject for discussion and interest,
The Soviet Union, a country thousands of miles away from America, is responsible for maintaining communist Cuba and Fidel Castro's dictatorship. Castro should be called a dictator, The main fire when aimed at Castro will win approval from a lot of Cuban communists and from most leaders of con— munist parties in Latin America. As already pointed out, these
communist leaders from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and other countries have been in a running fight with Castro since his emergence from the Sierra Maestras.
11. factions exist in some of these parties, and they do, Castro helped to organize them. It is obvious therefore that these communist leaders have no use for Castro.as a person (he is called the "bearded cult") nor for his policies and tactics. These communists fight as hard as anyone against the United States, But they refuse to knuckle under to Castro's dogmas handed: down to them in dictatorial fashion. Their own national interests as well as their Marxist training caution that they must differ with Castroism. Most of the parties named no longer send people to Cuba for any kind of training. Previous "schools" in Cuba gave birth to pro-Castro groups .. upon return to their country. Guatemala is one such example--— Castro created a guerrilla force that until recently was inde- pendent of the communist party and often rejected party leader- Ship and tactics. The same thing happened in Venezuela.
Exploiting the Split to. - ΠΝ Curb Influence of Both
Cuba and Soviet Union
In the struggle between China and the Soviet Union, most Latin American parties overwhelmingly endorse Moscow. They would not want to submit themselves to another country in
53 - . CON AL
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‘Latin America that they believe would dominate them. The
guestion is how to utilize this situation. This is something to: think about and study. |
An interesting parallel can be drawn between the European Common Market and the proposed Latin American Common Market. Perhaps the United States can profit from the experi- ences of the former in implementing the latter. There is no common viewpoint among communist parties in Europe about the Common Market, The French originally were against the Common Market. They took the same point of view as the Russians that the Common Market,is an instrument that will be used against the socialist bloc. The Italian communists did not agree with this. They said they were more concerned about the Italian people getting employment. They engaged in sharp polemics with the Russians and the French. The Italian communist leaders even suggested at one time that the Soviet Union make an effort to reach an understanding with the Common Market, On the other
‘hand,-the British communists were against Joining the Common Market. " .
But Latin America is auite different than Europe, A number of countries aré very backward, they produce very Little industrial goods, and most of the production is raw materials or agricultural products. Capital investments, in’ the main, come from the United States, The communists and
nationalists charge the United States with monopoly and imperialism,°
But there are some sections of the people in Latin America genuinely interested in the welfare of the people and in an expanding economy, Some honest nationalists and perhaps communists may take the same position on the Latin American Common Market as communists did, in Europe and agree to work with the United States. This did happen
in some European countries; so, this could happen in the more developed countries of Latin America--Argentina or Chile, and perhaps others, This approach is worth probing, providing the United States shows that this cooperation is not for the selfish benefit of investment houses or the oligarchies, but can serve
the national interests of the countries involved and help
guarantee their independence, This is more than Castro will
do or can do, The Soviet-oriented bloc may offer such ccopera~ tion in competition,
The opportunity exists for taking advantage of splits, whether ideological or organizational, and influencing splits in a practical way. This will reduce the influence of communism of both domestic and foreign varieties, and particularly check Castroism and the dominance of the Soviet Union. The United
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States can ask some challenging questions: What can the soviet Union supply to these countries that would really be of economic help to them? The Soviets have not been able to supply.even their own people. The USSR and other socialist countries had to buy grain-~the Soviet Union, the biggest.
agricultural nation in Europe, could not supply them with bread or rice.
Placing the emphasis. on the split in communist. ranks and how to utilize it in Latin America is in kéeping with the contemporary world situation. One might say such opportuni- ties should not be lost because of political hesitancy. Economic and political situations develop or change, and the United States in the world struggle, particularly in Latin America, can "miss: the boat," and thus allow the communists another advantage or ° even the start of another war of liberation. In each country .there are power plays that go beyond classes. For example, the Goulart government was not a conmunist government; never~ theless, they were a threat. They represented a bigger danger than the communists because the communist party did not have the influence of the Goulartists, The communist party utilized the tactic of the united front with what they called "national elements." The United States will need to find allies in the very lowest strata of the population to check the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies, and the communist partiés of Latin America who carry out the general Soviet line in a con- crete way opportunistically, when necessary under flags of national independence, Unless the United States shifts the foundations of economic and political alliances to the. lower classes including the middle classes and the intelligentsia,
it will face more guerrilla wars under the leadership of Castro imitators.
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OFTIOMAL FORM HO. 10
MAY 1941} EDITION 3010-104
OSA GEM, REG, HO, 27 O Q Tolson
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT io oan
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE ==
Felt
TO fy Mr. W. C. Sullivad, DATE: 5/29/67
! 1
FROM : ©, D. Brennan i 1 1
OQ 1
1
SUBJECT; ᾿ SOLO
Kir. DeLoach
Mr, Sullivan
Mr, C. Ὁ, Brennan Liaison
Mr. R. C. Putnam AL SECURITY -- COMMUNIST i! Ρ hey
΄“΄ PURPOSE : ΄ This memorandum recommends that a paper prepare
by CG 5824-S*, our top informant, regarding foreign policy of the Soviet Union,. be disseminated to the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General,
% BACKGROUND: τ .
At our ‘request, CG 5824~S* has prepared. ὰ 55=page paper entitled "Reflections on Soviet Foreign Policy" (copy attached for ready reference). In this paper the informant draws on his lengthy experience in the international ‘com- munist movement (over 40 years), his personal discussions. \ with leading figures in the international communist novenenty, and with top leaders of the Communist Party of the _ ee Soviet Union. He points out that pursuit of national~ a interests is and always has been the keystone of Soviet policy and how the Soviets have utilized the international*.comhunist movement to advance Soviet national interests. <<" &
In addition to providing a comprehensive diimmary κι «4 of the numerous pressures on the Soviets, the informant sets f forth ideas to exploit these pressures for the benefit of United States foreign policy.
Attached are letters enclosing copies of the informant "δ document along with a letterhead iiemorandum containing salient points for the White House, Secretary * of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and. ὦ
‘Attorney General, MA. 109 . Lor Hfegt (οὶ [ο 97 oG/ a
RECOMMENDATION : REG 2 7 Ἵ “ty "Ὁ" μον fe fe tthadledr Letters Sie./approvel ae alti sen OF:
, aa ῖ,,. OEEICE Fo * ae i k sy
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CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY ΡῬΕΒΙΨΕΡ FRO:
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1 ~ Hr, A. R. Jones 1 - Liaison 1 lr. R. H. Horner
Date: . June 6, 1967 To: τ Director _ - Ou - Bureau of Intelligence and Research P
Department of State vo From: Jobn Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
. ‘The following has been supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the ‘past.
. The Communist Party, USA (CPUSA}), has been con=-_\
: tacted by officials of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC ι regarding possible means of providing support for the " struggles of the Portuguese “patriots fighting oppression". both in Portugal and alongside the national liberation forces in the colonial wars of Africa,
_ Jt bas been learned that the CPC sent copies. of a pamphlet entitled "Report on 2 Mission to Portugal" to organizations in the United States such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the "Portuguese emigre group" in
.
New York City, and the "Angolan students organization” in
Rochester, New York. REC- 19 /2d~ YAY O7/ 63 {3
‘The CPUSA has’ peen Sefhestea to secure additional
ἢ φ -«,@opies of the pamphlet for distribution to key members of
‘the United States Congress. it is hoped that these pamphiets ‘can be sent to the Congressmen along with accompanying letters from citizens' groups in the United States organized for the purpose of urging action against the Government of Portugal. It was further proposed that the pamphlet be furnished leaders. of. groups in the United States interested in civil. liberties. The pamphlet as:¢o be utilized as an instrument~ —~- to initiate a conference am.thesUnited States on amnesty
for political prisoners in Portugal. ,-, 8. JUN Ὁ 1967
RHA :dmk WA ἡ is ac Μ Ε eed sc
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NOTE:
Director " Bureau of Intelligence. and ‘Research Departmant of State
™
ss, Pha CPC suggested a citizens" committeé to obtain aninesty for political prisoners in Portugal he formed in
the United States to. develop: liaison with sinilar groups in Canada and South. America. A. major project of such a group.
*
would be to focus attention on the status of political _ prisoners in Portugal by bringing the matter up before the. United Nations. Other. activities would include drawing
world-wide atteition to special grievous cases, the ) growing presence of the. North Atlantic Treaty Organization ἱ in and aroiind Portugal, and the role the United States plays ‘in providing arms and support for the Government of
Portugal. ᾿ . oe,
Σὸν Director. ᾿
Céntral ‘Intelligence Agericy Attention: Deputy Director; Plans
at
gince tinauthorized disclosure
Classified "ἢ
(NY 694-S*) who is of continuing. valué and such revelation
of ‘this information could re al the identity-of the source .
could result in grave damage to the Nation.
τως This information was contained in a letter from _ William Kashtan, General ‘Secretary, CPC, received at a mail drop: for transmittal to Gus Halil, General Secretary, CPUSA,
τς Da ~axtracted from New York airtel 5/22/67, captioned
Is ~. σι
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Director, FBI (100~428091) . 3 : Es TEE an
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA. INTERNAL SECURITY ~ CANADA
memorandun classified μ t" and captioned "Communist
There are ‘ses copies of. ‘a letterhead Party of Canada."
- Promptly fur 5 τε οὶ randun — _to your sources in th Your ". gources should be cautione Ξ ossentia at no
distribution or use of our intelligence information be under= ὁ taken which would be likely to Jeopardize the. security of our sources, -
Enclosures - 3_
“1 = Foreign ‘Liaison Unit (route thro
RCP :dnk (6)
> - x -- - = π - = oad
: NOTE: ᾿
ha soni
Ἐν See LHM. captioned "Communist Party of Canada,“ . dated 6/8/67:;, prepared by RCP:dmk, This LHM is also being — disseminated to State and CIA by routing slip.
__ MAILED 27
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LASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: ADTOMA ECLASSTFICAT! ΤΕ
| cy
1 = Mr. Mossburg 1- Mr. R. Ὁ, Putnan
June 8, 1967 ~ COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA ᾿
‘Sources ‘which have ‘supplied reliable information. in the past have advised as follows.
᾿ "he Comntinist Party of Bulgaria ‘has invited .a - representative of the. Communist Party of Canada ‘to visit ‘Bulgaria during ‘the Summér of 1967 for rest and vacation.
. Norman Freed,. Educational ‘Director, Communist Party ‘of Canada, ‘and ‘his wife have been selected to:accept this ~ . ᾿ invitation, ‘They expect to depart from Canada ‘about the - first week in July, 1967. ‘They will spend about one nonth, in Varna, Bulgaria, and visit Czechoslovakia: and ‘Great Britain on their journey home. |
_ | reed will have to be ‘back in Canada ‘by the | middlé of August, 1967, for the Communist Party of Canada. “and thé Communist. Party, USA, plan to conduct 8. joint. training school for youth during August 19 through - September’ 1, 1967. ‘The school will be held in Toronto, Canada. About ten Communist Party, USA, members are, expected. to attend this school. ‘The Communist Party of Canada would like the Communist Party, USA,;to send - == =: - instructors to the school. Hyman Lumer, Ediicational. τ ee Director, Communist Party, USA, has stated thet, unless the Canadian Government grants official permission for Communist - Party, USA, officials to enter Canada to becone instructors. at this school, he considers it most undesirable for the” _ 6, ᾿ ‘Communist Party; USA, to furnish any: instructors for this ‘school. ~ . = - 4 - γον τ Θ᾿ δ hiaisgn Ursh Capite TREO i toriged disclosure ‘or thig information could reveal the identity of the source - (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing valiie and such revelation could result in. grave damage to the Nation. CG 5824-S* - referred to as "sources" in order to further protect, his _ identity. Dissemination being made to State and CIA by” * olson routing slip and[_____]through letter. to ‘Legat, Ottawd.. Data DeLoach a, ©6=C tracted from Chicago airtels 5/31/67 and 6/1/67, captioned
= a LWW
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alone —— 100~428091
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Date: 6/5/67
, ROUTEIN ENVELOPE.
Transmit the following in
Y (Type in plaintext or code) wa AIRTEL |
(Priority) | ee ee ee ee eee eee Lee TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) yi)
2 Oo SUBJECT: ὍΝ “δ
Re New York airtel to Bureau dated 5/22/67 enclosing a copy of letter dated 5/16/67 to GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party. (CP), USA, from WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada. The enclosed letter stated that there was enclosed. or under separate cover a number of documents concerning the struggles in Portugal, but these documents were not received through the New York drop address.
On 6/1/67 CG 5824-S* advised that during his conversations with KASHTAN during the period 5/26-29/67 KASHTAN had informed him that these documents had in fact not been sent as of that date but would be forwarded immediately.
On 6/1/67 there was receivéd at a Chicago Solo drop address an envelope postmarked 5/30/67 at Toronto, Canada, which contained the following documents, one copy each of which is enclosed herewith for the Bureau and New York. An additiofja] copy of each is enclosed for the Bureau in the evel ᾿ : ς :
)- 404 7D αὖλι ζῶ - Bureau (Enc¢S. 12)
) 1 = New York (10Ὁ- 134637) (Eneis. 6) CRM) ns τὰκ semen
1 = Chicago
WAB:mes τ 6 JUN 8. 1967
(5) a “he ΒΝ -:Ξ ΝΣ ὌΝ -
[ cy eo ἘΞ Prowse WX AL Y ᾿ Sent μΜ" Per ὁ Ἕἷἕἷἕ΄'ὅὃἢἪ᾽
6 Ὁ JUN 1 34 1 Di id Agent in Charge
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CG 134-46 Sub. B
1)
2)
3).
4)
5)
6)
alo απ ak eg “ΠΕ σι Δ 4 ποτε - τ τ How ge - . , 4 - τὰ " - 7 ‘ j - 4 4
Xerox copy of Pages 11-14 of an. article entitled "MUNDO OBRERO Intérviews ALVARO CUNHAL,"
which appeared in. Issue Number 92 of the "Information Bulletin," issuéd by World Marxist Review .
Publishers, Prague, Czechoslovakia
Xerox copy of a pamphlet entitled ‘Report on a Mission to. Portugal,
by Two Members of the Canadian Parliament," issued by the Canadian
Committee for Amnesty in Portugal, . Toronto, Canada
Xérox copy of the letterhead of the
Canadian Committee for Amnesty in Portugal, 765 Queen Street V., Toronto 3, Canada, with. handwritten notes (apparently. by KASHTAN) concerning individuals | whose james appear thereon.
Xerox copy of Fébiuary /April, 1967, ᾿ Yolume 7, Number 1, issue of "Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin,” assued by Κι SHINGLER, 10 Fentiman Road, London, S,W, 8, “England
Xerox copy of "Submission to the Commission on Human. Rights of the United Nations," submitted by "A Delegation Mandated by the Canadian’ Conference for AmneSty in Portugal 614 in Toronto, Canada, October 28-30, i966"
Xerox copy of "The Politics of Justice in Portugal," by HARK B, MAC GUIGAN, edited. by the Patriotic “Front of National Liberation (Portugal) 13,
rue Auber, Alger
CG 134-46 Sub B
On 6/1/67 CG 5824-S* sent a letter to KASHTAN _care-of the "J:, KLEINSTEIN’ drop thanking him for this “material, The’ text of this letter 15 sét forth below:
"Thanks a lot for your efforts. & ‘speedy, | dispatch of the material on Portugal. We will | discuss this problem in the next few days. =
"Did you see the editorial on the Mid-East crisis in the Worker of the 28th? It is somewhat Similar +o the editorial in the Tribune of the 29th. Héwever, you Should. know there are problems here, especially in the peace movemeé nt
' and among. the’ Jewish comrades ‘ho question the policy of the main fire being aimed at imperidalisn | by the Arabs who want an all -out attack against Israel, Some here are algo ; . equating ‘Vietnam with the situation in the Mid-East.
'“Oncé again. thanks for your very warm reception & concern,!
ΕΓ ΑΞΒΤΕΙΤΘΑΤ On AUTHOR TY DERIVED FROM: : : FICAT On cuipe °°
3 mr
τ Ὁ. »ᾷ ὁ - Re " ΒΟΌΤΕ IN ENVELOPE
| 1% Pes i- Liaison "
MEO 1. Mr, ΒΕ, C. Putnam a, be foo. 2b γε τ Ψ June 8, 1967 ΝΣ πος
«Ὁ . ce | To: Director ᾿ Central Intelligence Agency . - Ν Attention: Deputy Director, ‘Plans ΕΞ - From: ‘John Edgar. Hoover, Director Referral /coasul
Data in letters mentioned above were. developed - {i 824-S%- on Solo missions to the Soviet Union. To down ith grade these Letters in, their ‘entirety. could: -jeopardize- this Ν᾿ - _ Valuable. source and; jthe,, future of our Solo Operation. Chicago “Tefson Ww, being furnished List, οὗ ἢ deading functionaries of: Institute: . Delvoach am to asgist im interview of CG''5824-S* for ‘addtional data. New: York and WFO | are bping requested by separate covers to
Wick
Caen — furnish photographs\ 55) these ,functionaries, 4 if available,
. Conrad. ~ " δι" ται ἢ
Gate Classified a] ‘since! it refers — to CIA letter which . 15 6 classified.
Tove) een qe kos
RCP: dm Excluded : . ‘ie owngra ἢ ᾿ ~ . ᾿ . 7 58 ΞΡ ὩΣ “τὸ - " ie _ .
J
ΤΡ ΘΠ IFICRTION AUDTHORE ΤΊ Y PER RIVED FROM: MOTOMATIC DECLASSIFAGETION GUIDE Ὁ
atl Oo .. Oo , ROUEE IN. ENV? LOPE
Date: 6/5/67
nal] hoon ing i ᾿ Ἢ @ following in - (Type in plaintext or code) Ι Spear AIRTEL | |
f
Via (Priority) | me ee ee θ62 :.. τ τοὦὸ.ἅ»ὦὉὉὉ ῦὺ.Ὰ ΔἙἍὩἙ ἑἡδ͵οι.ι... τ Loo TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) wee SUBJECT? Qoro | τ (7 - C -ὕ ι 2 wa S af 3 4 S Re previous correspondence concerning 4 s investigation by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ( ν ΑΜ and Office of the USA, Southern District of New York, Vy [5
into alleged manipulation of the stock market.
The Bureau was previously advised that records of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, filinois, pertaining to transactions of CG 5824-S*, CG 6653-8 and
‘ NY 694-S* were subpoenaed by the USA's Office in New
δ 5824-S* advised on 5/31/67 that although a Genera Counsel of the Lincolnwood Bank, | A apparently not appeared in New York-City, the records AR pe . N had been forwarded to the USA. CG 5824-S* stated that C aN (se does w what were the contents of the records Wass δὺ sent wf ny Soon as he was able to get ἂν an appo —,. Cyne would attempt to find out.
Pe BGP ay. or ϑδαανν α ᾿ ΤΩΣ ra
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[_inzormea CG 5824-S* on 5/29/67 that in his opinion the USA and the SEC have no case at all against Ing [ either CG 5824-S* or any other members of IRVING PROJANSKY's 570
group and that i e government is trying. the case in the newSpapers, does not see how the case can go
«® ΕΧ103 ἶ Φ - Bureau (ἘΜ) 200 - - 422 fo Of b3 i" ὶ - 5 hice York (100-13 4637) ca ον ΟΝ ic — ὃ BAL aterm τῶ δή Wd τ Ir ὦ eg’ SUN 9. 1967 ab, mes OESKLE
(5) a ested by
sy RL . Le τ Ὁ pose if a ὦ; : ‘Approved: \ δ δ Sent ee \ Per —____
{11 AY ent in Chargf
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CG 134-46 Sub Β
t on the basis of what they have at the present time...
has protested to AUSA LAWRENCE NEWMAN against what log he calls NEWMAN's illegal manner of leaking information to bie the newspapers, "blackmail stories" asf Jealls them, in order to pressure people into making damaging statements.
CG 5824-S* stated that members of the family
have reported to him what they have heard "on the grapevine,"
the sources not being identified, He was told that "two
petty hoodlums," BURT KOZAK ἀπ τ τ ] are
Still running the USA's Office in New Yor ity and are boasting about it. They are trying to contact people to induce
them to commit perjury. The informants of the PROJANSKY ‘family who themselves were approached have stated that they would deny it if questioned officially regarding it. . Additionally, it was reported that a “petty thief" named Ing HARRIS NAGORSKL had beer arrested in Illinois on:.some rather ITC minor charge for which a very high bail was set, He was
then transported by United States Marshals to New York City
to be questioned on this case, In New York City, NAGORSKI has persisted in claiming the privilege of the Fifth Amendment. KOZAK, according to these informants, has been in and out
of NAGORSKI's cell attempting to get, NAGORSKI to: talk,. to
Such an extent that the United States Marshals have indicated that they are getting quite disgusted with the whole setup.
KOZAK has a gambling debt owed to the "syndicate." He does. not have the money to pay it back and, therefore, the word is that the USA in New York City is hoping that .KOZAK ; is not killed before the case is finished, KOZAK and 8 have, Since the outset of this investigation, been
Olng a lot of talking in bars and similar places about- what witnesses have said to the Grand Jury and the AUSA. They obviously have the confidence of NAGORSKI and are boasting of how ἐμὸν are going to "sett those under investigation based on their allegations,
PROJANSKY Ias stated that there is a lot of talk in upper corporate circles about the *gestapo tactics" being used by the SEC and the AUSA in New York to. discredit legitimate businesses; The General Counsel of Hercules-Gallion
SUR dt -~2- .
CG 134-46 Sub: Β
Products is coming into Chicago in the near future to talk to some of the individuals involved, including PROJANSKY, to. determine what can be done about the Situation. According to PROJANSKY, a lot. of reputable people have continually expressed their readiness to go to New York City as witnesses to protest that the tactiés being
employed by the AUSA in New York City are wrong,
ARTHUR KELLER’, former president of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood who was fired by PROJANSKY, left for Eurape on vacation when this case was first under investigation, According to PROJANSKY, he has now returned.
In addition to.the above information, CG 6653-S has explained to us their irivolvemént in transactions in -
‘the stock of Mercury Chemical Corporation, another stock
on thé American Stock Exchange under investigation by SEC. According to this source, STUART PROJANSRY, who is the son of her-brother, IRVING PROJANSKY, a vice president of the Lincolnwood Bank and a successful insurance broker in his
ἀπ contact with BU AK and: who represented the stock - irm of Cleveland, KOZAK informed STUART PROJANSKY
was opening a Chicago branch in thé vicinity Lincolnwood Bank ‘and implied they might place their bank account amounting to a million or more dollars*in that bank. PROJANSKY continued to cultivate KOZAK in the hopes of gett ing this gccount,.
KOZAK then introduced PROJANSKY to a stock broker
“(name nét recailed) representing Douglas Securities, who
Subsequently madé the following proposition to PROJANSKY,
Thé broker askéd PROJANSKY to get ten people to each purchase through Douglas Securities $8,000.00 worth of stock in Mercury Chemical Corporation. He assured PROJANSKY that this stock was going to rapidly rise in price and a handsome profit would be made within 60 days. Furthermore, he would furnish a written guarantee that if this profit did not materialize
or if the investors changed their minds, he would buy back the stock at the end of 60 days for the "original price, plus Six percent interest. When PROJANSKY offered this deal to
- 3 - ee
¥ ee tl ee ._. - -- . ΝΞ - τ -- - - =n
CG. 134-46 Sub B
CG 6653~S, she declined on the grounds that this broker's guarantee was only as good as the man himself and she knew nothing about him. PROJANSKY persisted that according to KOZAK, whont he trusted, this man was reputable. Against her better judgment, CG 6653-S finally acceded to this pressure . from PROJANSKY and purchased $8,000.00 worth of |. - Mexcury Chemical,
A Short while thereafter this group of investors decided they Should pull out of this investinent and PROJANSKY: went to the broker to sell the stock back. The broker told PROJANSKY he had no intention of fulfilling his promise and furthermore that the written guarantee had
δ this point PROJANSKY and CG ooo == —
and outlined their situation. then. that the broker had violated the law — offering the written guarantee in the first place. made representations to the broker for the return of the investment and finally, after thréatening ἃ lawsuit for recovery, the investment was refurided with a small profit. | Qur informants 1966. Income Tax Return ShowS a purchase '
of $8,000.00 worth of Mercury Chemical in 2/66, which was sold on 4/14/66 for $8,165.00, a profit of 2.06. percent.
CG 6653-~S noted that the broker in this case made his contact only with PROJANSKY, whom he persuaded to solicit ten people for a $8,.000,00 purchase each. Thus PROJANSKY 15. placed in the position of appearing to be the conspirator in this case rather than. the victin,
I Ip TC
The above is being provided for information. ᾿ The Bureau: and New York will be kept advised of further developments,
OPTLOMAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1942 1O1TIOM
5010-106 O ἢ Οδὰ GEN, RIG, νῷ. 27 Tolstoy re,
Loach pees, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ie
Wick
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE &=
Contad aa
g aa “ Trotter
- Se , . . ᾿ Tele, Room —— FROM#lS-O, Ε΄, Downing’ ‘
Holmes —. Gondy
NIERNAL SECURITY - C
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential
informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.
On 6/6/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted,
ACTION:
For information,
1 - Mr. Conrad ᾿ a 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo; Mr. R. C. Putnam) | / je 1 - Mr. Downing |
1 - Mr, Newpher
1 - Mr. Paddock
en | IP es _ Κῶ ῥς: Pape vib
ΝΕ 8 JUN 9 1867 gv am . Ae g ὁ JUNT4 1967
OPTIONAL FORM NG, 10 501 10. ᾿ MAY 5962 EDITION GSA GEM. REO, NO, 27 Tolson -
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT νος Peli ΝΞ Wick / | 1 = Mr. DeLoach Gasper Memorandum 1 = lr. Delonch cli TO yy: Mr. W. C. Sullivah . pate: 6/7/67 7 ἢ 1 =r. C.D, Brennan “tei FROM : C. Ὦ. Brenna . 1. = Mr; Mossburg fetgee = — 1-Mr. R.C. Putnam = Sv some Gone
RNAL SECURITY - = Ὁ C ) Pell
PURPOSE; ; (ions This memorandum advises of information firsishea
by CG 5824-S* concerning the receipt by James Jackson of an invitation to visit North Vietnam, and recommends attached
Summary incorporating this information be furnished the, | hed White House, Secretary. of State, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, :and the Attorney General.
BACKGROUND: . , 3 ----.--------- Ss .:
--
CG, 5824-S*, one of our top informants, has ‘learned ~ that. James Jackson, Publisher of "The Workerz," east coast -" communist newspaper, and Chairman of the Party? s. Commission νυ
. on International Affairs, has for some time been seeking=to - obtain an invitation from the North Vietnamese to visit, that” country, In furtherance of this desire, Jackson enlisted the aid of Hyman Lumer; the Communist. ‘Party's. ‘Educational Director. 7 Lumer ‘in turn contacted William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada. Lurier was aware that Kashtan was already negotiating. with the. North Vietnamese. for an eee
a,
to be sent το: the Canadian Party for a visit to North Vietnam. Kashtan agreed to intercede for Jackson with the resuit that both Jackson and the Canadian representative have been invited to visit, North Vietnam. The only conditions to the invitation”
rea be
Bayt
᾿ - week of June, dia ‘the: ‘visits ‘must ἘΠ ΠΣ toa "g Sa ‘weeks
' hie ono πὸ 294:2 ΖΦ: AS . πϑράμμενθα ON,
* ”
~ Boots: “epnat 4st attached aummary incorpSrati ne” oe ‘information - furnished by GG,,5824-S* be, sent: to. Mrs. Mildred:Stegall,. The White House;. Hondrable: ‘Bean Rusk! ' ‘Secretary of” State; Honorable Richard Helms 3 Director, Central Intelligence Agency} and the Attorney General,
“ ahs By separaté “eoimiiniodiden this information is bein ttawa, for ἊΨ» to the
= ee a 100~428091 Gh dy RHH: jav ἌΧΟΣ ὦ 2. ἵν aa
δον ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Ly FB!
fo Date: 6/13/67
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority) [ a ι...-.-.... -- TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) ὉΠ) FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) ἢ ay OR, “ ΄ ΜΝ: ἢ SOLO ν 4 ii ““T$=C Tit) ΡΝ ie
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for. New York one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Possible Trip to North Vietnam by Reporter for Communist Party of Canada."
The information appearing in the enclosed letter-
‘ head memorandum was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* during the period 5/29-31/67 to SAs RICHARD W, HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE, - —
ὃς
ἣν 7 The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified
οὐ whos ance Since unauthorized disclosure of the information Φ contained therein could reasonably result in the identifica~
a tion of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement,
ὮΝ and thus adversely affect the national security. - ay ἡ τ᾿ In order to further protect the identity of this ἿΕ i source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown
0 as being prepared ed at.Washington, D.C. \> 4d eet 0 nee Ὁ dee eels ; ¥ (3>-Bureau (End 4) (RM) (25 εὐ ὝτΝον York“~¢100- 134687) (Enc. 1) (Info) RD fy 9 of 2 fa Gf 419 ql” i-Chicago ._ ~ REC 46 ene poetic να (
(pw Ἔ : +i] 6 JUN 12 88] a aa
20 SUN LA We
Approved: ὴ {2 d Sent - -ι-ΣἝΒΜΝ Per Sbebial Agent in Charge
ee ns
O axe
CG 134-46 Sub B
The information set forth in the enclosed lettér-= head. memorandum was obtained by CG 5824-S* in conversation during the period 5/26-29/67 in Toronto, Canada, with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada,
ΕἸ
ΤΟ AUTOMATE
CATION ΑΓΓΤΗΘΈΣ ΈΈΥ DERIVED FROG:
DECLASBIFICATION GOTD! ᾿ Ἐν ' ᾿
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - ἢ
Washington, Ὁ. Cc.
In Reply, Please Refer to 5 ᾿ , 4
File No. " . June 1, 1967 ΞΕ
POSSIBLE TRIP TO NORTH VIETNAM BY REPORTER FOR COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA
?
A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during May, 1967, advised as follows:
It was recently learned that the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) desires to send a reporter to North Vietnam, In furtherance. of this objective, discussions were held with representatives. of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by William Kashtan, General Secretary of the CPC, while he was in East Berlin where he was attending the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG), which was held April 17-22, 1967. The North Vietnamese. indicated
" they -would accept - such. a reporter’ fron. the CPC but would not pay anything toward the fare of this individual to Europe,
The SUPG has invited the -CPC to send two repre- sentatives to the German Democratic Republic for a vacation, the cost to be assumed by the SUPG. The Canadians believe that once as far as the German Democratic Republic, their representative can probably be sent on to Moscow, USSR, at the expense of -the SUPG. From Moscow, they believe either the USSR or the North Vietnamese will assume responsibility for his travel to Hanoi. At this point it is not known whether or not such travel. would be via Peking, People's Republic of China, It is known that the CPC has taken the
This document contains neither recommendations _. -nor_conclusions of the FBI, It is the property of the FBI and is loaned. to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency,
lion OR ko yy - = \o33°
δ᾿
POSSIBLE TRIP TO NORTH VIETNAM BY REPORTER TOPDSECRET FOR COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA
position that if their representative cannot make the trip in the above-described fashion and would be forced to take the long way around to North Vietnam, then he would not go Since the CPC could not afford such an expense.
Without stating the reason, ‘the: North Vietnamese representatives insisted that whoever travels to Hanoi for the CPC must be there in the first week of June, 1967, and absolutely no later than the second week of June, After arriving in Hanoi, the Canadian may stay in North Vietnam only for a few weeks,
- 2k - TOP-SECRET
Trangmit the following in
™ QO ae
Date: 6/1/67
(Type in plaintext or code}
AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL |
(Priority) Ϊ
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
One FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) i .
ἦα ery, ΄ Ni
τῷ Ὕ ΤΥ Pas 6 Δ}
ReCGlet to Bureau dated 5/18/67 and CGairtel to Bureau dated 3/28/67 both relating to efforts to travel to North Vietnam by JAMES JACKSON, member of the Secretariat and ieee of the International Affairs Commission of the 5 ‘
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for New York one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Invitation From North Vietnam for James Jackson, Chairman of International Affairs Commission, Communist Party, USA, to Travel to North Vietnam," |
The: information set forth. in the enclosed letter- head memorandum was orally furnished during the period of 9/29-31/67 by CG 5824-3 to SAs RICHARD W, HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE,
& he enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified \\ vfdersaCter" since unauthorized disclosure of the informa- tion set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information
on the highest lexe Dg regarding the international communist
I tee. Ge at 8 % pe Rerersely. affect the national security,
ΑΝ ΤΡ ΣΝ ΄ REC 46 fg - Καὶ ΔΓ bal
1-~New York (100 134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (
1-Chicago WAB : MDW . " oy 1967 (5) yr 7 πῶ 6 Ju" 12 AAS oy ἢ I iN ‘dl . Π — Approved: (Wx A Sent Μ Per G: p¥cial Agent in Charge
CG 134-46 Sub B
in order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.
The information set forth in the enclosed letter~ . head memorandum was obtained by CG 5824-S* in conversation during the period 5/26-29/67 in Toronto, Canada, with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada.
is
BO LASS PICATION
ΕἸ UTOMATIC DRCLASST
Q37-0S-Z£OLA - ᾿ vi
. In Reply, Please Refer to Washington, Ὁ. Ὁ, .
File No,
Berlin, .While in the “GDR, Lumer contacted Willian Kashtan, ~ “
AUTHORITY DERIVED PRON:
ὃ Oo -
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ;
June 1, 1967
TO CRET 4 rf INVITATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM FOR JAMES ackson,
CHAIRMAN OF INTERNATIONAL. AFFAIRS COMMISSION, ΄΄. COMMUNIST PARTY USA, TO. TRAVEL TO NORTH VIBTNAM
A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during May, 1967, advised as follows:
James Jackson, a member of the Secretariat and Chair- ° man of the .International Affairs Commission, Communist Party, USA CCP, USA) and publisher of "The Worker," (an East ‘Coast communist newspaper) , has been exerting every - effort to obtain an invitation, to: visit North Vietnam, During April, 1967, he requested assistance in this matter from Hyman Lumer, a member of the Secretariat and National Educational Director, CP, USA, who was traveling to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to attend the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party _ of Germany (SUPG) ; which was held April 17-22, 1967, in East ᾿ General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), who was already in contact with representatives of the Working People’ s Party of Vietnam relative to an invitation from the. North Vietnamese for travel to Hanoi of a reporter for the CPC. Kashtan agreed to present Jackson's, case to the North Vietnamese representatives. Kashtan ‘subsequently’ reported that the North Vietnamese were most anxious for Jackson to go to North Vietnam and extended such an invitation to him through the cPc. The only conditions: placed by the North Vietnamese were the following:
This document contains neither recommendations nor
conclusions of the FBI, It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to. your agency; it and its con-
tents are not to be distributed outside your agency. ~ ~~~" -
oN ENOLEcon (60—-4¢24£ 0 G/ —~o3 rl
γς---------΄ Ὁ
. ΘΟ ®
INVITATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM FOR JAMES TorrseCRE JACKSON, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:
COMMISSION, CP, USA, TO TRAVEL TO NORTH
VIETNAM,
Ῥ North Vietnam would not pay any of Jackson's fare to Europe; and, Jackson must be in North Vietnam by the first week in June, 1967, or no later than the second week in June, and he can stay in North Vietnam only for a few weeks.
- 2k - pester
“PD-Te Rev, 5-22-64) 9 © | Oy ROUTE IN ENVTLOPE |
VY Date: 6/5/67
AIRTEL (Type in plaintext or code} |
(Priority)
— τῶν ee ee ee ee ee ——_ re ee rr τοῦ erie ce i ee ee ee ---ὦ
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM; SKC? CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
SUBJECT} SOLO is 2 ¢
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "PLANNED ATTENDANCE OF CANADIANS AT INTERNATIONAL LENIN SCHOOL, MOSCOW, USSR, DURING 1968."
The information set forth in the enclosed ΤΗΝ was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* to SAs WALTER A, BOYLE and RICHARD W, HANSEN on 5/31/67.
The enclosed LHM is classified ἢ ρ»β ζετο since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the
ing the national Security,
“φῶ, Bhfathl J L-PE
In order to either protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LUM has been Shown as being prepared, | at Vas] inlets ἌΝΩ
Nhe “604 ὦ ~ Bureau ED AM vt wach ¥ ἐς - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) CRM)
Zo OLA
ἊΝ 1 - Chicago K . ye . Ν ἔλβεθθα REC- a yop b pe (hh by A. 5 ἽΝ | — Ty 6 JUN 12 1867
Approved:
international communist movement, and thus adversely affect-
foo
a
,. τ mers " ᾿ - - " oe . : . - = πὶ . . " _ oF με ef - - - ; O , ᾿ | 6} . ᾿ = a | ΓῚ .
CG 134-46 Sub Β
The. information contained in the enclosed LHM | was obtained by CG 5824-8* in conversations in Toronto, Canada, during the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN,
neral Secretary, Communist Party of Canada.
a
οἱ
Go
aAMITHORITY DERIVED FROM:
: a
Oe ei ἢ ἐδ ἃ Ἢ 1 ΘΟ Ἢ LL? ὩΣ
In Reply, Please Refer to June 5, 1967
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Washington, D.C,
PLANNED ATTENDANCE OF ‘CANADIANS AT INTERNATIONAL LENIN SCHOOL,
MOSCOW, USSR, DURING 1968
During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:
A leading member of the Communist Party (CP) of Canada recently stated that although it has been past practice for the CP of Canada to send new students every year to the International Lenin School in Moscow, USSR, during the current year for the first time in years no Students were Sent. However, during 1968, the CP of Canada plans to send nine students to the International Lenin School in Moscow, Six of these will spend one year Studying there, while the remaining three will attend for only six months of study. Toe
CRET
Excludét\ from automatic ~ ... radiag and os
3
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of __ . investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
poor Frb 27 — ΝΟ
_ TELETYPE UNIT Juik τ 1967
» Casper.o wa , Callahan__.
SMCODED MESSAGE
wenne 33---~-
FBI NEW YORK
1906 PM URGENT 6-7-67 aws ay τοῖο, Ream putea 1898-42809 | ; Vi Miss Gandy
FROM NEW YORK 198-134637 oH if.
(Com SECURITY~-C.
CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH S ASTERISK ADVISED ON JUNE SEVEN NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN THAT HELEN WINTER HAS REQUESTED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS BE TURNED OVER TO HER ON JUNE EIGHT NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN. THIS MONEY 15 FOR EXPENSES FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL OFFICE.. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL IN THIS REQUEST. UACB, THIS MONEY WILL BE, GIVEN TO CG FIVE EIGHT Τυὸ Hn FOUR DASH S ASTERISK AROUND ELEVEN THIRTY AN ON JUNE EIGHT “ NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN, END
HOLD
ΠΕΡ... #2604 8332
S JUN 13 196
eis gee Tt \ im TORE δὰ ὃ yuna 88 _ Ban,
CC: MR, SULLIVAN
ἀπ τὸν
Ι ᾿ : " ᾿ - , κ᾽ wo . FD-36 (Rov, 5-22-64) 7 oO ει Ο ἰ - ἡ - - [
Transmit the following in
(Type.in plaintext or code)
να. ΑἸ REGISTERED ᾿ς. 0.
TO : ~DERECTOR, FBI (1002428091) " po oe bl λα, NEW YORK (100-134637) D.C ‘isa
| (Gro) ζ“
ES=C.
On 6/8/67; . theré was received from the Soviets, via. radio; ἃ partially coded-ciphered message ; the plain text of which is as follows: |
- “We plan to have ἃ personal. rendezyous with you at Elliott (Avenue J Subway Station, Brooklyn BMT Brighton Line) on June: 15. Usual time (7:05: PM). Your confirmation of this message by phone will ‘be considered also as your readiness for & personal rendezvous."
Tt ‘is the opinion of NY 694.5% that the Soviets wish to. pass on to hin personally a néew.ckpher pad, a i. -- revision of the open code. (se@ NY airtel 4/24/67) and. i possibly an adapter which is to be utilized in the. tape Jo. recorder Uher 4000 L Réportér (see NY airtel W28/8T) --
bs 764 Rep an 7 Mel
J urean (RM)
Chicago (2.5 16 Sub B)(AM RM)
NY 134-92 (τὴν) (42:
Ny 105-14931-sub- ¢ (TALANOV) (3421)
= WY 100=134637" (41) ue Ah ae Ld 0 Gf — (δ ᾿
S JUN 18 1957
eq -
- ᾿ Sent -----------------Μ Per
"ΣΕ τος
BM
1 OPTIONAL FO%m NO. 10 ’ 4 % MAT 1962 LOIION mores
GLA GIN, KG, NO, 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
yr
. Conr
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FROM ASE, Ἐς Downing
SUBJECT: (oro
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
transmitted to him by radio.
O 4,° MemorangunSOUTE IN ENVELOPE
bare: Juné 8, 1967
Totson
SULT peepee Tarvel ae Trotter
Tele. Room ~ Holmes =
Gendy ee
pr) peemeon
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications
On 6/8/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station.at Midland at which time a message, NR 276 GR 45, was intercepted,
The plain text and cipher text are attached.
The New York Office is aware of the contents.
ACTION: For information, me. Enclosure ΤΌΝ
με pe
1 - Mr. Conrad
2- Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
1 - Mr. Downing 1 - Mr. Newpher 1 - Mr. Paddock
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v™ 40262 09825 73412
NR 0276 GR 045
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06/08/67
21808 63105 00720 16304 58926 71517 82974 44607 48094 18813 354104 35254 39630 17372 19068 25094 87998 89926 26952 24341 18514 03739 07561 79686 45924 89902 43519 01042
49441 88636
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06/08/67
eh anfrobavelunor ἐμττηνουμήξιι τοτήειι orn θήσυν e[usuatt ΜΕ ΠΥ OuRlcONF rRMAT 1 ONOF{THI SME SSAGEp YPHONEN
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CLOT:
4 MAY Ieee Form 1 NO. ἰδ
A Be. PmomROULE LY Ὁ SLOPE qh “Memorandum
ΤΟ. DIRECTOR, FBI (100--428091) DATE: 6/9/67
«οὐ
Re- Chicago airtel 4/10/67 , Chicago teletype 5/15/67 and. Chicago airtel 5/29/67, in which information is set forth concerning efforts to arrange a meeting in the vicinity of Montreal, Canada, during the period August 21 - September 11, 1967, between GUS HALL, General Secretary ; Communist Party. (OP) , USA, and WILLIAM KASHTAN,. General . Secretary, CP of Canada.
AC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
σα 5824-Siis récent trip. to Canada during the period May 26-29, 1967; was made at the. express instruction ὍΣ HALL to. proceed. to Canada to arrange contact with KASHTAN and also. Yocate and rent housing for HALL and his family for a one to. ‘two: week period in Montreal 80 they: - can visit Expo 67 at the same time.
CG 5824-S* has advised that upon arrival in ya, Toronto, 86. had been in contact with KASHTAN and also with. ΒΡ ‘NORMAN. FREED, Nationad Education Director and member of 88 _— National Executive Committee of the: CP of Canada. The informant explained what was desired by HALL, and. KASHTAN Stated he would assign someone from the staff of the CP of | Canada to. locate such lodging for. HALL's' family subject to HALL s- or CG 5824- S*'s approvals It was ‘KASHTAN'S feéling that the best place to. locate HALL would be in the area of thie Laurentian Mountains.
CG. 5824-S* also purchased the local Montreal - nhewspapérs and Stated that they are "full of places to rent.
o-4 τον OD REC- 24 ,έ«- £2 cf - b&Qb
Bureau (RM): 1 ~ New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
Weweened perenne ΝΒΕΝΝ
1 ~ Chicago X03. som " WAB:mes TES ae JUN 14 1967 (4) a σοι
τς ΒΟΌΕῚΝ ENVELOPE
5 es 7 16 1067 aay U.S. Savings Bonds. Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
CG 134-46 SubB tt” oe
However, to inspect any number. of them to Locate what HALL would consider suitable would assuredly be a very time~- consuming task. Therefore, he has left this-in the hands ‘of KASHTAN although he is not convinced that the. CP af Canada will really apply itself to this jtask for HALL, He will continue to follow this mattér with KASHTAN. to insure that HALL gets the accommodations he-wants, - ;
FD-38 (Rev. 5-22-64) Cc) . Ae) I ᾿ ΕΒΙ Date: 6/3/67
Transmit th following in ἐ (Type in plaintext or code} AIRTEL νι42 " I
(Priority) Ι ee ee ee μα Loo νος TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100- 428091) . _ FROM HICAGO (134-46 Sub B) Ὦ ager” SUBJECT & “\
Re previous recent correspondence to the Bureau and New York relating to the visit to Toronto, Canada, made by CG 5824-S* from 5/26-29/67, Ib? On 6/9/67[ ____———_—idadvised SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W, HANSEN that there was received this date at the LYDIA WHITE drop address in Chicago, Illinois, a letter from WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP) of Canada. ‘The letter was postmarked Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 9:30 PM, 6/6/67. The letter intended for CG 5824-S*, currently in New York City, was dated 6/6/67 and the contents thereof are set forth below:
"Thanks for your note. Haven't had time yet to catch up with the press, but will make a or point to read the editonal, \
"Here too there is considerable interest and concern in the Middle East crisis with some good people temporarily disoriented. It requires patient explanatory work and avoidance of any appearance
a) γώ FELD REC. 24 [26 - 2.7.7 772 ἜΦΗ
Bureau (RM) 1 - New York (100~134637) (Into) (RM) 1 - Chicago “yi. 6. Jus 14 1967 WAB:mes “ ΒΟΟΣ ΜΕΝΟΝ
Β΄} aK “SNVELOPE
"Sent —_____—_M Per
CG 134-46 Sub B
of indifference to the existence of the
State of Israel, while developing a elear and firm line, AS you may have noticed wé issued a statement following the editorial which focused on some questions and this was very well receiyed in the course of the public meeting I addressed. Got good press and radio coverage.
W471i follow up on the item you spoke to me about, Should have something more definite by the end of thé month and will advise you on it. in the meantime al] the best.
‘AS ever UB n
The Bureau and New York were previously advised of the note forwarded to KASHTAN by CG 53824-8* making . reference to the editorial appearing in "The Tribune," weekly newspaper of the CP of Canada, and directing YKASHTAN's attention to the editorial in "The Worker." In the last paxagraph of the letter from KASHTAN, ‘the item you spoke to me about" refers to efforts by the CP of Canada to obtain suitable lodging - for GUS HALL, General Sécretary, CP, USA, on his projected visit to Canada 8/21 ~ 9/11/67 for conferences with WILLIAM KASHTAN and for a visit to Expo 67.
Ω - Route IN ENV! SLOPE
- ΝΝ ΝΞ _ 6/18/87 " " a _ deur. 8. 6. Putnam , 9 f ‘Airtel ΝΕ " “- a ae ᾿ . ie all :
‘To: Sac, New 1 York gano-134697) ΓΝ parector Fat (200~428008),—
25 τς INTERNAL sicuntry - ὦ couniunrst :
ivr
qouraiytel ἀλλ yinieh, enaloged a letterhead . nemorandu . CLE) captionsd MHaating of £ European. Communist ᾿ Parties at Karlovy Vary Czechoslovakia, Between April 24D
=
ΕΛ τσ _thia LM. the "ist word. “i the acted τὸ τὸ ΑΕ λα with ;
thustria and Ro mania. had indicated ‘they would not sigh any —
agreoment. ‘opposing | NATO." “pis Cantral- Intelligence Agency
gnquired ‘as to: ghether our’ source: may” not have .
_- .. .vather than. Austria 38. this Letter since: yugosiavia bas peer — overtly opposed’ tothe convocation of this conferences
junédiately xéecontact NY 604-8% and gaterming ᾿" Ξ'
: hich is. torrect. Advise by airtel. ΝΕ a! — ᾿ 1 + | μόριά | Tie |
cra inquired and. has, peen ‘answered. “gat, We are checking: τὰ. our Source” It, is yoted that ‘NY: -694-S* ‘peceived *_ this information on 4/5/67. wail in. advance ὁ of the date ὦ of” - this “conference, and CIA notes that the CP of. Austria attended the conrerence and signed, the ‘pesolution which indicates to τς ΟἿΑ ταδὶ they qould not, haye made this statement. Since the - - _ information obtained, by “NY 694-5* was received ἃ well in advance
= ‘of *the start of -the Conference; vit ‘4g, conceivable that. the ΟΡ. , Debosch of Austria. may have. c changed its mind. =s24 at τσ στσττττι 3. Reclays Woon e fi 262 ye LL wae
Ἐ: Calighon εὐττιτττ ἘᾺ}
ae | sont wer | ee goer UHL 967 | oe fone INN 1 ον _ L__BOMM.FBt _— :
eGo . . 7 ‘. ᾿ Gandy -““-πτὐ---- MAL oy TELETYPE ‘wor Cal
# " ΠΣ Ω a
‘reo 95.82.84) O oO | woe ROUTE IX ENVELOPE
/ ΖᾺ Date: 6/8/67
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code}
AIRTEL i Via ὍΝ _ a (Priority) | ee EE 1... .....-- -. TO ; DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM: eC CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) Q : SUBJECT: \_SOLO. «. 1s -
c 4
Re Chicago airteis’ 3/28 and 5/4/67 and New York airtels 4/21 and 4/27/67 concerning efforts of GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist. Party (cP), USA, to obtain an invitation from European CPs for the CP, USA to send’ an observer to the Copference of European Communist and Workers Parties which was held 4/24-25/67 at Karlovy Vary 5 Czechoslovakia.
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead: memorandum (LHM) entitled "EFFORTS BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA TO SEND AN OBSERVER TO THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES, KARLOVY VARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-25, 1967."
The information in the enclosed ΤΗ͂Ν was furnished on 5/31/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN by CG 5824~S*, who has furnished reliable information in the past.
The enclosed LHM has been classified TOP-SECRET” in order to protect the identity of this highly placed source who is furnishing jnformation on the highest level concerning the in communist movement.
ar ey mathe μι θᾳ, ὁ - “06,26 (304 - Bureau (Bn61S.,4) (BM) ' πος 1 -- New York (10 4637) Qinel. 1) (Info) (RM) ; 1 - Chicago, shi | 6 JUN.1S 1361 eS ἜΣ Uti pBxel04 ; — " | vam IN ENVELUY ᾿ aby ROUTE IN μ᾿ Per ——————
4
Approve
{
65 We wud ἃ
{\ " 1S it Agent in Charge 0
CG 234-46 3} Β
Unauthorized disclosure would jeopardize the security of this Source, thus adversely affect the national security.
The enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C., in order to further protect the identity of this source, -
The information in the enclosed ΤῊ} was obtained by CG 5824-S* in conversations at Toronto, Canada, during the period 5 /26-29/67 with WILLYAM KASHTAN, Getieral Secretary
of the CP of Canada. KASHTAN stated that in view of his OWN experience set forth herein, He was not at all surpriséd
that the CP, USA had not received. an. invitation to this meeting.
ΕἾ
στ QMAT
LASSIFICATION AUDTHORT
ἡ oa
DERIVED FROM:
LTE 3-08-2014:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Washington, D.C.
_ dn Reply, Please Refer to June 8 7 1967
. File No,
EFFORTS BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF CANADA TO SEND AN OBSERVER TO THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES, KARLOVY VARY,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-25, 1967.
During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:
It was learned that in late autumn or early
Winter, 1966, William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP) of Canada, had applied through the CP of the Soviet Union for an invitation for the CP of Canada to Send an observer to the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties scheduled for April 24-25, 1967, at. Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, At that time the Soviet Party had informed him that they considered it a very good idea, Subsequently, he did not hear another word about
it. When Kashtan attended the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany which was held April 17-22,
1966, in East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, -he had.
been in contact with fraternal delegates of the CP of the Soviet Union, the CP of Czechoslovakia, and other Parties who were going to attend the Karlovy Vary conference. Kashtan felt sure that certainly the Soviet delegates at least would Say something to him about the decision on
Canadian attendance at the European Parties’ meeting, but they
did not,
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outs ide your
jo o- pote γ. -.- 0223}
/
we FD-364Rev. 5-22-64) O
/ FBI 2 Kw Date: 6/8/67
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
AIRTEL Via .
{Priority}
a rere er em ce ττὰἪ ee ee ee eee ee ee eee eee eee eee ee
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM : ἢ CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
¥, SUBJECT; OLO “ὦ
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA,"
The information in the enclosed LHM was furnished on 5/31/67 to SAs WALTER A, BOYLE and RICHARD W.
; ΒΟΟΤΙΣῚΝ ENVELOPE
<< &
HANSEN by CG 5824-S*, who has furnished reliable information iy
in the past.
The enclosed LHM has. been classified Tonong in order: to protect the identity of this highly” place Source who 15 furnishing information on the highest level
concerning the: international communist movement, Unauthorized disclosure would’ jeopardize the security
of this source, thus adversely” affect the national security.
The enclosed ‘LH has been Shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C., in ofder to further protect the identity of this Source,
The in egaversa in the enclosed LHM was obtained
~ Bureau (Exel
by CG 5824-S* inc Yersations at Toronto, Canada, during 3 ἃ hs fcc GeoY ay eves REC-34 /00 — -Ζξβ 7. 9 3
) (CRM
aw
1 - New York@100-914 4637) (Encight) (Info) (ΒΜ) @ ‘yun 15 1997
1 - Chicago WAB:mes a or ee " (5) , tae! στ < We RO τ [Δ] RAR TET AD Υ 100 RO 65 JUN OY WORGmNG un 22 0h7 Ap! Bproveds Sent M Per
say Agent in Chore
CG 134-46 Sub Ε
the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada, and NORMAN FREED, Nat ional Education Director and member of the National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada.
σά LFICERP TOM AUTHORITY DERTTES ECLASSIFICATION tHe
sit
O 0 .
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
In Reply, Please Refer to June 8, 1967
File No.
Washington, D,C,
-
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA
During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:
During May, 1967, leaders of the Communist Party (CP) of Canada engaged in conversations relating to current problems and activities of the CP of Canada. Some of the matters referred to are related herein,
In the recent past the CP of Canada had sent a delegation of Canadian-Ukrainians for a visit to the USSR. They were accompanied by Tim Buck, National Chairman of the CP of Canada. This delegation had returned quite dissatisfied with their trip. Their discussions with representatives of the CP of the Soviet Union concerning matters of interest to Ukrainians had not satisfied them at 411, However, as of late May, 1967, Tim Buck had not returned and, therefore, the CP of Canada leadership was Still waiting for a report on this trip. As a matter of fact, the CP of Canada leadership did not even know where Buck was at that time nor when he expected to return.
According to high officials of the CP of Canada, the Party is having problems in Vancouver, British Columbia. The British Columbia provincial leader of the CP of Canada, Nigel Morgan, has been sick and in his absence some groups
decdwassifica
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI, It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your
ee [t= dafoi] 0390
SNCS
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA ᾿
composed of "leftists and pro-Chinese" communists have started forming and creating problems. These problems are far from solved,
In commenting on the youth meeting called by the CP of Canada on April 20-22, 1967, it was characterized aS a very good meeting. This meeting was held about 125 miles from Montreal and was attended by about 85 young people. Included in this gathering were youth of all sorts, even including Separatists, anarchists and communists. Α11. in attendance agreed that they are going to set up a new youth organization which will be Marxist-oriented -but -not actually a communist organization, The meeting and this deciSion were marked by a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of the youth,
ΟΕ ΤΕΤΟΞΈΣΟΘΝ AUTHORITY DERIVED FEOGH: FET AUTOMATIC DECTi SST LSS DATE 03-08-2012
FD-36 (Rev, §-22-64)
/ <2
te: 6/12/67. | “ Transmit the following in : yt ΄ (Type in plaintext or code} ATRIEL Via (Priority} eee nono “... -. TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-|,28091) [ν" FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) SUBJECT: Crono) i? =¢ /
Re previous communications concerning possible indictments in the current SEC investigation of stock | manipulations on, the American Stock Exchange. Ι΄
Through the NYO liaison with AUSA New York LAWRENCE NEWMAN, it has been ascertained that the Grand Jury. in the current SEC investigation of stock frauds is presently in recess, subject to recall by the US Attorney \K j whenever the latter sees fit to do so, ὃ
oS The said Grand Jury recessed immediately after yf indictments were. handéd down in the case involving Pentron AAD stock, the reason being that the USA's office desired to ~ evote some time to a review of information pertinent to Ve the prosecution of cases involving other ‘stocks, of which ν ον
there are nine,
A further reason for recessing the Grand Jury; according to AUSA NEWMAN, ig that the USA's office desires "to get the press off its back", because continued publicity | of the SEG case could ver “ἢ affect the stock market, |
Foy σῷ Wo eee ee
NO rztcce! ἃ (1.00-4.28092) (RM) ΤῊΣ προ ta) 09} (AM RM) γῇ 8 1-NY 100-134637 (1) pM JON LS 1967
po SE — ἣν ὩῚ a
Clastie ae
OD Sear bse
Approved: ΔΕ ἢ Sent M Per lial ἐπ - -- , δ ne 7 δ wo Sun t " pecia Agent in Charge
LASSTIPICRTION ADTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
ANTORATEIC DEC
Moo lPlCETIVA CATIT?
4TH G3-Oh-2012
Trotter
τοῖο. BE JU] Holmes 44 J
Gandy ..........ὕ..ὕ..
ὁ ~imr Ὁ
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
_ BY LIAISON Date: June. 13, 1967 1 + Hr. Hossburg a . 1 ~- Liaison ~ To; Director i ~ Hr. R. ἢ. Horner
Central Intelligence Agency Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
From; . John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: INTERNATIONAL LENIN SCHOOL | —— ᾿ “ΞΟ MOSCOW, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (Ὁ.5.5.8.}
-- -
A source which has furnished reliable informa~ tion in the past has advised as follows. a
A leading member. of the Communist Party of
Canada recently stated that Lt: had been the past practice. of the Communist Party of Canada to send students. to the. International Lenin School in Moscow, 'U.8.S.R., each year. No students are boing sent during the current year; however, during 1968 the Canadian Party plans to send nine students to this school. Six of these will spend one year studying if and the remaining three will attend for only six months. - + }
NOTE:
Classified “foppacéret"' since unauthorized dis- closure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such
“revelation could result in exceptionally graye damage to the Nation,
Infoxmation obtained from source during period _ 5/26-29/67 during a trip to Toronto, Canada and in conversa-— tion with William Kashtan, General Secretary, CP of/Gdnaday> Data extracted from Chicago airtel 6/5/67, captioned(™ IS-C," This informitigi igalso being furnished Legat- Ottawa for referral to by’ LEE.
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a
on
downgradiig and Wo? eclassification a a MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT
Ζ OFTIOHAL FORM ΝΟ, 10 s910=104 : ΜΑΥ 1962 EDITION eet - oo, : GSA GEM. REG, NO, 27 3 κ᾽ ‘ ἦ | Tolson
y7 / NUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT - DeLoach
Mohr
M emorandumROUTE IN ENVELOPE "ΕΞ
Conrad ὦ
TO : M : Conrag OE, DATE; June 13, 1967 . CE ματωντακανετεναντν αν
- ΓΖ - Trotter « ὡὰ . 7 ele..Room .- νον FRO . F. Downing Ae Holues ¢ om, andy Ν wo {7 [
SOLO
) coro) SECURITY - C Cp bRbn
Captioned case.involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.
On 6/13/ 67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted,
ACTION:
For information,
1 - Mr. Conrad "
ἃ - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mi. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. c. Putnam) 1 - Mr. Downing
1 - Mr. Newpher ες os 1 -Mr. Paddock
08 | | ᾿ 7 ΝΕ a 1 drv ah BB? |
(1) 7
εἶ ἤθη). ΚΕΝ De YO \—" : oo 43 sur 15 861. ΕΞ
65 JUN 11 δ"
OPTIONAL + a MAY 1962 a. 6
4 r GSA GIN. no! NO, 17 *”
, UN ITED STAT ES GOVERNMENT
φ Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELO,
5010 π|δ
ΤῸ : \Mr. W. C. Sullivan . DATE: 6/12/67 -*, 7 ia a ες “Ν . Ce ἑ - 2-Mr..DeLoach |. J yeite——— . FROM : C. D. Brennan Ἵ - Mr. Sullivans 7 ine 1 = νος Ὁ. Bréfnan “4 S- 1 - Nr. Re Ὁ, Putnam Ὁ
NTERNAL SECURITY ~ COMMUNIST οτος μα olbaigen
ἣν memorandum of 5/8/67 set. forth, ind ail, disbursement of funds by the Communist Party, USA, during April, 1967, which funds had previously been received from the Soviet Union and Red China since 9/58, The following schedule shows the receipt and disbursement, of auch funds during May, 1967.
. “rota FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 to τας τ δ,
Total received from Soviet πα 19 : Total received from Red China (all οὐ. 2710760), __ .50,,000,.00
ἃ Total received 9/58 to 4/30/67 ocecesesscccccese$4y 2377745. 19 : Total disbursed 9/58 to 4/30/67 ..scsecccesesese 3 267,905. 17 = =" Balance of Fund 4/30/67. secsoecreveesseer eS 969,840 .02 5 ΒΕΘΕΙΨΕΡ. -FROM SOVIET UNION 5/20/67 oe eccesccsinnd, 530, 000. 00 TOTAL ΟὟ 499᾽.,840: 02 ᾿ - τ τ
DISBURSEMENTS DURING MAY, 1967 All disbursements made on specific instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party USA. For Party expenses and ΝΡ ccc 60,000.00 ἱ -,
Honey spent on Hall or his family HES Whe? 5 2 / Apis
ὑὸς ΠΤ apparel for Hall.....s-+e9 αι Ί.
i's . . ene eeeeees 500, 00 Ing T car for/ 8511 s| _ Sooo - - -ὅ SUN, LS 1967 ΟΡ μα re 935.34
“eye Travel expenséeseor Hall's family. 368.00 .™ —
ft ‘~,, Miscellanéous expengés of Hall's | |
an FAMLLY cs cccascadicvecdececesecs 206, 00- τὶ
Total cccccccvecevsccccsscces$ayGL7 44 2,617.44 “an aged Ν CONTINUED - OVER
65 JUN 498 ΜΕ]
Memorandum to Mr, W. C. Sullivan ~ RE: SOLO: ° *00-428091
Gift for Henry Winston, Chairnan: of the
Communist Party, USA. seeeceececceverrecrseneed = - 35.00 Salary of Max Weinstein for work in 7 Τ
securing business opportunities for the- a.
ΡΨ ΚΎΜΗΝ + “ 300.00 Titinois District CHPENSCS. see τνενενννίν ον τις 200.00
᾿ Party expense for plane ticket for NY 694+ S* - Soe to Soviet Union in April, L967. cseerescceeee 526 .30
Rent on safe déposit box, New York City. cece . 57,15 TOTAL DISBURSEMENT MAY, 1967. ere abe δὰ "ἢ eee oS a“ 63,736 49
BALANCE OF FUND 5/31/67. one ὁ ane 9 erasererezate eve esl, 436, 103, 53
This money is held in safe deposit boxes under our control as follows:
In New YOLK. cc ccc cccccencseccees Si, 313, 182. 58 In Chicago... sscovccescrevcccens 122, 320, 9
ACTION:
None. This memorandum. 15 submitted for your information, An up-to-date accounting of Solo Funds will be brought, to your attention each month. Details. of the accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.
δὰ
Fou 7 We “ve
----- - - - τ ᾿ μι oF = ἢ _ . ay ΓΝ 2
FD-36 (Rev. §-22-64) O O : d ROUTH IN ENVELOP
Date: 6/6/67
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Vie AIRTEL I (Priority)
—— re me ee ...ὕ....ὕὄ. ...........................-...-. re ee ee ee eee ee ee ee
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
SUBJECT:\ ἫΝ a,
2 2
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "COMMUNIST PARTY OF SWEDEN,"
The information in the enclosed LHM- was furnished on 5/31/67 to SAs WALTER A, BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN by CG 5824- ‘SF, who has furnished: reliable information in the past.
The enclosed LHM is classified "§ ~ since unauthorized disclosure of the information set fo therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnish ing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect::. the national security.
In order teéfurther protect the identity of this source, ee sed LHM has been shown as being
prepared at W on, D.C.
y “i [oc φοῳ φεῤκέακες,, » ta ἦφ. Bureau (Etéls. 4) (RM) EX108 Get Ρ
fas inna
New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) Lo
1 - Chicago REG-34 0-0 - 4 - 5.6.7, -
WAB:mes “ (5) wtf. 6 JUN15 1967 n Νὰ ιτ ¢ ehecEr:
ΘΝ fee
ττττ — 2 . ᾿ proved: 1% Sent 2M OP σΣἙ Ἐ ΦὋοὃ’,.
ἃ Ν 1 yay i? Koent in Charge
CG 134-46 Sub B
The information in the enclosed LHM was ‘obtained by CG 5824-S* in conversations in Toronto, Canada; during the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada who attended as a fraternal delegate, Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. .
LAS SIFICATION AUTHORITY DHREIVED FROM: AUTOMETIL DELL! ; Ν
at ὧς
E 02-05-2012
O om -
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
In Reply, Please Refer to June 6, 1967
File No.
Washington, D.C, "ἢ
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SWEDEN
During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:
During the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany which was held in East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, from April 17 to 22, 1967, there waS some discussion among the fraternal delegations concerning recent developments in the Communist Party (CP) of Sweden. This Party has recently held its own congress and zis: now considering changing the name of the Party from CP to some other name, Such as possibly the Communist Socialist Party, or the Communist ‘Democratic Party, or the Communist Freedom Party, or a similar name. Eventually the Swedish Party plans to drop the word "communist" from titsi: name and will try to stand apart from the burdens imposed by association with the actions of the communist
countries,
in discussions about these developments in the
CP of Sweden among various fraternal delegations to the congress, including the CP of the Soviet Union and the CP of Czechoslovakia,
there waS generally agreement that this may be the way for the Swedes to break through to the masses of the Swedish people. It was felt that many CPs in western countries are in a rut and are not leading the masses and thus they may have to break with the past in order to break through to the masses. No .one considered the Swedish communists to be "revisionists" because of this attitude and no hostility was expressed against the Swedes and the CP of the Soviet Union delegates concurred in this position. :
conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It is the property of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and
its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
ΟΊ ΑΙ ΘΕ #
ΒῈῊ
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“Tele, Room 2
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CLEGAT, Ottawa ΝΕ ΠΥ οΜι5767.
‘sources ‘should Ὅ6.-Οδὰ
rion GUIDE™
“ENVELOPE
ROUTE IN
"Ὶ ~ Ur. Méssbure
_ Pirector, RBI (gonea28094): ; rte. ‘Ri ΗΕ. Horner
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA = INTERNAL SECURITY ~ Ὁ a
Enclosed ‘herevith are thre copics'.of a letter- ᾿ τ ‘head memorandum classified topeeeat and captioned - ὁ. “Planned Attendatice of Canadians at International Lenin - -School, ‘Moscow, ἴδε, ‘During’ 1968." ἢ ; ‘ um to- nn sis ‘These . - -
one hat no . ‘distribution .or ‘usé of our. intelligence information be undertaken ‘which ‘would be likely to jeopardize ‘the Security. 7 ‘of: our ‘source. | ; ΝΣ Ν
‘Enclosures = ‘3.
NOTE: OL 7 oe ; τ 7 ᾿ - " 5 . "-Ν _ ‘Enelostire classified "abp-e Yet" since unauthorized - ᾿ disclosure of this information could reveal the: identity.
of the source (CG 5824-S*) who. is, of continuing value and =~ such revelation "σου result 3 in exceptionally grave ‘damage -(ὁ
ἴο the Nation. — " ; By- separate letter this infortiation, has also ΝΣ - béeh farhishea, ΟἿΑ, -
- ἘΠ -" τος
αλλ 9 a: on iG. JUN 14 1967
TeLetyps ontr Lo].
σ-- BEST COPY AVAILABLE G/1B/ET PLAT TEXT ATRTOL ᾿ . ρ΄. ν᾿ DINECTOR, FAT (29-0) ᾿ ᾿ | FROM: GAG, NEW YORK (29-0) ὴ SUDIEC?; τοιοῦ : Allored Possible ~ ~ | PUA Violatisna gt the Pirct - National Tank of Lincolniwead (Ω Lindsinwood, Tilinois OD ΡΛ μὴ | at (\ | NetCairtels, 6/5, 6/67. © 7 on 6/12/67, AUDA PAUL ἢν GRAND, SoU, advised ες SA FRANCIS P, HENRY that AUOA TAVRENCE W. ΣῈ wily Lea on eave. GRAD is assisting NEWUAN in the CEC investication - NS and is-faniliay with captioned ratter. ca GMAND stated he doneurs-with the decipim of USA | Ξ. ΤΥΙΔΉΏ Vs HANRAIAU, Chicas to hold captioned PRA investirationx - in abeyance pending completion of the Gnd care. GRALD-stated a that on actiye FPA investifationoof the First Notional Lan; Έ. of Lingolmuosd now nicht préxaturcly dicclosa information ~ ang Witnesses πασᾶ in the SEC cane. . Ξ ; "ghar stated he 46 gure AUSA ΠΡΙΣΤΔΙ alco wilt agree 2 With USA EMIRATAN's position, GoanD stated ho will. Ὃ ῬΏΟΣ ΦΑΑΤῚ bring this matter to TAs attention when YOMNAN veturns to wort. τ ᾿ ἢ ὦ Tureau : | AE « 100-NCIS51) | “3 Chieacy . «ἃ ; 5 131637) " b7D τι. ie no han Ri νὸς : aay τὶ {linia ee 7 ON eaten | NOT RECORDED Be . 172 Ju 124967 "8 ΜΗ . ” ey ᾿ . lane semana ἰπασκ σαν — θυυ} 19196}: οι
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
6/8/67
AIRTL
70 : DIRECTOR, FOX (29-9) PROT τ SAC, Cilteaca (29-9)
σίας ον CUBIECTG; Alleced Pocatble FRA Violaticag At The First Nations Lank of Lincolrycod Lincolnvcod, Y1linois FS PA
fe Chicags airtel, 6/5/67.
On 6/6/67 ssf eee ALAC EYLG -G. CLAMS that inaswuen os the alliexations criginated
with ΔΌΞΑ NENMAN in Now York City, USA EDVARD. V. IIANRATAN cesired that AUOA ΝΠ ΔῊ bo udvised that any FRA investica~ tion would bo hold in abeyance pending conpletion of the Ot anvestication,. .
Now Yorks, without dicclosing any information about Caicage inforsants, advisd AUSA HOWIAN ag xequested by GOA TANRAGAN,
Kew York anvice the Curcau and Chicago of the reaction of NEWMAN.
4 = Bureau (1) - 109.-4:0 00}} a» New York (1) (1 « 199-~-104597)
= Chicaro (1 . B) " cayibas 76 Φ .- Zieh /
NOT RECORDED 172 JUL 12 1967
|
ι. 59.011 9496}
διαπποιιαϑλυνλβ, ψαμμμκαλλννααν ert ᾿
5981 -- /
i
᾿ “ ORIGINAL FILED IN a7
bi7D
AIRTEL
we ΡΊ TO : DIRECTOR, FBI FROM: SAC,. CHICAGO (29-0)
UNSUBS;
ALLEGED POSSIBLE FRA VIOLATIONS AT THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LINCOLNTOOD, LINCOLNWOOD, ILLINOIS
Enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) copies aptioned 'tHEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN AND UR, CONDUCTED HAY 10, 1967, STATES COURTHOUSE IN FOLEYS SQUARE, NEW YORE." Enclosed for New: York is one (1) copy of foregoing captioned | menorandum.
By letter dated 5/25/67, from the USA, Chicago, it was requested that an Agent by assigned for the purpose of conducting an investigation into. various alleged FRA violations at the First National Bank of rorri\r| meee aan
liinois, and that the Agent assigned contact AUSA to discuss: the matter further.
On 5/31/67, avsal ——arreoroa memated. a copy of Ce fon ὁ 70. which reflected his interview of - .
on 5/10/67, at the United States Courthouse
(4)- sreau (Enc. 2)(RM) | | 00 HAE 4.327]...
100-428091) 3 - New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (RU) NOT RECORDED ~ Chicago 483 JUL 12 1967 (1+134~-46 τς B) (1 pamnerermee recraremreat Tommi EJN/rus/meb (6)
71 sur (9 667!"
417.
ar ΩΣ
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C& 259-06
dn Βοΐογο Square, Now York City. Ler eeghared that. there is a FGJ investigation boing currontiy cofducted at
Now York City into a nation-wide stock fraud coal, the Anvestipation of whicl ἐν δὴ the Secnritics and Exch asion (S currently employed
as ἃ, of Installment Loans pt the First Wational Lank o colnwood, has beon going to New a York City on one-day trips to holp out the SEC investigation, ba
While there, hé ΔῸΣ olked about the information contained IC in onclosed nemo, gaid, cedpite tho fact that yosides in the Chicago arog, it was suggested by AUSA LAURENCE NUWIAY of the Now Yerk City USA's Office that it would bo better o have one of the AU3As fron Chicago como to Now York to θοῦ, and record any information ko had to furnish as was re -noryoud and fearful of possible hoodlum reteli~ —- ation, said that, in his opinion, an investigation - should Eade santo any gilesed FRA violations in enclosed ΕΣ monorandum, . ἷ
| A rovicew of enclos¢d memorandum reflects it to be ἃ father vague and self-serving documont waich mainly recounts the. acquisition of the First Notional Rank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois, by a group headed by INVING PROJANSEY ᾿ and ARTHET C, KELLER arid tho alleged over-tho-logal-Limit - loan prociivitied of the bans with various. individuais and — companies from waich tho bank will reportedly suficr loases of approxinately $209,000, Such oyor-the-legal~Limit Joan, ag deberibed, are not FRA yiolationS but are covered by the repulatory powers of the National Dank Cxaminors. An investiga tion into the cireunstances of these loans would be ἃ “fishing
expedition’ as, according to cnelosged momorandun, the National Bank Lxamivors wore cognizant of these loans and would havo referred them kad thoy beon FRA violations..
. ο momorandun ὅσου atate tha wag toid ty ona | ono of the threo principain in Automatic: bee _ *Kecounking Orporation, which company had obtained loans οὐ Be
CG 29-0
at the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, that, as to any payoffs, Automatic Accounting Corporation gave Air Travel Credit Cards to ARTHUR KELLER, IRVING PROJANSKY and his son, STUART PROJANSKY, 211 officers of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, but does not indicate ζ ιβαὶ οὐ, or any, use
of the cards by these individuals. also coral] that he had made gone ai payments for STUART PROJAN on PROJANSKY'sS car, that in consideration of the loan from Dr. to Automatic Accounting Corporation, that STUART PROJANSKY was gi 000 or $5,000, This loan was a personal loan by to Automatic Accounting Corpora an did not know whether the bank had foonede ey
ing Corporation,
Various individuals named in the memorandum are familiar to the Chicagd Office as follows:
It is noted that on page 1 of the memorandum, the name of CG 5824~8* is mentioned as a stockholder of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood. This is the only mention of this_Chicago informant and no allegations are made by implicating him in any of the transactions described. As the Bureau is already aware, CG 5824-§* is involved in the current. investigation of alleged manipulation of stocks on the American Stock Exchange ‘being conducted by SEC. This investigation reportedly now centers upon activities of individuals connected with the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, ‘However, the disclosures of _| whose interview arose during the SEC investigation, appear to have no impact upon the SOLO operation at this: time.
| ad on page 13 of the memorandum the name of is mentioned as{__P= the, Gaylur Mercantile Company of Chicago. was
reportedly brought into the bank by GEORGE BIEBER, 2 Chicago attorney and stockholder in the bank,to examine
the money to loan to Automatic Account-
08
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lb7D
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ΕΝ ͵᾿ — ee BEST COPY AVAILABLE
CG 29-0 . ᾿" . 7
the books as to thd howly discovered over- loans, In conngction with this situation, purchasod a quantity of cameras and agreod to pay off. Tine-Life and dispose of ‘tho hooks, which coais had originally boon sot up by the Automatic Accounting Corporation, ‘The Gaylur Mercantile Company also obtained an $30,000 loan from thé ban: in this con—
nection. Informant has advised that these aro Lovitiniate. trangactions which would not be of concern td investiga-
᾿ ΤΌΣΩ of FRA matters, Ho advisod that FELIX ALDERISIO
and other top hoodlums have no interost in this bank's
operations,
7D
GEONGH BIEDER ἐπ᾿ ὰ Chicano attorncy who, together with his partnor HICHARL BNOLSIN, of the firm of Bichbor . and Brodléin, has for a number of years roprosonted nunecrous major Chicato hoodlum and thieves in local crininal courts. Chicano informants have advised that BIEBER and PRORXIN | have often bragged that there is not a caso in Cook County Folony Courts which they cannot fix, ΝΕ
” fin artiels appeared dan the "Chicago Sun-Times" of
6/2/67, entitled "Four Chicago Men Indicted in Pontyon Erdding Probo," which article concerned the indictment at Now York City of six indiyicuels including OSEORN ANDREAS, SPENO FURUA, , ὁ. OBERT NESS and WANK HOLLAND, nll. of Chicago, Illinois, and PAUL DEYSCHUDER and HARIO TLOURONE, both of Now York, for fraudulent activities in the sale of Pentron stock. The article stated that the Grand Jury anveatigation is also reyvortedly ‘looking into suspicious trading activity in Nowland Products Inc., Lecce ~ Hevilic Company, Diversified Wetals Cotp., Horcules Galion Products Inc., Duraloy Company and 5 dustrios Inc. 11 will be noted that in oncloged mono, advised that IRVING PLOJANSSY is.on the board of Hercules Galion,
᾿, ᾿ On 6/2/67, in view of tho forogoing “iriformation davalape veardiny Chicavo informants CG 5924-5* (Operation USA EDWARD V,, HANRADAN, Chicaro, - was
CG 29-0
contacted by ASAC KYLE 6. CLARK and without disclosing the information developed relative to the two foregoing Chicago informants, the advisability of commencing the requested FRA investigation in the light of the current SEC investigation was discussede HANRAHAN advised that he was in full agree- ment with Mr, CLARK that investigation of any possible FRA violations in enclosed memo be held in abeyance until the BEC has completed its FGJ investigation and returned any further indictments at which time they are reportodly to turn over 811 information of pertinence to FBI jurisdiction which is d@tained in the course of SEC investigation,
. in. view of the foregoing, no investigation will be condticted by Chicago at this time,
New York is requested. to follow SEC investigation through reliable officials and furnish the Bureau and Chicago any information obtained concerning the First. National Bank. of Lincolnwood or its board members and stockholders ..
[δ a5
1 A
' ὃ τ: τ ὃ. τῷ ΟΒΟΤ “ EXVENOPE
7 Legat, Ottawa 6/14/67 ᾽ Director, FBI (100.428091. -. 1 μ᾿ Ὡς, C. Putnan
COLMUNIST PARTY, USA: TITTERNATIONAL RELATIONS _ INTERNAL SECURITY «Ὁ
There are enclosed three. copied of a letterhead menorandun classified "Td et," captioned as above, Also enclosed are. copies of literature "yeceived by. the Communist Party, USA, fron the Communist Party of ‘Canada,
Pronptly furnish a copy of tho enclosed dun — ure to your source in the ᾿ ὉΠ Your source should: be cautione - εἰ assentia no distribution or use of our Intelligence Anfornation 86. undortaken. which would bo likely to jeopardize the security of our sources.
Enclosures ~ 7 . 1 = Foreign Liaison Unit Cou thro
; ROP rest col” (5)
uO NOTE:
for review) -
See letterhead memoranduri captioned "Communist: -
Party, USA: International Relations," dated June 14, 1967, 7 ὃ prepared by RCPiest. Only t ‘of literature being sent C _begat for dissemiriation tol binee there is no“need ‘for
~Legat to retain a copy. te
—_ ” - = A δι » τ
MAILED ἃ JUN 15.1967 a, - ᾿ Ἕ
6 JUN 15 1967
- | ee |
ΕΟΊΑ SIF EGAEEGH
OR
CULE Pepe ee eee aaa τ ROL’ _ VLO8E 7 . ὥ “ἢ. ---- “ἃ μ Η Maelo -
FEL MITOMATIOC ΤΙ LATE JPG-Geé-201e2
Η τ (er Εν ͵ - ἂν ὧδ Kh ORE τῷ ἢ πᾷ Ἢ wie "τὴ ᾿
ω
᾿ te, ᾿ ᾿ 1 “ Mr, R. Cc. Putnam June 14, 1967
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA YUTENNATIOUAY, RELATIONS:
-..... . The folloving was supplied by sources which have furnished reliable. information in the past:
_... . che Connunist Party, USA (CPUSA), has been
contacted by. officinis of tha Communist. Party of Canada
(CPC) vegarding possible means.of providing support for Ὁ the struggle of tho. Portuguese "Patriots Fighting Oppression,” both in Portugal and. alongside the national liberation .
J « forées in the colonial wars of Africn, | 2 ae ἀξ hns been learned that the GPC. sent literature Ww. Gelcerning this matter te the CPUSA. This literature (Ν κα consisted of thé following:
“ἮΝ A pamphlet entitiod "Report on a Mission to . Portugai"; a bulletin entitled "Portuguese and Colonial - Gulletin," dated February/April, 19673. a leaflet ontitled . Submission to the Commission on Hunan Rights of the - . United: Nations"; snd a letterhead of the. Canadian Comittee for Amnesty in Portugal, Copies of these doctnshts are attached to this memorandum. Notations appearing thereon ᾿ Wore. affixed by officials of the CPC,
" The CPUSA. hag boon requested to secure. additional ᾿ Copies of this literatura for distribution to key members. of the. United States Congress. ‘The CPC expressed hope that. this literature could be sent. to the congressmen along with 5S accompanying letters fron citizens" groups in the United. Stites organized for tha purpose of urging action - -Against. the Government of Portugal. It was further proposed that the iiterature be furnished leaders of groups in the United States: interested in-civil liberties. The Literature is to be-used to initiate a conference in the United States.
LUC BAUS. FX
‘ae HO
βιὰ ΠΣ ὍΣ amnesty for political prisoners in Portugal,
Wick ἘΣ τ 100-428091 | i GSD EE carer - ᾿
᾿ Gellehon a 1 = Foreign Liaison Unit, (Route through for, yeview)
Felt - RCP:est Cof/ Be See - . 7
FROSGT eine 6) BE NOTE PAGE TWO.
Sullfven νότιος αν... - .
ΕΠ GT cee ' Ὶ Tele. Room ——
ι Holmes πως
| “et — ωὼ - in | ft o- if τ 4 ὦ GL - δ 23
»--- τ
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
τιν
- ΟΜ PANTY, ἘΔ | INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The CPC furthos rucgosted that a citizens! comaittes to obtain amnesty for political pricozers in Porthoal be forned in the United States to dovalop digison with sinilar proups in Canaca and South Smorica.
A tajor projcet of such pa group would be to focus attontion oi the statua of political prictnors in Portuyzni by bringing tke catter up before the Yaited Nations. Other dctivitios would inalude drawing world-aide attention to epdcial griavous cacts, tho prowiny presonce of tha Korth AtJantic Treaty Orcanination in and around Pértural, and the role tho United States plays in providing arms. : ἀρᾷ support for tha Governxont of Portural. .
Attachzents . : NOTE: .
Classified "Topraearet” since unauthérized _. disclosure of this information could reveal identity of _the sources (NY 694-53} and CG 5824-S*) who are of con- tinuing value and ‘such xvevelation, could result in @specially grave damage to the nation. Data extracted from NY airtel, 5/22/67 and CG airtel 6/5/67, both captioned "Solo, IS «αν, Data& contained herein has. been previously diss ed to State and CIA. Copies of enclosures being sent as attachments to the LHM are already in our file.-
1
--
9:10 ΑΜ June 15, 1967
that-as I knew, when the Soviets give our Solo.informant money,, we keep a careful account and make him account for it to the penny. He continued that Gus: Hall, Chairman-of the Communist.Party, has contacted Solo and indicated he wants this morning $250, 000 for expenses. Mr. DeLoach said: this will.be:taken from. the Soviet funds.and not the FBI's and he seés‘no alternative except. to-give it'to him. I'told.Mr. DeLoach this was all right. as long as it comes from the:money that camé over from abroad.
Mr. DeLoach said it Will bé taken care of.
the. - . .... Very truly yours, iA ALE κῷ John Edgar Hoover 233 Director, 00. Vhs ALCY a 6 ι “REG 49 ᾿
ΝΝ 6 ΔΝ 16 167
SENT FROM D. Ὁ.
| tate ΟΥΤΩΣ
DATE , pf eal oy - BY - :
_SBHedm () ΝΞ Ὁ
Tele, Room. \: Sau 80,108 ?eLeryPe unit Lo]
ἘΒΟΜ ἵ
ῷ- Bureau (RM) eile Palo -* ? ga3t
OPTIONAL FORM Μου τῷ MAY 1982 EDIT: GSA FPMR [εἴ CFR) iov-t1.6
UNITED STATES Memorandum a
DATE: 6/9/67.
ΝΕ at
“Canada ‘by, ‘CARL’ LEICHTMAN of Prompt Press, “New York. Gity,, ~ to Survey. the ‘printing establishment of the ‘Communist Party (CP) of Canada.
During his recent trip. to. Canada May 26-29, 1967, CG 5824.84 inquired from. WILLIAM KASHTAN; Gerieral Secretary, CP of Canada, whether or not LEICHTMAN had’ arrived in -
᾿ Canada and visited their printing plant. — -KABHTAN: advised.
ye. oe ππιν
had arrived 10 ‘one had ‘called it, to: KASHTAN's attention. ‘Since this. would bé unlikely, KASHTAN was of the opinion that as. of ‘that date CARL LE ICHTMAN' had : not yet. made the. . trip. _
(be
j—9et Fy ἜΙΩ “YE = New York (100-184637) (Info) (ἘΜ). 1 - - Chicago WAB:més : 6 JUN 16 ir (4): ᾿
me το . ᾿ Ν ὅπᾳ “πε
_ ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
| Buy ὕ.5. Savings Bonds Regular on the Papell ΤΠ Savings Plan
e) have ROUTE | [5] 1cLOPE
-
ΨΩ f spon (bet)
i
aan ~_ oma . - -- ON . mo | ὀέτο ov. 12-22-65) D> ΝΙΝ - παν ;
4
Date: -g~1- 67 ;
iy Director, FBI ᾿ (Βυ}18 > 100- soso ) -
, Attention 3 —— -. : ᾿ i Legal iby { 105-684 oo ͵ | Tj ΜΝ | Title we) ,Character *~ : ; Ν ' Ι
“COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA
Reference : ΜΝ ᾿ ᾿ | =.
- (00: Bureau) ‘BUléet 3-28- 67, re "WILLIAM ΕΝ ‘SYDNEY, ‘IS~ δ, ἊΝ
* two copies | 9
‘Remarks:
Dissemination. - (i peepee GC
‘E_] May be niade « as , received
. May.be made. as indicated by stamp on enclos - τ τ μπῇ Ex] May nét:be made without: further cléarance ΠΝ : ; "ἝΝ
a
Followirig offices would-be interested in. receiving copies of enclosures: Ν ᾿ τὴς |
“New York Status with this office: ᾿
δ) aN
TO
Gendy —
: Mr, coma HP DATE: June 13, 1967 oe ι FROM Ge Tele, Room —
enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on.the same. day.
OPTIONAL FOM NO, 10 351 δα] MAT 1947 EDITION GOYA GIA, REG, NO, 1} Tolson
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Trotter —
wT) Ἐ, Downing Holmes ~
TERNAL SECURITY - C
On 6/13/67, the New York Office furnished the text of three.“ messages which the informant desired to send and requested that they be
i
The plain text and cipher text are attached, ᾿ . ᾿ pppoe ACTION: | ee ξς,
For information,
=
Enclosure 1 - Mr. Conrad . (i ἢ 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
1 - Mr. Downing 1 - Mr. Newpher 1 - Mr. Paddock ἐκ
neo 19 J pf AO — b3 ᾿ ᾿ 7 ; —— et τῷ
tg JUN 16 1967
t Ἰ ee — |
HS:dpy (7)
Ik
65 JUB 20 ΟΝ
Η » - , 7 OT 7 τ : a - - * -
6/13/67
05305 38544 05581 92303 44714 92191 16732 23305 31975 71237
82699 48946 04521, 95929 54953 86346 33152 16453 00087 74058
es
[CALL ἀν ΙΓ ouRaT Tent Lonsga inte qorla}a Hee ΤΣ | (ser sive]
oO | Oo
94073 67610 49727 76380 81872 92162 20999 35316 78889 85440 66762 39777 03335 72842 63588 71378 04944 09356 81708 56690 440341 10290 18267 05794 02062 07724 61069 52641 51835 02335 56915 92527 10199 57125 19944 26361
“ (87362 48836 $4806 91547 85344 68465 758417 54376 95414 86166
[rour. 8 ἤθλ 5 renat sr helverelweanouds ἃ ocayprsteKBanc 9] {veReyfoars ional faLsqweanplte[rHigcont inves||reRHar sy oUsHoULUMAKeWENresT gr onee TTENHOURS||W I THFEWEHD IST uRaANces||oPRING)l.
59429 07172 45455 378538
79520
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41219 37075 81920 19313 89887 22449 77709 13659 33805 6i020
38359 63607 92995 49541 96720 04255 96985
JHavef\LReapypuRcHasedunedsléooddirerorrer [SPR itd
SAC, New York (100-134637) August 24, 1967
Attention: SAC SAC Dillard W. Howell ἡ Director, FBI (100-428091) -- G3UQ
SOLO Is -C Kee
TRAMUS Reference is made to-your letter of 6/13/67, captioned as above, in which you forwarded 3, 116 pages of Xerox reproductions of money .in the amount of-$240, 000.
Serial numbers of the money on the 3,116 pages have been
recorded in the Automatic Data Processing Unit. These numbers will.
be 8 compared and added to the index.
There are being forwarded to your office under separate cover 3, 116 pages of Xerox reproductions..
Fou -
(6)
1 - SAC Dillard W. Howell (with Xerox reproductions) 1- Mr. Row
{ ὀ νρδέγοτιι κου - |, inne sixtas covertoen ΠΟΌΤΕ IN ENVELOPE
% Memorandum
|
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091 | ATE: 6/13/67
D. (ATTN: VOUCHER STATISTIC ἜΡΙΟΝ) SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
OLO Is C
TRAMUS,
Enclosed for the Bureau are 3,116 pages of xerox of money representing $240,000.00 in $20.00 denominations. This represents only part of the $530,000.00 received by NY 694-S* from the Soviets on 5/20/67.
Records of these bills should contain the reference, "ΝΥ 65-17696-A1391". It is also requested that the record contain the page number of the xerox which number may be found on the lower right hand corner of each sheet.
The enclosed material should be returned to the NYO after processing.
7- 2.0. 7.2 ; 3\~ Bu Encis. 3,116) (ΕΝ i 9) ἀν το δοίοηςε δυβέζαν Εν db Qtton) 1 - New York {395 17696) (343) : _ ΧΩ ἬΝ 1 - New York (41) S- JFL: rmp SG)
me (64 - fitog/ — 0815.
px 94) wat ᾿ ἰ «ὋΝ 15 1967
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
=
+ suet
ΝΣ | " τς 6/18/67
" Airtel το ΕΞ ΕΣ ΕΞ " ΦΧ as oo, ΝΞ
τς fo: | BACs, Chicago (13446 sub.B) ὁ ΝΣ - ᾿ New York (100-134637) | _ : “εν
os From: Director, FBI . (100=488001) es
‘SOLO’ ΝΕ ae — . 7 TRTERNAL: SECURITY - -» “ὐοιμσντον ἢ .
| τς In. orde® ‘to insure that..all. “Anformation on: tlié -
τὸν ἡ ‘yé-establishiont of & daily newspaper ig: available. atthe - earliest possible: ‘date, New York. and ‘Chicago should take the - following. steps.
~ ἃς NY: 694-9: ‘and CG 5B24~S%. are ‘to be given a τς specific. assignments. to. determing, everything: possibly ‘relating to this. matter; Particular |
. τς \ + emphasis must be placed upon. the financial
-ις 7 . commitments ‘mide by the Communist Party,. USA, =- > oo or .Gua’'Hall toward. purchase: ‘of: equipment: ox
Boe | get ΝΝΝ supplies. to. ‘re-cstablish ἃ daily:. newspaper. _ .
τι ᾿ ΝΣ ς 18, This matter is ἴο be. Zollowed most. elosely oot τς ‘and the Bureau immediatély, advised ‘of pertinent.
— - τ πὰ το" information developed:
a . Ν . 8, Insure. ‘that pertinent. information trom τος other ‘sources, particularly that: relating to:
- for. supplies and ‘equipment; are. furnishad the ‘Bureau at. the earliest possible date.
- 1 : eh τ = " a3 μος κα 7 NOTE: Gus ‘Hall, “General. Secretary, CPUSA, ‘has stated
that it will cost -one million doliars-to. re-edtablish a * DeLoach cnn daily newspaper’ and $600,000 a year to maintain it. The _—= expenditure of. stich. anounts: of money should be of. utmost
ical interest to ote 5 [6 σ- 4: 2 SoG 722 ὁ.
8 JUN 16.1867 i yy
. 4
Sullivan pee ἡ Tavel . Trotter
a . ae -
---
financial. transactions. and, Party ‘commitments *
© our NANvaLorE”
Φ
NR,
“Tolson a DeLoach < ---- --- Mohr ----.--.. WACK men Se,
Casper ————— * CeHohan . Fete <a Feh : Gale ΚΙ Rosen — Sullivan — ——— . Tavel
Trotter. iy,
Shia
“MAILED 39
061,3. 1967 |
go ROUTE IN ENV ELOPE:
SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)
-- . 6/19/67 | PERSONAL ATTENTION —
director, FBE (100-428091) —
SOLO ' Δ =r. R. δ. Putnam NTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
Reurlet 6/8/67 whicli-requests tho Bureau to furnish its observations relative to the conviction of ες τος the Chicago Office that tha location of a replacenent for ΕΞ CG 5824-S* cannot be conceived of as the responsibility of - _ the Chicago Office alone.
Your letter has. been carefully reviewed. To clear bP. Any misconceptions the following. points are being set. orth.
1, The Bureau: has ἢ not intention of making the
Chicago Office solely responsible for the Location
of a replacenent fox CG 5824-S*, As the Bureau | (Δ.
views the problem, the first logical step in a
matter of such prime importance is to désignate.
@ coordinator, Chicago is in a unique position
‘since it ig the home of CG 5824-S*,. ‘Therefore, . _ it. is logical, that Chicago become the coordinator... -
of this search,
|
OO ; 2. Since CG 5824-8* is the most. active, politically,
of our Solo informants, Chicago is in a position to critically analyze the work of other offices toward developing a suitable replacement for this informant . This is the task of a coordinator ..
3... ‘Bulet of 6/6/67 notes ‘that there has been considerable correspondence under various captions over the years concerning this matter.. The purpose . of the Bureau letter was to centralize. our efforts. .
- wnder. one caption and. institute a fresh start. As a Pirst step Chicago. Should formulate a plan of - action directéd -toward: oplisting the cooperation
of selected major: of. ces in locating ANS Ge bi ment for CG 5824.5*; δ Jee 22 “πᾶ
RCP: dmk : @ py |
wv VA
} vevetype unr LJ
ποδίος to , dlidengo. SOLO 100~428091"
ΒΗ
4. Your Letter requosted ‘that you, he. pdviaod of the results: obtained and progress made under ~~ inatructions set forth in Burea letter 1/31/67 ᾿ captioned. "High Level Informant Developnont b- | GPUSA.” ‘There have boen fio favorable yesponses - to this. Ἰούδαν, tos
By Your “I6ttor tiotes that tha T1lindis District has but iimitod numbor of national leaders: ΟἹ. the Communist Party, USA, While the prepondorance of national Loaders aro in New York and it is from the ranks of national lodders that a xroplacé- , mont for CG 5824-8* must be found. It could ‘ba that there is an altéynotive., The assignments of CG 5824-8* ard many, varied, and complicatad., ‘The , informant ‘himself ig a most unusual individual. iy | πΐ may woll be necessary, to locate: several . ’ gridividuale who havo sone of CG 5824<5*"s attria — putes: and utilize cach in separite spheres Of δὰ infornant's activities. ‘6. In any 'evyont, ἃ diglogue on this probien a τος hus been atdrted. By saparatd cover Rew York will ΝΞ ‘ba: Advised of the institution of this s¢arch and instructed to dévelop idoas for a frosh start. - . Copies of all coumuhications will bo dixactéd ‘to Do ha. Βαχῦϑα: and Chicage. .
' - —_ 2 we, Tye ᾿ . + , "
δὶ
9422
“
Of? Cr
|
ee
a τ
OFTICNAL pein NO. it MAY 1982 ED
ietemnet - SQewwert ROUTE IN 8 MNVELOPE Memorandum |
428091) paTE: 6/8/67 / Personal Attention: SAC, CHYCAGOL(134=46 Sub B) CHARLES Ὅς BRENNAN ae. (134 ub B) Internal ‘Security Section Domestic Inteligence βου
ye a ny, oe
Re Bureau letter to: Chicago dated w/a captioned "SOLO; IS ~C," setting forth observations and instructions for the Chicago Office relative to the development of a suitable replacement for CG 5824-S* in the Solo operation. Referenced Bureau letter instructed that on a continuing basis Chicago should submit factual iétters of results — obtained in this regard at monthly intervals beginning 6/30/67.
DIRECTOR, FBI (109
As the Buyeau 15 aware, I have given this
prograin my close continuing personal. ‘attention over a period of years and 1 will continue to. .do. so in the future. Alt responsible personnel in. the Chicago Office are awdre that the solution to this problem is among the most important responsibilities we have in the Internal Security field. This office has made. initiatives to the Bureau on this subject on numerous occasions and will continue to exert.
_-. -@yery effort in this regard,
Litt ες. ς Α͂
It is noted. that referenced: Bureaw Jetter yas directed to the Chicago Office with no, copies thereof nor instructions therein set forth for other offices throughout ‘the field. TI would like to note that on many occasions in the past. I have personally communicated to the Bureau the
conviction of all concerned. personne} in this: office that the
solution to this problem cannot be- sought .or obtained through recourse to the yesources of this office aAloné nor the potential - existing among communist subjects within the confines
of the Illinois District, Communist Party (CP), USA,
“HR το δ
REC. 54 Joo - “αφοφΖ΄ 6S 45
- Bureau CRM). πεῖραν ποτοῦ snes - Chicago -“" | | EX108 6 JUN-20 1967 mes 485 S83 EH 4 " ΕΝ (3) ΝΕ ieee str LETTE ἐδ
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
vl 22 [96] Buy. U.S, Savings Bonds Regulars 28 on the Payroll Savings Plan —
-_
CG 134-46 Sub Β " a τς τ
it is the firm position of this office that instead of being 8 problem unique to the Chicago Division, this problem must be viewed as a Bureau-wide problem, The continuation of Solo at such time as the current Sole informants αὐτὸ no Longer able to function is of such overriding consequence - that every resource of the FBI, both at the Seat of Government and in every field office, must ‘be brought to bear in order ὁ
to accomplish this. end, This office has givén and will > continue to give this problem attention commensurate with ‘the convictions set forth above, τὰ —
As: to, current efforts being expended by this. officé toward this end, the Bureau has been kept fui informed of ‘our continuing efforts to defec - with the ultimate objective of using him as ‘an assistant -- or "lepman" for cG 5824-54, rent that even if Successful jin this. endeavor, oes not constitute potential as a replacemént for the Chicago. Solo. informant, Nevertheless, his. defection, accompanied by an expanded | role in his activities within the CP, USA funds_operation will be of material assistance to CG 5824-Sx, m= haS already been interviewed on several occasions , 6. results. of which hay ing: ‘been. Already: furni te Bureau. Wé aré continuing to maintain contact-witt ᾿ printed material is béing placed in his ‘hands on those matters. wherein he -has displayed a weakness, and at this time we. . are attempting to €xploit the contradictions bétween his - religious and ethnic feelings and. the line of- the CP, USA on ‘the current Cragis. in ἀπὸ Middle East.
. In accordance With planning initiated ἢ _we have obtained Bureau authority to intervien TWinois. District, CP, Weve, at Bureau colicurrence- this interview is now being held in abeyance in order that current deve ts in the Middle East may have their maximum effect . hose primary interest and -perhaps weaknéss lie in the question, Under separate ca cago iS requesting the Bureau to authorize an Agent ~
ca packorcund to be sent to this office on special, to be a ahd to partitipate in. the
interview. o ith a mature Agent of this office who. is
7 oo Bo
b7D
_ &G 134-46 Sub B
- the identity Ο ἃ number of individuals having the | : ‘best Potential in this. regard, to div 1
familiay cc At the propitious “time, when from information available to us and in our jud ent the Middle Rast crisis its maximum effect upof____]the interview 7 a ett be aggressively pursued, οὐ.
Following the results of μα τε interview, . our next steps will be dependent upon ults thereof, AS pointed out previously to the. Bureau, it is our judgment that a "scatter gun" approach is not warranted in these high leyel defection attempts. - We believe that there is: preater . opportunity for success by concentrating updn the most iogical
potentials first. My letter of January 10, 1967, set forth
the identities of those individuals considered by this
. “Office and by CG 5824~-S* as having the best potential to perf lacement for CG 5824.S*, It is noted i [μα the only such pote nt jad, Who is in the
Chie . As. the Bureau’ is aware, the. Illinois
District, ΟΡ, USA, has-bat a limited number of national’
leaders of the CP, USA. . The vast preponderance of national. leaders are located in New York, and it is from the ranks of national leadership that a réplacement for CG 5824-=S* must be defected, My letter of January 10, 1967, set forth
jJudgnen at these individuals. stil best potential in this regard and the Bureau is respectfylly requested to issue explicit instructions to the New York Office to exert every maximum,copcentrated, imaginative and creative effort toward. developing successful defection approaches: ‘toward: the above CP, USA functionaries,
‘Although the Bureau: directed a létter dated January 31, 1967, captioned "HIGH LEVEL INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, CP, USA" to a number of offices ‘to conduct surveys in various. - categories for the purpose of developing potentials: in those
offices, no concrete results have been obServed by this office.
At. that time the Bureau observed that upon receipt of the results of the surveys. in.these offices the Bureau would issue further instructions, Chicago is not aware of efforts ihade .
. “ - 3 -
[071
CG 134-45 Sub Β Ὁ Se
. in this direction, The. Bureau is respectfully requested . . to advise the Chicago Office of the results obtained and | progress thus far by these offices following the* “receipt
of subsequent instructions from thé Bureau. --
. - This office intends to make contizuing aggressive . “ὟΝ approaches and to develop ceréative techniques in an effort -_ ID " . I must point out that- should -our - ᾿
: efforts in this- irection not meet with success, we must -. -. admit that at this time there does not appear to be any
leader of the GP of Illinois who constitutes potential for.
" - replacement of CG 5824-S*, Nevertheless, we will continue to bend every effort toward identifying any individual who = -- ean poSSibly be developed into potential as a ‘sudjable ann replacement for. CG. 5824-5*,, . —
ἕω
- ἢ το. The ‘Bureau is requested to furnish to this _- '. | office its observations relative to thé conviction of - εὐ Ἔρος ΤΕ this office that this program cannot be conceived of as the —
+ -.f vesponsibility of: the. Chicago Office alone, Any observations
oe at Of the Bureau which it may deem helpful in our continuing -
᾿ ΣΕΥ to sciated.. a. replacenent ‘for CG 5824-S* would be So . aren indeed appreciated. τς ες Tg
OPTIONAL FORM Μ ΝΟ 16 MAY 1052 £5 GSA FPMR Hi crn) 11118
Ο ΦΧ UNITED STATES, covernMRC) [TE IN ENVY LOPE ‘Memorandum
DIR CTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 6/13/67 : ‘AC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F). ely . Pde r ᾿ - 0 ἢ
ReCGairtel to Bureau dated May 19, 1967, captioned’ -
"SOLO,"
Reairtel advised the Bureau that as ἃ consequence,
of his ‘purchase from of their ‘stock in the First National Bank of Lincolnwood and in Hercules.
Galion,CG 5824~S* would purchase -U.S. Gover s in 70 the amount of approximately $33,000 for thé - ‘On June 6, 1967, CG 5824- Sk advised that he had sent CG 6653-S to a bank earlier that. date to. ‘purchase U8. Government bonds in ‘that amount in order to be able to. take
Such: bonds. to New York. City -on Juné 6, 1967, to turn ‘them over to GUS HALL, General Secretary, cP, USA,
log
On. June 6, 1967, CG 6653-S advised, that in dis- cuss ing this matter with bank. officials she learned’ that such, government bonds in that amount were not’ readily - -availl—. able and therefore she was only able at that’ time to. make: the following purchases: - .
*
ao C6 bheler
| bool
¥ -
Face Value . Purchase Price
(<i
Type of _Investinent
U.S. Series E Bonds -$ 7,000.00 | | $ 5,250.60 Trailer Train Equipment Bonds 15, 000.00 , 13: IBA, 68 oe , “ ' εἷς bo
U.S, Treasury Bonds 5,000.00 © - 4. 909.12 =< ,.: 6000.00}! =
++
Lat
Cashier ' s Check (cash) ᾿ : 6, 000. 00
Totals $33;,000 .00 $29 893.80
- For record piiposdy, ‘set forth below ate the serial Ὁ numbers of the U.S, Ε 5) Bortds! and the Trailer Train Equip-
ment Bonds: | amy ery MT 3 REISE LOen, αἀρξοῶς.. LS — (~ Fo FWD
@).Bureau ‘CRM) onto (100-134637) (Info) ody, 8. JUN 20 1967".
8 ΓΑΒ: MDW WR (4) Oke
Nn 2.2. 1967
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the. Payroll Savings Plan
CG134=46 Sub F
U.S, Treasury $1000 Bonds
12181 12382
30849
49302
49303 .
Trailer Train Equipment $1000 Bonds
M6601 6602 - M6603 - M6604 M6605: M6606 M6GO7 M6608 M6609 - M6610 ~ M6611 M6612 M6613 “M6614 τ᾿ - 6615 -᾿ ᾿ . .
The above ahounts in check and: investments were taken by CG 5824-S* and CG 6653-S to New on June — 6; 1967, to be turned over to: HALL or fief fearing | the week preceding the National Committee meeting, ΟΡ, USA, being held in New York City starting June 10, 1967, CG 6653-S
advised that the following are. prices paid hy: με, CG 5824-S* and CG 6653-S to the for the investments - ἜΣ in Hercules Galion and the First National Bank of Lincoln | Ἵν " ορά: “ ᾿ σοὺς Investment Cost. — Paid by - ᾿ _ (Solo. Fun Informants _ 800 shares Lincolnwood $20,000.00 _ $23,200.00
(current offered price)
4, 000 shares Hercules
Galion S$. 8, 820. 40. $ 8,820.40 ᾿
Totals $28,820.40: $32,020.40
." ᾿ -ἃ-
~
In our discussions with these two informants con=
cern been converted to the advantage - of it was recently learned that an ex ure of Solo funds, previously reported for December,
1966, as being turned over to GUS HALL for CP expenses and activities, had been used in part to mortgage the new home of en ἜΣ Haven, Connecticut. During early December, ; on three occasions, $20,000 was fur~
nished to HALL ostensibly for ΟΡ expenses. Actually, on one- LL bad converted $16,500 to a mortgage of his
the mortgage ‘bein de out to the benefit | . At this a is paying on this mortgage. at the rate of $123.20 per month which is mailed — με in the informant's name to the First National Bank of Lincoln~ — lane
wood where it is deposited to the informant's, account. Since this is Party money, we might have expected that thé informant would then withdraw such funds and return them to the. Solo funds. However , upon HALL's instructions; such is not to be the-case. Upon the accumulation of three months’ payments amounting to $369,60, the informant is to add $5.40, ‘bringing
the total to $375,00 and purchase a $500 Series E Savin | Bond in. th name and forward it to then, a
began s such payments in March, 1967, and therefore CG 6
additional $500 Series Ὲ ἘΞΞ Bond in
mame and mailed it to the during the une. ΜΝ
CG 5§24--S* recognizes that this isa most dangerous practice whic —him even more closely into a financial web with the However, this transact ion was carried out by HALL without. consultation with the informant and. therefore he was unable to control this, HALL was informed subsequently
by. the informant of the dangerousness of this continuing trans-
action but HALL was apparently impressed by the informant's
previously demonstrated ability to provide for the financial - welfare of his family and furthermore HALL apparently felt he 6. had πὸ one else to whom he could tufn with such trust.as he has in this informant. Therefore, HALL resolved to invol
informant ever deeper in the financial affairs of ‘ref At this time we can see no way in which CG 5824-S¥ can extri-— Gate himself from this arrangement, but we will remain constantly
alert to any opportunit ereby CG 5824-S* can remove: this tie between hinself and the ;
+ ie
[2 ͵ 7 “Be rhs NO, 10 $010=106 % MAY Ὁ} ΕΡΙΤΟΝ . 10054 GEN, SG, NOs 27 " oe
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
x Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE: = TO : Mr. We. 6. Sullivdy Date: 6/15/67 , ~ 5 ων:
τ΄ 1 = Mr, DéLoach oo —=" | FROM : C.D. Brennan 4 1- Mr. Sullivaym . Holnes—— 1} " 1 _ Mr’. Cc. D. Brennan Gendy “ an : 1
{ox . Ll-~Mr. Re C. Putnam, Jia SUBJECT OLO ee iG Ρ Bil. oy | INTERNAL SECURITY = COMMUNIST ΝΣ . ΤΕ .ΡΞ,4
Solo is the code word used to refer νὰ iiaison .
/ operation performed by our informants between the Communist. Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.
ra
PURPOSE:
This is to advise that CG ‘5824-S*, who is in
New York City, has received instructions from Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, to furnish Hail
Ι with ΦΏΒΟ,ΟΟΟ ὍΣ the. evening of 6/15/67. ). This meriorandum recommends our: New. York’ Office be telephonically instructed: to make this. money available to the informant from funds obtained by our sources. from the Soviets for the Communist Party, USA.
__ BACKGROUND :
CG 5824~S* advised our ΜΝ York Office that Hall
instructed him to furnish Hall with $250,000 by the «evening of 6/15/67. -According to sourcé, Hall stated this: moneys was ‘to be used to help in the re-establishment of a daily opm ‘munist newspaper, We know ‘tha the Party is committed the purchase of United States- made printing equipment ἃ at. the cost of $150, 000 plus an additidnal $50,000 to set ἀρᾷ new composing room for ‘the papei’s printing plant. it; ‘would appear that this is a legitimate request on the part ‘of Hall, iy for in a summary teletypé on this matter on 3/15/67, New ‘York f advised that CG 5824-S* had ‘been told by Hall that_he esti~
' ted it would cost one million dollars to get _the.paper ; sta po plus” ἘΠ Adare roHar "$600, 000 a year to keep it going.
κι ΒΕ ἢ MICK - — * * gac Roney of New -York recommen re make.. this - ΒΝ “money available and we concur ; for to dd~ e otherwise would
ay pean —the_exposure.. ον. ΕΖ: e- hgqpnd st ΟΣ Solo fog {anil RECS Leo fi Paey = ~=b3 47 (5) οὐδέ ἢ, ἀγὸς SIREGSHQ #4 ah,
| 6 JUN20 1867 “77 100--428091 ὄν CONTINUED = - OVER.
os wie
t
: _— ay . 65 JUN 22 196 7
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan RE: SOLO 100~428091
Qperation. SAC Rone ointed out an e i Lon as necessary since the informant must’ have the money in the afternoon of 6/15/67. In addition, the serial numbers of these bills must be noted and the money packaged prior
to passage to Hall. .
RECOMMENDATION :
It is recommended that our New York Office be telephonically advised to make $250,000 available to CG 5824-S* for passage to Gus Hall.
Pursuant to the Director's telephonic approval,
this is being done. Ko ace 7 OF
ἘΓΆῸΝ ΑΕ ΓΒΕ DERTVED FEO:
CAT
OR GIT
Τοϊδου τατον De ὙΡΘΕΒΟΟΝΕΝΝ Mohr es Wick ,
Caspet ann, Callahan
Conrad --------»-ὐ
Felt ------
Rosen eee
Salivary smmemnanins Ταν Ἷ [ene Trotter
Tele, Room wan Holme Gend
Beeston
: UN Doel Qbrh TeLetype uni L_]
' ae =“ iia Ὡς
ΕΝ c 1 ~ Liaison
1 ~ Mr, E. H. Mossburg 1 - Mr. R. H, Horner
-— ROUTE_IN ENVELOPE “πὸ
LEAISON
(IS) 100428091
Date: June 16, 1967. ° b, Ζ . ᾿ ὄ To: Director “ΕΝ ᾿ Bureau of Intelligence~and_Research - ae Department of State From: John Edgar’ Hoover,, Director 7 υἹ i) 5 = . Lr ὶ μ Subject: COMMUNIST PANTY OF SWEDEN ἐν μ
᾿ . A source. who has furnished reliable information ain the’past has advised as follovys:
During the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) (Communist Party of Rast Gormany) heid in East. Berlin, Gorman Democratic Republic, from ᾿ April 17-22, 1967, there was some discussion among the ἢ delegations concerning recent developments within the Communist Party of Sweden (CPS).
; The CPS recently held its awn congress and is ΝΗ considering changing ite ‘name from the Communist Party of Suedon to some other, possibly such as the Conmunist Socialist Party, Communist Democratic Party, or the Communist Freedom Party, Eventually, the CFS plans to
drop the word “communist” from its title and will try to fAtand apart from the burdens imposed by ascociation with
the actions’ of the commmist: countries.
ΤΕ
-
Source further stated that in discussing these developments, the various delegations to the SUPG Congress, including those of the Communist Party of the Sovict Union and ‘the Communist’ Party of Cacchoslovakla, expressed general ngreement that this might be tho way Zor the Svedes, to break
recat ,5 6-- “2foGf - 5 98 mig SEE"NOTE PAGE TWO.
Moa g JUN 20 i967 ; a ΠΈΣΕ ὩΣ ,
τ vada ᾿
| the masses.
Dirsetor Ὁ " Curesu, of ΖΑ ΘΙ οπος. srid Rectarch
throwsh to tha masacs of the fredish poople. χὰ sag Τὸ
that mahy of the comministh partica in wostorn edubtrics ᾿ sero ΣῈ ἢ ταῦ, wore not lending the macocs, atid vould, thud, have te break with the. past ip osder to brosk through to
L=Dixcetos’ ' "ΝΕ Central atcllicened Agoney
ἝΝ a 8? fitentions Comxty Birdetor, Dlang “72 wy
as Nome 6 —
_ Classified REE Since unauthorized disclosure of this information could réveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation: could result in grave damage to the nation.
Information obtained from the source during a
5/26-29/67 trip to Toronto, Canada, and while in conversation ;
with William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of |
Candida, Data extracted from CG airtel dated 6/8/67 captionéd
"Solo,
ἢ
DEC
LASSIF
CAT
ΓΜ AUTHOR
et LAUTOMATEC Ὁ
LTE 03-06-8012 £
ἂν
‘Canadian-Ukrainians did χοῦ satisfy then,
SHRIVER Fro: CA GUTTE
" τ
᾿ SS | MY taison
i - ἔπ. E, H. Mossburg
1 - Mr. R. H, Horner
ROUTE IN ENVFI OPE
(IS) 100-428091
Date: dune 16, 1967 To: Director - Buroau of Intelligence and Resear ες Department of State \ From: John Edgar Hoover, Director pol a * " ; οι ᾿ Subject: COMMUNIST PANTY OF CANADA bo Vd
A source yho has furnished reliable information ‘in the past reeontly reported the following:
_ A dolegation of Canddilan-Ukrainians, accompanied
by Tim Buck, National Chairnan, Communist Party of Canada
CPC}, was recently sent by the CPC on a visit to the Sovict Union. The delegation returned to Canada quite dissatisfied with their trip. Discussions held by the delegates with representatives of the Commmict Party of the Soviet Union concerning matters of interest to the Tim Buck, who as of the latter part of Nay, 1967; had not returned to Canada and whose whereabouts and date. of return were unknoun to the Canadian Party a, hag made no report to tha Tendoranap | hed oe" 05 - of & 3 {4 4
her ndvised that. thé fafoy~ is: having. sousge fupphor tars British Colunbia..
British Columbie provincial leader of tha CRC, Ninel Morgan,
has been absent from his duties because of sickness. In
hig absence, groups composed of “leftists and pro-Chinese” —
communtets have started crenting problens which ard Zar rom solved.. 6 JUN 20 1967
Source vent on to state that the youth meeting called by the CPC was heid from April 20-22,-2067, and" was considercd successful. it was held in a location
Peet «| RHH:est aa’ os ὁ" ΄ NOTE PAGE: THO, Kec |) —_ dt (ob 2-804 | COSpOt amen τ ᾿ , — _ 7 Gale. nai —_ ΒΝ > 1 Rosen .-----..ὔΡ. “ Τονοὶ mm αι - otk beter eel ng JUN 28 990] ol Garde τ MAIL ROOM oO TELETYPE unit L_]
μ. ᾿
αν τὴν 4 " ᾿Ὶ
Director . Parcau of intelliconca and Rosenret:
cyevoxinatoly 120 miles froa Kontreal τοῦ pad attended by about δ yours pedplo, fssng these attendiny reve scparaticte, nucrehists, ond communista., It yas agreed tq cot up ἃ youth orgenization τ σὰ would be Marxist oricnted but not actually o communist orfaaisation,
2 « Director Contral Intebligence ποῖον
Attention: Poputy Pircator, Plora
a
Ayes NOTE: | a Classified Heeseat" Since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reyeal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.
Information obtained from the source during a 5/26-29/67 trip to Toronto, Canada, and while in conversation with William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada, and Norman Freed, National Educational Director, Communist Party of Canada. Data extracted from CG airtel dated 6/8/67 captioned "Solo." This informatio 3 also being furnished Legat, Ottawa, for referral to by - ictterhoad memorandum. ΝΞ
[575
τυ
[ FD:36 (Rev? 5-22-64) .
Transmit the following in .-
Boe”
Dn 2 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE Date: 6/ 19/67
ee μα, ey a ne πὶ πα πῶς τ +
{Type in plaintext or code) WAN AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL _ i [Priority) Ϊ oo a a a a a a ee a ee ee Le στ’ το: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) 9 ἤ (| us? ; |
A .
3
¥
ὡς
τ
ATTENTION: FBI LABORATORY | A | ΜᾺ ῃ VA ἀπ ke, Ne
FROM: Lon" YORK .(100-134637)
! BR i gat SUBJECT :“SOLO ns th 7 ἰὸ “6 ,
me
Hae On 6/16/67, purstiant to previously made arrangements, NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact NIKOLAI TALANOV, in the area of the Avenue Jay Subway station of the Brooklyn BMT subway | line. TALANOV gave to NY 694-S* a cigarette box containing i microfilmed messages, which will be reported later. ie, Ali _ TALANOV advised the informant that, in accordance Me ‘tn with instructions,from the CCCPSU, he was furnishing the j latter with information to be transmitted to GUS HALL -- that the said information was being transmitted simultaneously |X ; to the heads of 811 Communist Parties throughout the world, Ἰηῇ a the information concerning the Mideast crisis, -TALANOV Ὁ Lang Stated that his instructions were to furnish the information h v5 orally to NY 694-S%, who would have to rely upon his memory
in transmitting the information to GUS HALL. He stated that thé information ould aes the "line" of argument which “Premier
ALEXEI KOSYGIN would sent to the United Nations ypon his arrival in the USA, AS * at ~Foy Bek anna SA. ς 7-10
ἅ
Weare Bureau (RM) ( AS, 1). REE 22 |
(1 - FBI LABORATORY , [.6f 7 5580 a: + Chicago (134-46 ob") (RM) (Enc. 1) “ od ol J YW, b
1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (41). | —
1 - New York (105-14931 Sub 6) (TALANOV) (341) 7
1 - New York ὁ τ Ὁ Ss ‘JUNO 196
Pr ες ἢ ie ty? ATE T Ep - ἜἜ ACB: jay a Ghee . afb eg ποῦ
ως, ἃ : pra, ae al a ἢ ᾿ 4 it 2 - * ’ # i, f ΤΩ ‘é xe χα τ ™
Ων ae) ‘a | ap WT | δ μι ρρρονϑάς, ἐς - Sent Μ᾿ ~Per ὁ ὁ ὁ ὁϑέΠἐἷ᾽..-.
uta ὦ ἡ ἔϊα! lagont in Charge
NY 100-134637
“The information furnished by TALANOV to NY 694-S* was transmitted telephonically to thé Bureau on 6/16/67. fursuant to Bureau instructions, a summary of the said infor- ~ mation was prepared by the NYO and delivered by personal messenger to the American Delegation at the UN on 6/16/67.
ΕΝ The contents of the. aforementioned summary are as follows: ,
"On 6/16/67; a confidefitial source advised that the | ". following information is being furnished by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union siiiultaneously. to 821 the leaders. of the Communist Parties in the world, - including GUS Hall of the CP,USA. The information concerns the crisis in the Mideast.
"The war in the Mideast was instigated by the imperialist countries of the United States, Great’ Britain and West Germany: | in behalf of the ‘oil imperialists' of those countries. The war has been directed not. onlyagainst thé Arab nations in particular, but also against the national liberation movements of these :countries, which have been friendly toward the USSR. It had become esséntial for the 'imperialist' countries. to destroy and root out national liberation movenients which have been making great progress in the Arab nations. | . -"It is most urgent at this time that the leaders of all Communist Parties throughout the world realize that the
bourgeoise of thé dinperialist countries have distorted the situation in the Mideast,
os "The Soviets wish to explain their position before the outbreak of the war and after - to explain why they supported the cease fire resolution in the United Nations
as they did, What, follows will be the 'line' to be pursued by Kosygin when he addresses the United Nations.
NY 100=134637
“the imperialists, using Israel as a foil, were atterpting to overthrow the regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria. In Syria the imperialists tried to utilize members of the old ruling circles to overthrow the Syrian regime. Failing in this, they utilized Israel to attack Syria, Members of the ruling circles in Syria - whose interests were related to those of the imperialists - - engaged in provoking the Isralis along the border in order to give the imperialists and the Isra@is an excuse to . attack Syria. The imperialist couritries had been losing influence both politically and commercially in the Mideast. Meanwhile, the anti-impéraalists of the countries of the United Arab Republic, Algeria,and Syria were becoming stronger and were inclined toward socialist orientation. They. are also. improving their friendship with the USSR and the other socialist countries. The policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been to support the Arab nations against the _ inperialists, particularly United States imperialists
‘in the Mideast. This policy also was to strengthen the entire anti-imperialist camp against Israel and its supporters among the imperialists.
| "The USSR Delegation to the United Nations ‘supported ‘the cease fire resolution because, on the evening of June 6, 1967, theSoviets had received infor- mation from thé United Arab Republic. that a very critical situation existed at the front. ‘The United Arab Republic requested that the USSR effect a cessation of military action until the morning of June 7th, and help to solve the entire probiem tn the Security. Council of the United Nations. Therefore, the USSR Delegation in the United Nations and the United Arab Republic representatives thereto supported the resolution to cease fire,
“When Israel continued the war on June 6th, Nasser, in consultation with the Soviet Government, (4:00 p.m. GMT _time June 7th) informed the Soviets that Isra@i aggression
was cortinuing. At that time the Soviet Government sent 8. méssage to the Israili Ambassador in Moscow stating
- 3-6
NY 100-13}}637
that if the Israidlis should not cease the war immediately, the Soviet Union would sever diplomatic relations with Israel. On June 8th, the Soviet Government introduced in the United Nations a. draft resolution condemning Israel - as an aggressor and informed Israel that it must cease fire and withdraw béhind truce lines ~ naming boundries set as a result of the treaty following the war of 1948.
"Tt is significant that only three hours after the Soviet Union severed relations with Israel, the real céase fire took place.
‘On June 7th, Nasser had requested the Soviet Government to press for a cease fire in the Security Conncil and emphasized that he did not wish the Soviet Union to become involved in this war. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union then called a meeting in Moscow of representatives of the socialist countries - including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary; Roumania, Poland, and East Germany - at which the agenda concerned Shopping the war in the Mideast. -
"Te was agreed at this meeting that a cease ‘fire must take place immediately, and it was also agreed that the aim of the imperialist forces actually was to destroy progressive regimes in the Arab countries, It was also. agreed that it was imperative that no further destruction as a result of the war occur; if possible. Following this meeting, the aforesaid countries - through their représen- tatives - demanded that Israel withdraw behind the truce lines of the 1948 war and to establish a permanent peace in the Mideasé,
"Also at this nesting it was agreed that, it was essential that these countries support - more than they ever had before ~ the anti-imperialist and progressive forces in the Mideast.
NY 100~134637
"{hat there has been a strengthening of the anti- imperialist forces in the Mideast is evidenced by the fact that the people in this area have refused to accept the resignation of Nasser, or of Syrian Government officials.
"The Soviets are strengthening the anti-impérialist forces inthe Mideast economically and militarily (that is).
with equipment), the reason being that the Soviets wish
to advance the aims of the anti-imperialist and the national liberation movement in ‘these countries against the imperialists.
_ “In the beginning of June, the Ambassador of thé United Arab Republic and the President of Syria weré in Moscow discussing the situation as regards the Guif of Aquaba. | The Soviets. urged the United Arab Republic Ambassador and the © President of Syria not to close the aforesaid Gulf. The Soviets emphasized that they were opposed to closing the Gulf of Aquaba, which they said would constitute a very grave mistake. They were warned that such action would lead to more Serious problems. When the invasion began, the Soviet -Govern- ment chargéd Israel with being an aggressor and demanded that it withdraw its troops behind the truce lines set up following the war of 1948, It was at this time that. Kosygin sent a message to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow charging Israel with being the aggressor. At this time the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations was instructed to prevent the acceptance of the United States Delegation's resolution supporting Isra@i action.
"ALL the Communist Parties in the world must: be aware of the fact that now, more than ever before, it is essential to Stress thé fact that Israel has been the aggressor in this war and-that it must withdraw behind the truce lines established . following the war of 1948, and there mustbe a move toward permanent peace in the Mideast.
-5-
NY 100-134637
"a further objective must be the support of anti- imperialist forces in these Mideast countries, both politically and morally, and to refute the thesis of the bourgeois propa- gandists against the Arabs and the other sociazist countries of the world.
"A further objective is to re-~emphasSize the necessity for the restoration, on ali fronts, of the border positions - which have been lost by the Arab countries , and to maintain them so that they may not be lost again." -
The messages on microfilm delivered Py. TALANOV to NY 694-S* are as follows:
- "To Jack Brooks, "I would like to transfer to you thé following:
"1) 1967 te. timetable (see NYairted, 4/21/67, Page 2 2) agreed CPSU ~ CPUSA code (see NYairtel, _ Afe4/67) . 3) 3Gamma cypher pad (see NYairtel, 4/24/67) 4} Telephone numbers for acknowledgement:
«8751 ee 8407 - duly - August 695-8858 ) September - October .563-8183 1 November - December Tine ) 5: 05 p.m.
T'd like to have your opinion of the possibility to xing radio reception through walkie talkie, It is for the sake of security. If you agree, please let me know from what date this order would be in effect (maybe we decided dur~ ing our meeting). |
NY 100-134637
"In this case, when Moscow asks you to acknowledge the radio reception, you inform me on the saméday through. Walkie talkie with two signals at 7: 50 - 8:00 p.m; Your
walkie talkie timetable and signals are unchanged..
"The above mentioned telephone numbers would be used only for drop acknowledgement when you Pick up.
"Late evening, May 3, I put signal on Wall Street station, calling you to drop; But I failed to receive your acknowledgement May 4. Did you check it?
"I was informed that you decided to change this place. ον about a new ond
"I was also informed that you expressed your readiness to explore the Rogerbalety to use the television signal (see NYteletype, 4/20/67, referring to a proposed signal via television). - If it is convenient for you; let's test it June 20 and 26, at 9:00 - 9:30 p.m. Bu we cah discuss the dates and time during _our meeting and fix it to our mutual convenience.
"after each test, please acknowledge if your got viene (4 channel) the saine day at 10:30 sharp by calling 9200. You do not give this call if you got no¥ Wax signals: τ the tests are successful, I'11 inform you about the order of using, Wax later.
"Our drops, which you handed in Moscom ἄγε in effect after this meeting. (See NYairtel, 4/3/67.)" -
oO The next message was the 1967 Radio schedule. . There is, set forth hereafter, the schedule for thé months of July through December, 1967, of which the FBI Laboratory has not been previously informed:
NY 100~134637
Day of ist transn.. 2nd transm. 3d transn. the week GMT κα GMr KGC GMT KGC CALL Monday 1132 12882 1155. 13908 1212 15004 1 511, 7) Thursday 1146, 183072 = 1206. «0 1H16 S226) 15569 8 38 Wednesday 1139 «= 12053 1159 13548: 3019 hole PP7 8) Friday 1154 γ5108 121} 14h330 1933 15657 BOW . duesday ) 1128 13099 Lg r4562 1208159074 NSN : O)Shursday = 1736 = 13128 1156 N96 1216 6021 38 Μ Monday a5 1287: 1205 1301 1566. 15633 ὁ 58. 10) Friday 112112651 1 138᾽|6 1501 15611 G9 6 Monday 1228 1272 Δ «13536-1307, sas 5381 ‘li)jWednesday Ὸ 1213 Take 1233, 13625 1253 15982 ὅ 61, Guesday 0 i234 1ρ930΄ ᾿- rash INOS: 1314 16104 4 R 2 12) Thursday Ἰὼ e761 - = date = 13854 χ305: «15593 2 7 2
. The next message was a new open code to be used in transmithal of messages between the CPSU and ‘the CP, USA. Prints from the Russian film are very poor and it will require sometime to accurately report the code to the Bureau. This will be done aS soon 85 possible.
NY 694-S* has advised that. he had discussion with
‘TALANOV regarding apparatus problems, which he will report - as soon as it is convenient for him to do so,
ΕΣ
NY 100~134637.
NY 694~S* gave to: TALANOV a cigarette box. - chemically treated - which containeda number of messages on microfilm, some of which were in ciphered code and some in plain code. The messages were as follows:.
1, Calling to. your attention again the gap of _4O gamma groups. JACK BROOKS
‘Regarding above, see New York airtel, 5/17/67.
2. Your last walkie talkie signals. to me were weak due to. local distunbances. Were my walkie talkie Signals also weak? tf this continues ; perhaps you should
make new tests for. better hours, with. fewer. disturbances. JACK BROOKS 3. "Have: Already purchased UHER, 4OO0L Reporter. _ - JACK BROOKS |
Zhe above, ‘gee. New York airtes, ‘i /2/6T, s ‘page 2 3
ΝΞ 5, 30/67 Receipt ‘ ἐν . . $500, 000, 00 . — $°'30,000 | 7 . “(or TESSTCA Α sm ΝΕ JACK BROOKS
. ” Regaraing above, this is the aclmowledgéement of the receipt by NY@4-S*, in belialf of the CP,USA,.
ὁ $500,000.00 for the Party,. and $30,000.00 for JESSICAI. SMITH and the "New World Review."
ΝΥ 100-134637 σοσρδῦ
Many weeks ago "The Worker" ‘contacted, WILFRED © " BURCHED? who resigned from the "Nationel Guardian" (NY), requesting him δὸ become our correspondent in Asia, We
afford him same payment that he had received from ‘guardian, mo
We should appreciate your cooperation in inducing BURCHETT to accept. our offer. His acceptance would help: build daily Paper in days ahead,
. οὐδ HATE, (COCRSY 7 _ When the arrived: in Moscow, WILLIAM: WEINSTONE, DISKIN’ (LOU. DISKIN) will shave for the CCCPSU copies: of some repats of our recent National ‘Committee plenun; which énded-6/13/67, We know. that thesé Will .be οὔ interest to: yOu...
| 6G 5824-g* ΄ céGrsu. ΕΞ Our comrade MIKE DAVIDOW of "The viovker" is going |
ἧι 4d Moscow f¥om.New. York to attend film festival in Moscow ᾿- ij. in Jilly. He will be joined later. ‘by his wife - Mrs, comrade
, your. Washington, D.C, embassy to issue visas for. these two Ϊ comrades ‘a8: soon. as possible,
wm το
Gus HALD, CCCPSU- " 4 ge | τ ᾿ϑολαῦθ 4b. Lf you would issue visa for ΕΠ two months — 60° 6 able personally. ἀκ to talk things over w the - “LEV
ALEXETVICH DANILENKO, ἃ Soviet ὁ 6 Tollowing 4 - are details. in corinection with the matter. .
Sincere. Fraternal Greetings;,
Gus HALL τ ᾿
a ΟΡ 1Τῦ
PAVIDOW,: who will pay her own faré to Moscow. Please instruct
ΝῪ 100~134637 ες ,
communications sent ἜΗΝ be San Francisco, California, —— Chief, Consular Division,
Bibasey of the USSR, 1609° Decatur Street N.W.,, Washington,
᾿Ξ ᾿ Sen Francisco, California
nS oo .- February Ik, 1967. ᾿
A. Kosikov εις ᾿
Chief, Consular Division . .
Embass ay of tthe U.S. ake a ᾿ ᾿ 1609 Decatur Street N. ᾿ . ἐν Washington, Ὦ, 0, ee
Dear Sir: τ Oo ᾿ς ᾿
The enclosed is δὴ avplication Σ a for both myself ες ang dso will be I am requesting 570 a@visa ovner than ἃ tourist visa which will be valid Tor =:
the duration ΟΣ the time required to carry out marriage procedures, |
oy The child! s‘father is a Soviet citizen, Lev Alexeivich Danilenko, a student at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages. He has asked me to join him in Moscow, where we will make our home . In addition, will you please send me information regarding the procedures to be followed in buying a co- -operative
apartment through your Consulate. : "
+.
Enclosed please find three copies οἱ my autoblograohy, end a money order for &8,00 for visa and translation fees.
Please send me instructions as to what ty pe or information will be needed from my fiance.
ey Ν -.ι νκ fe ξ - .
Ν : Sincerely, Ν
τ᾿ “ - ge. me * . τ ok ι΄. ". " FP Carey »ν (ἂς πὰς ewe Ss og eo = a π - 3 *
-She works as a Medical Secretary. My father was born in Zager,
.l was
as being a DuBois Club member, I helped organize a progressive high
A. Kosikov — Chief, Consular Division . Embassy of the U.S.S.R. 1609 Decatur Street NY : - Washington, D..C. me Spe ᾿
τ τς ᾿ “ἢ - se + : Dear Sir: me ott .
* ν
I was born in Denver, Colorado tol > “My mother was born in Lincoln, Nebraska in .
lng
Ip Fe
Lithiuania in 1908, and lived most of his childhood in Kozlov, Russia,
and was taken to America, by relatives when he was twelve years old. My father works as a janitor. Myf
works as a computer operator,
my family moved to Santa Clara, California, when we moved to San Francisco. At. that time, I joined the W.5.B. DuBois Cluo and became. in the Peace and Civil Rights Movement, As well
When I was where “
an active varticipan
school organization, SCEAL, (Students! Organized Education and Action League.) We published a newsvaper called The Activist Opinion for
distribution on the San Francisco high school campuses, The paper was banned by the School Board as "Communist propaganda." We spent a year
- Lighting the ban but were unsuccessful. I was President of this organ-
ization for a year, during which time we held the first high school denionstration against the war in Viet Nam.
In the summer of 1965, I was chosen to be a delegate from the DuBois Club to the Helsinki World Congress for Peace. After the Congress,
I was a member of the Youth Delegation invited by the Soviet Peace Committee to visit the U.S.S.R. During this trip, I met Lev Danilenko,
‘who was a guide for the delegates and is now my fiance.
After the tour of the Soviet Union Ce ois Club bs pe τε εηπσσσπ ταταττσ.--τετε ὅἰς Hiroshima Memorial in Japan Ib7C
Augus rough August J. is trip was made possible by the Soviet Peace Committee, ᾿ : “Se
After returning in September, 1965, I was appointed International Secretary of the DuBois Club and a member of the Executive Committee.
I held this position until May, 1966, when the National DuBois Club
Office moved from San Francisco to Chicago. 1
It was this summer of 1966 that I went back to the Soviet Union through Intourist. During mv visit, I wrote a series of articles in the August issues of Komsomolskaya Pravda in conjunction with Vladimir Bolshakov. The articles were based on my life in the Progressive Movement, written under the name o7 Ann Carter. My visa was extended and changed toa .° fuest visa for that purpose,
Since returning, I have continuad my activities in the Peace ον σοι * and am now working as a DuBois Club memoer in the Soring Mobilization
‘ which will culminate in two mass anti-war demonstrations in San Franciscc and New York on Avril 1 , . - .
» ™ : -“-" "
Ds mR 18
." Β = a
h School in San Francisco with[ __] .
. ἢ was-graduated
in May, 1966, San Francisco State wet College in the er emester, L have interruoted my stucies, ave vo However, I am working on my 300 full time and am conti nu-ng politica activity with the DuBois Club. τὴν -I sincerely hope you will be able to make “possible the reunion: in ; Moscow with my fignce and our child by the end of this summer. Oph, Thank you for your kind assistance in this matver,, gt ΝΣ ΝΕ Sincerely, pS ‘ Boos 8 yo ΝΞ ΝΕ ΝΕ " : ~ poo . πόνους . my ἡ Η peo. » » - - ᾿ _ * Ν * “ ἔπ Ing ᾿ - “ἢ ᾿ “ oes bie " ᾿ for ™ Ε " € ; ° fe ᾿ | 4 ° oe ᾿ , a - : . ° . ἡ . os “wae “" . : δ τὰς -""- ; . * fa! i " ἐξ Ἶ - . os . _ . : - -. - ° - ia . . a 2 oF τ - - 7 fas 7 a onto. .. " ᾿ -.ΑἊἌ - oo * ᾿ ᾿ ‘ . Μ᾿ a - - Ἶ 4 . Ἱ " . . ᾿ ᾿ τος Pea ΠΝ met ες ΝΗ ΝΞ yl ᾿ «Ἄς στὰς " ae " wee ΝΣ s “S “ ἕῳ ᾿ τ “4 » ᾿- --καὖῷ- μ“" =“ mer. "ἐπ ᾿ by - ; “ we 7 : - σον Ὁ ee a πῶσ “-
---- ποσνκον : ΜΝ , ee ΝΕ ,
' _ πέτα πὶ ya ey pe “a et ces “σα ανασσννσον ay at τήν tet ae ee ae a " — La ar laa RA Ea tan RAP REC AE . τ ΉῊΝ .
wee
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wd
Ἱ -
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ee ae ἵμες ae A . ᾿ :
-
᾿ * 7! at 4 ' ' a + . - ᾿ ΕΝ . ᾿ . "
"" tor ᾿ ῃ a - = .- : ἢ ᾿ ἐν . “ a . ~ » 7 x a. woo I Fa -Ἀ at ᾿ . . Pr - oa 7 . ΕἾ - 1 = i" a * ᾿ " ε εοὔὖὦ,ς ῃ By wt i - - - : 1 * 3 - " . »ὩΨ . "” . . ‘ ‘ z3 . , i ᾿ - 4 . oa ΄ . . " 4 Ἂ - . . ᾿ . . - . ᾿ Vin ae
“ at et oa Ν ες , ΟΝ , ΩΣ ts eo San #ranci } fornia , . ' ἡ SF ΤΥ ὝΠΟ ρει March 6, 2967 τῖ
.,. - a - Ξ hia 4 * a 7 5 5 = ΝΞ 1, . . . Lk τὰ -. " ᾿ ." " . . a = = ῃ ΓΙ -- κα " τ ε ' . et . wae wot 7 * - Ν 4 * . -
. ἢ 1 ΓΝ - a = — ‘ ‘a τ de ες »? rs. 4 + &_ κα - ὦ - . . af A ᾿ Μ .
eince “oyvamhen, 1065, T have been a member of the San Francis co he ommunist Part When I joined, I was DIC. I had Ὁ θῇ
of the. San Francisco high scnool ἢ nt for a year previous to joining the Party, and the refore continued in the ! : same work as my first Party assignment. . .¢ ἐς :
t
During the year 196551965, I ves| em?! the high school oo group in the area SOSAL (StudentsT Organized Education and - oy dbé Retion League). AS well, I was appointed by the National ΕΣ ae Executive of the DuBois Club to replace Mike Myerson as Inter~ . National Secretary of the DuBois Club. I held this position , until May, 1966, when the National Office moved to Chicago. ~ | . My current Party assignment is to work in the Spring Mobilization Committee in San Francisco and specifically to.mobilize the Neighborhood Vietnam Committees around this demonstration.
+
Congress as a DuB Afterwards, I visited the - "os Soviet Union as a and Laver the Hiroshima Memorial
in Japan.’ While I was in the Soviet Union; L__] Soviet ; student, Lev Alexeivich Danilenko, a guide ror the Latin American Delegation from the Peace Congress. We found that we shared. ; {. “many viewpoints and aspirations and became very fond of each ot er. ᾿ , . a . 1 .
: ἐν: os : :
as
Lev is 23 years old, was born and spent his childhood in a ae
village in the Caucasus. Later, he moved to Leningrad, whe re
he attended the Suvorovite High School. He is now a Spanish.” ‘and English student at the Moscow Institute of roreign Languages, =
" and he will be graduated next year. He also attends lectures εἰν
at the. Merxist Institute. He is doing his greduation thesis :
on the‘topic of Argentine fascism, He intends to do his graduate
4 i
:
i
5 τ, ἢ ¢ A ’
In the simmer of 1965, I attended the Helsinki World Peace i i
"
|
|
Ἰ
|
|
‘work at the Latin American Institute in Moscow.’ ” Lev is also ᾽ a member of the Komsomol organization in his Institute and | .
hopes to become a Party member. ae . aes : -
‘After returning from my trip, in September, 1965, Lev ani I οι continued’ to write each other. We wanted -very much - to be together | " again, so I decided, since I wanted to continue my education ες * and as well continue my relationship with Lev, I would apply , to go to Moscow as a student, I then made my request to . Mickey Lima who took it to a member of the National Soard.
Around April, Mickey brought back to me a’response, in the form of a note, from the Hational Office.. I felt, at tnrs cane,
7 -π ὴποτ-- sg ry ΕΣ
4 4 . μ᾿ ᾿ 1 - " Φ "᾿ > * . ᾿ . ἡ " . ἔμ a a ” » . at 4 tise oe a ioe ' ¥ εὖ wt . a * ᾿ at See et . ats ere a a fhe ar we wt ote ae ome er ots ? . -" κε "-" a a τι 4 ᾿ " a . - .- 5 . ᾿ Fa oe Py ε ΠῚ a “ » oe r + + aren .. - ΄ “ 7 "a * an vr 7+ : " Ν ——_—_— ΝΛ Ϊ a * 7 t 4 "- ’ 4 - "» , ᾿ ta rot . t
ἐς ᾿ " : " ᾿ . . . " ᾿ 1 j Co Fs . 4 ‘ : 7 . "» - .- , 1 . an τας “ ι ‘we: : me ' ' . » oa 1 , a * . . a7 «= Ν - τυ ie , σ π ῆρη Ἃ 'XERO} oo, - le ἐπ ΝΕ ue - τ’ ifxenoy a ro τὰ i hak tol ᾿ - ” «τος Cor ee wae ΟΩΡΥ |, ‘
‘ " - " -
I sincerely thank the Comrades for any hel
ἷ
_that it would perhaps be at least another year before
* arrangements to study could be made. Since Lev and I were, So anxious to see each other again, I decided to go to Moscow through Iintourist and hoped to be able to arrange something there. I realized very Soon the mistake Τ had made in-acting outside of the collective and thet I had not acted in a manner exvected of a Party member.
Since I was not able to arrange for schooling, the only thing I would have been able to arrange was to marry. However, marriage at that time was impractical because we hag no place to live and no means of financial supoort.
Γ So we decided I should return home for a year and come back
to Moscow through prover channels. ΝΞ
I returned to San Francisco in 86 nd_soon afterwards | discovered that I was going to Te dhe . I, then found a job money in order. to return ΝΟΣ
to Moscow after the and be able to buy 4 co-operative apartment. . ᾿ me,
ΤΩΣ τὴς . ἈΦΗΝ ἃ
Now I am requesting the Party organization to helo me make
_arrangements for my return, Since at least Tour weeks are required to complete’ marriage procedures, I will need a visa for approximately four to six weeks for myself and
However,’ before I can return, I will need help
aF
+
marranging for the purchase of a co-operative apartment.. - fo this date, Il have saved $1000.00 and plan to have $3000 .00 by this September. I’ need definite information on how much ὁ
‘a1 or 2 bedroom flat will cost in foreign currency. It, Will also be necessary that I work, so I would aporeciate
any help from the Party in arranging this matter. I thought
perhaps while I am gaining fluency in Russian, I could 80
Some kind of work in the: Foréign Language Publishing House.
. . - they can give 3 p they can giv me a τος ᾿ raat ἢ τᾶς " τυ . “ ἢ , ᾿ RP ΤῈ Tate rn ae 1π᾿ ee,
BS τως τ aa.
re a ΠΡΡΌΝΡΝΟΙ
NY’ 100-134637
‘CCCPSU
Received your request about writirig inteduction to the book being published by International with introduction by FONER (PHIL FONER) "attitudes of Americans Toward the
Soviet: Revolution." Would appreciate 46 if you were more: εὐ, specific as to the kind of introduction you want me to
write and how it would differ from, that: of FONER, Am
waiting to hear from you.
GUS HALL . ‘The NYO has no. further information régarding.
the above. This message -was sent to the Soviets at. the: request of CG 5824.s*,
-<CCCPSU
τὰ
Trying our best on Montreal Trade. ‘Union 1 Delegation. Information arrived only yesterday, Very difficult. to mobilize. delégation on only two. weeks notice. However, we will continue to try, -
τ το δ | ~ ΟἿΒ HALL --
Regarding above ;. detaiis are known ‘£0 CG S82h-3* who requested above message sent to thie Soviets.. of
CCCPSU
» Greeting and salutations, | ὶ
Many. ‘thanks. for your fraternal concern for the .
. teatment of our delegations.
᾿ With warm fraternal regards,
GUS HALL
17.
NY 100-18}637
CCCPSU
Ing
: Congewhing | emrerTe tits ‘you, agree that he IIc
may go for purposes ould sent him with a =.
delegation going to the USSR, someohe in delegation being ᾿ assigned to take care of his physical needs, Pleae |
reply by radio at. once on this.”
GUS, HALL Regarding above, see New York airtel δὴ. ᾿ reflecting that the CP,USA requested that - be!
be, permitted to visit $he’ Soviet Union. OTC. York airtel, 5/31/67, reflecting that the Soviets nequested : e forwarded to them-a medical History. of
tains the medical ee and ὦ Physicdarts ᾿ b7e
1-8
ta
oF a
ARS ig tT SN - a
amie aT
dee" Wi FES oe
τωρ ge eee -
_ 621952
Wy, duane Serres: σὲ πο eRe wT be ee TAR “5. τ 7% 4
vo
ae H * * - ᾿ 4 CJ siven extensive functional training; .
᾿ : ' ᾿ .. οὖς Also therapy: concentrating on attempts Τί
Spent three days in hospital ad treatment for upset stomach "
we
Hosptfatized wit] ὉςἪὦὁὁὁὦὁὦὃὮὃὮἝὮἝὮἝὮἝὮἝἪἜἝἜ 1]
Confined *{ for three weeks; received ‘hot pack tréat= |
‘ments for two months; daily physical thdeapy while in hospitad;
. first able to sit up with aid 12-1950, | εὖ
« ᾿ Released from hospitalf ~<A Ie To use
wheelchair regularly after 5-195],
"Received therapy requiarly through 5.953; concentrating on
. : 7 a ; attached’ to. torso corset (single unit bracing) and full-length
“crutches . ; ' τὲ
,.“ Minor surgery to release ‘tension in leg muscles to allow patient
to fully extend legs at knees and hips.
Entered Warm Springs Foundation at Warm Springs, Georgia; For
two months placed if] with pressure placed against a ‘Spine in effort to straighten i+; then instructed if
Released from Warm, Springs Ν Ι
᾿ Returned to Warm Springs: Foundation tor exanitistlon; physicians
concluded pationt shoufd expect to continue] |
. Ι ; ΝΣ
PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN EXERCISES Τὸ STRENGTHEN: UMSKEKX BREATHING AND: 1N WEIGHT ὌΝ 19.-
SS πος -
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
. ss Mapa te crdizats his entity $9 cope. pays Ξὲ σοῖο with [15 τὰν hat δα 8 victin 110 he would have consis ἢ ‘sblo difficulty with re ae ay chen. be vas struck Pig with patio ο in
, 1950; He spent three weeks in en] Λ Δ8ΕΟΈΞ.͵.) [πὲ teach hha vas wader rehebi litetics Jielnstie: + Nara. Springs on. tio‘ otcesions in In τῶν Load, = ὯΝ
anh thy the prosent tino, ‘the tosdiusts of polio inctets late loss of motor fnetien ‘4m both loter lixhs: Roderatoly Severo ΚΤ, weolmess, γ- notary lateral scolicsis “ns _ ESR oftropttetan, δὰ Dane eh octet sneer, en EE of ιν . aes Ὁ Stran ry Se * ¢antinad to whee lchalr, but ha. 25 thle τὸ transfor himself inte end out of bed,
a oF An inventory of his fesidual Ἔ plttties τοϊσος cortein question! in το δ το ait” life, which wh be: “olgher inimics “te gre. Ἡραῖα, or to coping rendily ἐ th his
4 if
de this men doos- ast broath ith a nomad potter! ὃ but uses siccessory mscies of sosniration, " Vitel capacity measurements mada dir ne Vo ἃ feading Of 1,7 Litess vies is he Gf nore predicved for his ere end Dehts τ ght. fn δὲ tion, fe has on ebviewsly wosk cet to weckness of ‘respiratory τὸ suscles end abisteny of frequent md sonstiuns contlent |
πὸ
- 2, This men, uses hig vbboldialé dn Hitustioss vhore nomally ors. walks, ¥odern wkdolehattes _ > have ἃ 8 8-1/2", Ἃ imderstend that the usual inpress to a coll is chout 26°, ΕΝ _ fore, Mr, (111. have: & preblen in this respect md will probebly have to δ cask
7 8, Inspite of tls bh hendi Μὲ ee ods assistence only in bathing, {% ordey ἐὸ alt”
| °F ἃ ἃ 5τοῦ placed wi anit, τῷ Ee.tekes a Sento shower us ng {i onder te alt τς : shower hoad, Covicusiy 1 with ‘flail links ho comot stand, I, Moreforey ¢ cot vieualtzo $oens defi culty in hygiene in the future, =| ἃ .
The leverage for this royiewnt: ds obtained with the
orem - τῷ Τὶ “
᾿Ξ ῷ
rere ra ΠΝ :
- PE τον τῶ age a ἃ -- + > 4 ὍΝ -- a - αὖ - “πα τὰ
Fa
4 tities sori ὰ τῆς added by hypertrophy of certain ain tnctos τὸ slic .
᾿ * O§ τ΄ . 1 a * ; ἴ . “ « + Ξ - ὦ. ἢ ΣΝ f τ μα et ¥ * tog, 3 . Ns 1 ἢ 4 > 3 4 »" ον + La } φ α Ξ . " 5 é “he i 2:0 ia "" a. :" # ὦ ᾿ - τ εὖ ᾿ χ' ᾿. τ τ [ ἘΠΣ . ἂν a! de me rs ΕΣ cg AE δ ντς ᾿ ." w toa «ἡ ‘ a : ets τῇ | a " 7s ΓΝ οἱ ον ᾿ one ' τς ™ ΝΕ μ᾽ ι : ΝΟ.» δυο ΝΟ, Ὡὐ ΟΝ ΓΗ Ἐπ i μα «ἰδ καρ ‘an at Josh = ἊΝ 2 yeh ks a Sits ἦν - ΓΙ * * αι ΗΝ
Ε
Ἔ σε ξεν le παι σιῖς deletes fing barite oar Rien. πάντ ὧν lcs toe +
ag, mila ee 29 ξημομῶ sie Peden ie on bere, EB | ati
..
Cee
NY 100-134637
The: following 18 a destragtien of axact location where I plan to place tape as signal that I wish to | contact you,. Request you inspect and advise whether you approve.
_ Directions: Drive east on. Roosevelt’ Averiue
You wild gee, inside the girder fh whiené biack paint eras; two strips. of plastic tape -- one yé@how and oné red; These have been so placed that’ when : approaching girder by car, ‘the driver gan -see the ‘strips of tape. | } Yellott Will, signal drop :contact and: xed personal contact. for. the Lollowing, day... Test this ‘gignaling | inethod, making any additional recommendations you wish.
You may. hegin tests as of 6/19/67. Teast tapes will remain in place until you tell me to reniove them. “Schedules Will be arranged: Af you approve this signaling method...
- Ὁ TACK: “BROOKS. -
_ . Regarding ‘above, seé. New York aidtel, ΠΥ page Ὥς
᾿ ᾿ There followed on the microfilm five photographs of the area in which the above described signaling operation is to ‘take place. . :
Τρ νῦ be understood fro, now! on if. Ὅρόρ. ‘place 18 éither Closed or demolished: go-:on same day tonnext ° Listed axop. Heréafter, Twili designate. two drops. each tinie to. take cdre of such an emergency. The" foliating drops next to be used; An order, are:
ἃ, Millie; - πω
JACK: BROOKS
ΝΥ 100-134637
-- Η
Next personal contact « armstrong,
Micro-transceivéer number 2 next, — οὖν ΝΥ 694~S* also fiirnished to TALANOV, of microfiii, &@ copy -of the report Gus HALL made at the CP,USA National
1
Committee meeting. beginning 6/10/67.
τ Accompanying the said report is an outline of the. opening remarks of HALL made at the said: meeting. Also. accompanying the report: is a message from CQ 5824-S* to the CCCPSU: describing: thé agenda of the said meeting.
A copy ofthe GUS HALL report; above déscribed, is being furnished. as an enclosure to thé Bureati. and , Chicago,
23 (4
ΙΕ στ τ + " * ? 2, τ Ἐν ond εἰ ἜΘΟΣ . ᾿ “ ἢ . = "at ὲ _onnemnemntined + τ΄ : - . - = a - βοῶν κυ oon, ἶ ΐ | : - ᾿ . O | . [Ἵ " 1 7 ἢ 4 a ; ε “| wow enh tt VA fat “- σα ΜΝ - oe ak sid τά owe “~ it . . . J + . a 1 ,
A ; + | 2 Nas , ts | . [ i EB ~ oe wen bee fo ᾿ , " δὰ soe * ° ” * * . . . t ti ΙΗ - ᾿ i . " ; ᾿ ὦ owt ἢ ; Ν ΄-ν-Ν " , . Pale 7 me ἱ ᾿ ἝΝ ! ‘ 5 ΝΠ ΞΕ" ws Soe EE | i " Ν᾽ : ‘ “ . , ᾿ " Ξ a i" r * + = ™ | Ρ ᾿ Ϊ - , : τ ; εἰ . a! [ : + : - I . ; , : t Ἷ νι : - , τ ῃ ΙΝ ἘΠ rr a " ay τὰ , : ᾿ ; ἢ | 7 A. meetin of the Natdonal- Comnittes of the GPUSA δι } “4 " “was hela une 10-14,:1967. The last day was devoted to ἜΝ ᾿ ἊΝ _ Corthission ond Subcom ties mostings to .coneretize .... the ns are Ἢ .resolutions and men noranda | that were adopted "to ack 65 guide . i δ os af τ Lines for the Party; .. These-documents are to be further ro. Fk | τ concretizéd .. state by 5δαῦθ,"" With ΟΝ excepbions, these paceeks ἢ οὐ dosuments ἐν 8.8 adopted unanimously. -In a ecuple of CASES ;. Στὰ (ἢ
§ . such. as the question of: Youth Work and the publication ‘of . ;
af 8 axily, paper, there were two. or threo ebstentions, There , a 7: Were ‘nd votes” opposed, ἜΝ ΝΕ . ‘ hae ἢ Η ᾿ 4 . pox : , τὰ ‘ εἶ " , " 4 pd “2 “is ‘The Loli oukiig senda Was token, up at ‘this wheeting: ae : f } a ον τ "» ; i Π ; ᾿ ΣῈ cue, abe ἃ roport. ‘by’ Gus Hal (the war it uation, the {1 ἔτ τι struggles. for poace,.and the political outlook: for 1968). Son fe ἢ . The subjecy mabter presented..in the report. vias’ discussed in pod Pho the followings MANNE? , each point separately; sich, ast a ΣΝ a ἢ
i . : , : , . 3
Fi δος , "5 νον δι. “The sibpetion in tho ‘Mideast. ’ ‘ i | vig ' ‘ 4 A : “σα ΝΣ . ὃ, _ ig, wiag 3 ἂν Vietnam and the: peace Rovendist οὐκ ἃ : " . * . . 1 PI a ‘ " ἱ ἢ ἽΝ ΝΣ . Ge ‘The: election ‘Struggles for 1968 ""- i 3 : * » ᾿ ft κι ἣν H . . = + + ik ἢ ᾿ ΝΞ. ἃ, The. vevitalizabion of: the Avioedoan Labor en one iat Ἵ : ΝΥ ΕΞ + novenent:-end tho role) of ‘the _Covinunists “ἰ ] | : " ay . H we Tg ᾿ Ν ᾿ he ὃ,
“4 a ; a 4 4 . Fld
if . Co ἐς en: The “strugéte for. » Negro rights and frecder ἷ ᾿ Ε ij : = ᾿ a τι : [ ‘ ἊΝ . »" ΝΙΝ Remarks by. Winston on the carrying ont’ of the ΝΕ ἶ
af ‘above tasits. .. ae ar ot τε δ ἢ ες ἘΠ κε - " "ees ‘ “ta a ᾿, . , os . " ΝΗ ᾿ to. ξ
i. “oR 3. ς Probosaig, on Koutti Poliéy. en i ae soe at
*, ~ ᾿ . :.- “ ΝΗ ῃ Ν᾿ Π .“ ΓΝ ἔῃ . ee " . if . οἰ ΚΕΝ Hes he’ ἀλά ous stoi ane the: gacbeton of, the: aval Wo ἊΣ nde yo, resplutton on the ‘calling of "a new world conference of -’ 2° > ; PE ee Marxist-Leninist Comaunsat and Workers paréics.. a κὰν ει {{} ἢ ~ tab ' ; ει . . ᾿ ( “oy . - st a i . : te oe - 5. ‘Move on the publicat fon of a daily 7 newspaper. ‘ i ΕΝ ἊΣ πὰ a, . : , * . 3 +r i Loe or be Some" motions on. the. Alvertson eases ; 8 ots | ny * - 1 > Ψ Ἢ " i . Before the National, Committee meets he - adjournea, res Ε i “ταν there were proposals adopted .on the calling of special. an wg ἢ) : ες conferences within the next- few. noriths to check on the "* at! ΑΝ γχ} f 6g os. Carrying out of the resolutions, en . ΝΣ
| ΓΝ fe 34. τ᾿ 2 ane te . } t ᾿ , Ν . »," ἢ ‘ - | . ; ' ‘ ! ' . ioe * noe : 4 ως ΤΕΣ 3} : : goer
4 μ᾽ " aw ᾿ “ vs . ¥ = 7 . a “ μι. 0 . : re
ar Renee LAREN ren rt ener rarerem eet mrt entrar rae ean re rs g i " πὶ " + . 3 * - 7 : . a ἢ . ᾿ . 7 ™ “a τ Κ Naat [ nat 4 Su - -κ tattuet ca ai 7 * ron : . ΟΕ . oi 8 . . ' * . . ‘ ve
bony τὸν
mee. af gp ie iS A Ree gS A ee i πον re ee metadata lana Malia i τ δι - 4 1 wee -- J i = oe = - * .
f τ ᾿ 5 JF, : : vos x = .. . i i , i - ‘ κ᾽ . * ΄ ᾿ . . Π ᾿ - ; he aa - * * “ . ea ᾿ wi f ΝΞ 1 ‘There wore “also proposais, adopted instructing the . wt gil oo? ? , , National Executive Board to consider the convening of ἃ oN 7 t . special convention in early 1968 to carry ont the mandate . ' : ; of the L8th Convention to adopt the Party program. That ἡ this special convention is also to consider the nomination | an ἢ tif 7 of Ne&tional Party candidates. for President and Vice-President we so ε A ! ‘ of the USA as part of independent glectoral struggles. .This aS i Σὰ : ‘isia tactical question related to the Party's emphasis at . ΝΣ τὴ : this moment on the mobilization of the:-masses for on aid To 7 alternative’to the Democratic and Republican reactionary eg | ἢ ὔ οἷ foreign, and-domestic volicios-~this to take the form of an τι ἊΝ ar de independent peace and freedcm ticket. ot ν ὦ ὔ ἐς ae 7" SF | ὯΝ . ‘ The report of Gus Hall contains the entire essence { ibe of: 811 these policies and tactics. The resolutions and ; ας δ Εἰ τ memoranda are thessumarization of theses STARS ᾿ ᾿ ἂν ' ἴ- Ν - ᾿ , a “ ᾿ wre - ‘1 ¥- =e {τ ὁ , _ The discussion was ona very high level, end rich ’ a ὮΝ Ι in conerete proposals, The report on the legal status’ of - “ Sok F $ ἘΞ the Party and recent victories for democratic liberties τ᾿ i or indicated big opportunities for the. Communist Party; It'is » i i ΞΕ significant that for the-firstt.ime in 20 years the CPUSA ro. ι ~ bal JS “eirculating a Panty application , card, ἐν i a4, 7 he ! a . ἢ ὶ . κ ΝΣ Ν" mo, 3 4. “ ΝΣ The report of Gus Hall. 3 Most important, ‘and 18 if Rae ᾿αρξϑομοᾶ, ΝΞ κι τ " | PP 4 ἂν ᾿ τς | . ; tf πέρασι a g " | we 7 4 4 τι ᾿ μος ; o | ἢ prey ὁ . ᾿ with siarnbst fraternal: greot ings, a ao at whoo . 2 Η * " ᾿ εὖ ΝΣ we * . Ἂν - oo - am pepe πε meee se on tee. πα. - : 4 : te * a Ἴ , » -- ἢ Υ el, . ᾿ a amo: ae ‘ ' i, : Ι { ᾿ - " ws" εἰ ἀνα, Ὁ . Ι . vt " Ἐε ΜΝ κ * * . ‘ . - τς τιν Ἂν τς “ so ΜΝ 7 Ν ᾿ ᾿ . ᾿ς ΠΝ 47 ΠΝ ΕΝ ᾿ . ἐ ςἤἔὮ * εὖ, ἢ " arts A a “ ye, v Ξ ‘ : ἘΝ Beoafe ἥ. " | ἐν 4 F " - Ἷ ih - ° . » ' , a . Ἢ a ἢ “ ; ἊΝ ᾿ on { t ‘ 2 Ἢ , τ © τῇ ἘΝ δ . Ὁ AN at . . ᾿ Ν “ ΠΗ Ν ‘ i ; ‘ ᾿“ oa " 4 a4 ᾿ “ ἢ ὰ δ᾿ ᾿ Ἀ ' wu «ἷ ° ° * 3 μι ” ᾿ i t. an [ ᾿ oe # ᾿ ao oi : — “ 7 ede om 4 ᾿ μ“ ὍΝ ΒΥ ΕΝ ἣ ᾿ " ; , Wh * ; Pa , aw .. ξι - ΜΝ . _ ᾿ . re ym ' Cy > ar ia si vey τοὺ τ- - «ΩΝ “ΞΕ {0 , ae Ye a Ξ ΞΕΕΞΝ . ΑΔ - τὶ - -- ἡ - . * » , at a ᾿ ᾿ ὅτ ᾿ " To “ee “eceeys TE pte Seti are ‘enna. mf, wees nl ee es Ἶ a be 5} τειν " Tyr ts - re ee ae ΠΣ a My “ὦ tS yo He * . .- * * ‘ 4 at * 7 εἶ ' ἢ * we Bef “ ! ty! “a * op ee we yah fy a " tog Ἧ ΕΝ ἌΝ oo ἐν 2:0 Ἔ sees ee Le : iP ton ‘ sous 7 3 ΕἸ — rs rs : ΒΝ - ὅπ ἀν wr ἐμ ᾿ "ῷ “fs . an ’ 1 κυ ΗνἑΨ » : κι ἐκ ἐπ " 7 * a “ ὲ ¥ εν " , ᾿ " | " Ϊ " δ da ; . " ᾿ ἐν t i? - - ἢ » ‘ . κ« tq
Blast 2 ' Od? * . i Te ge λε row "4 toe | : : ” oo Η . ἊΣ 4 » ‘ ᾿ a a i ¢ Lt. εἷ
" ᾿ πε a . Ἅ . “κα aoa + CT * . _ nero} ᾿ ᾿ Ω δὲ ᾿ ™ , : ὶ a > al - : ; "REa@ “ IXERO t* . | ' ἀΧΕΠΟῚ . : ants hg pee EP “πππττνυσοτπασολκτσσσ πε en els eee ee a ag CORY ne ees
— -
[
-
emp athe Ω
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*
oe
ce ας, τ meme EI ἡ ἤμβηγτῤτασβνήμι 1
7 See ee ee
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- τ᾿ Pe ee ae
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roe te x ' ΝΣ τ
a
ee lin ee lp mre aa Fe a ype le
πον ΚΞ TW te TL θ
“να . r .-
᾿ " -
͵ oe "" ὋΝ i _ ; ΝΒ “tiie” "4 a Wateee TU TLING ΔῈ Pee ον . ' “ταν πα we nace “ “τ Gus 5 Hail Report 6/19/87 Qvening nenadKs hoe τως" εἶ ΝΣ " - ‘ ‘
Ucw.many have not read the 5
whew
ection om the Middle Bast orists in
in The Worker?
. ἮΝ Η͂ so γ ᾿ ‘ - fis Pah 5 written over ἃ week.ago, Obviously this wag before the act of aggrecsion τὰ 2. we " | . : ' ἷ i “ " ᾿ » . . 3 ᾿ a
- . ἢ ᾿ +
-
Tt have not: changed, it b
- απ ως.
ry ἘΠ .
‘dos ᾿ τ
because it is sound.
ΟΞ
committed. The two Hnes on the aggression were ins extéd the moming of istwel's a HECK.
"«
4 + 1
a *
Η
Ἐν ᾿ ᾿ .
Bvonts have fully confirmed its soundness i
‘ . 4 ᾿ . ¥ 4 " ἣν ᾿ \ 7 . τως ao . RNovw of course events have fully exposed the ‘riminal behavior of Israel,
oF
po ᾿
Ν
x
| af, ᾿ ΝΜ x ᾿ ἷ ° ἢ " L / .! ἢ i . A '- , 7 ro (Contin: ation’, of: aggteasion = diplomatic break} Ὁ | wu pd . Ἷ “8 ἤτον gape: . , That SP has ected: asthe, fool of ue 8, on Monopolies, life has documented gd .- " ἢ ι ἢ . " " ! - ᾿ bee " Ἰ - ' ᾿ " ¥ » ᾿ im | * : . fully. The dim is alégo'cleor, ΤῈ ἐσὲ ee stoy the! ‘polits cally. indéyiendent Arab ste t , ete "-" ἊἝ " a8 " " 1 * " -» » . ἫΝ » “ ΝΣ
JERe ¢ oil monopolies ‘went covernments like those tn. ϑαβοξ prabla and ‘ran -- subset vient ν᾽
ro on Che actions cgozinsi Syria also proves our point~-thdt it was the Syras, if government that ahove all Ὅς 8, μηροῖς la lish wanted to- overthrow. and dependent: } ες ΝΕ ean τῇ a ἐς ! Ay : . ag: "ad ; F ᾿ . 7 7 “" ἢ ς . ᾿ . ta " k + - " , ᾿ The ewant to ‘des stroy the 50-59 off deals/in the Arab world. They wont fo retum τ , . * “ ' at : ᾿ 3 a ae Ἢ " ' ban a * * ~“ ; 7 "8 + . * x Tye 7 to the 59=20 ‘split aizongementy. ΕΣ an - ἐξα * ψ ἊΝ ᾿ εκ 7 ἱ " κ᾿" * al eat Η Ἢ -" Ἴ r | oe : , 4 rT _ _ 7, & ἀξ in ‘the service of + these 0 despicable cuithoat thieves that t the leaders of ΗΝ > 7 ΜΝ i t - . 1 Ay " 7 ‘ a ihe “ 4 " . ' λ cane
Ye ΠΡΟΣ sold Gp’ ‘tho Joyish Aa REOH, th
State-of Israel, the anti-iniperta
Ἢ * " “-
- a 7. - . z τὰ
list forcos of Tne
Π ,
wor sid and prpgtcasive nurionity. ‘they have prougi eoeace and dishonor to fhe cause
- HF A ᾿ πριν ἔξ. aa δι τ ὦ a 4
ten rac! chat yall take a tong ἐξ
a? +
‘
LT ΝΣ go. | Somites throuch out the work. :
meto livo
~ OW " . ν»ν. "ὦ * - : wk es - ¥ at
«ἀν ra " doy : ‘Theyneve add δὰ grist tothe Δ} of anti,
‘yay ae ke meee πὴ af
Τ' A. “fen
—r aoe πὶ -
ty
ce tay tage pater aS te :
tag.
art)
a ee ae ee ea
ι τῆν ’ 4 -.- .* . * κ᾿ κ at ' a. " - ἢ * i aod * . ΕΣ * aa . ἀ fee - PY
} - + Ls . i Π . εν 7 i . * ᾿ ; _ ” . , . νειν, they have done 5 this in the name of generations of suffering and } a ἊΝ 4
Μ “ ῃ " ᾿- : ᾿ - Ν " ἧς - " τ τ ᾿ 7 . ‘persecution and torture suffered by the Jewish péople only adds tothe enormity
F ᾿ + é ἢ . Ne i . ™ A ‘4 7 ’ ᾿ » . ᾿ ° - ᾿ - 7 a . “ne ἱ ᾿ i a . . - 7 " ᾶ .« . ; "-“ οὗ the. crime δ᾿ me ” . . 7 rt 4, . Νὰ “ " . " Ν ut e ) - . ᾿ co 4 t - ς ΝΞ «κα * « . ts : a "ἢ Ν ἊΝ * . Η ' ta, . . . "" f & ‘ ¥ ; . ΕΝ shat they. have mislod mult tori of Jews throughout the world who put , ᾿ he a “ ; , "ἢ an ᾿ " 4 Ἃ ᾿ ΝΗῚ r a * “ ᾿ ἦ x * “-- " 4 . , " ¥ . yt ᾿ . μ“ " af. " "- 4 1 5 I" , their feith and hope on a ; homelaiie” τ it further compounds the crime. ᾿ a rE ἢ ¥ Μ Η a . *. " : a F 1 Εν . ; wel, ryt “¢ , τιν τ ἢ εὐ ἦν , ᾿ . ΜΗ ἣν αὖ ; ΞΕ . -« + Thea cousing 2 inger of shame niust be pointed onthe small ring of ’ j ' * ' : to | ᾿ . ' 4 Ν “ " ᾿ ᾿ 2 ae ᾿ ων . ᾿ ἢ “ ΝΣ " ‘ ‘ . Μ . of ’ ω πε yt . 4 ; reactionary business circles ἀνθὸ nave taken over.’ oral and: tied it to the " Ι " ᾿ κ᾿ 7 " yr ° ' “- ᾿ ὧν J ΓΝ a wes é " " La " a us . \ e oy , t . ‘ ᾿ . . ' : ὑπ, ἡ Ghariot of the oll vultures. ute των ἢν τς Ce ; ᾿ : . ἊΝ : ᾿ a oe i eo wry ‘ pie ᾿ > τ - so , | ora eo ™* ‘ a Ν «πο δεν ν᾿ : . ΝΕ i ν ΝΣ Pn , “the daly will como when tio Masses will wrest Ter raék from their grip by a Ν [ ; ι - i τς, ΝΣ “- ΝΞ ΝΕ ᾿ ᾿ . tr . . a ." ἢ ᾿ * Η , ΜῊ τ ᾿ ΓΣ " εν : 2. , ᾿ ᾿ γ ᾿ " ' " ᾿ : ΗΝ * . ? ΕἸ * tas’ ΞΕ sone! Yeti st to: the peonte oft arack. When that time comes Isrect ΜΕ] te take its . ᾿ A , τ ‘ ™ a a " 4 *, . > , * - : “ἀν. , : | , ad : , * - os , ι..ς . . ? ¥ a Δι + a 7 place in the wo; sd camp of, progre δι ες _ fot yk ¢ * ᾿ ~ "νῷ, ¥ ᾿ “ . Ἂ Ρ ᾿ a ' . ὦ ν ‘ © "»" ‘ nt J " ἐπ, Pa , Ly ah - ‘ , z , . oo Π wa a hae wey AE a " 4 t Do m = . Te, - an 4 is 7 οὖν 1 ’ . 4 , : Ν " . πὶ " a ἢ 7. » . τ a oo . "ἢ , - , ‘. . » " ἀν ἢ v * ae ae " ε ᾿ . i * . . a 4 ae $ “ " 1 . τ αὶ τὰ ; . | : ἃ ao ar 7 ἣν " ᾿ . om % ' Ν f + . ot 1. - ‘3 ” ‘ 1 a ᾿ eo # ; Ω » . ᾿ . FT μ " ᾿ ΜΝ " " ᾿ Σ τ “ ιν" 4 ") * Y= ΙΝ , + εἰ -- " J . εἴ ε » # QP te “a 4 εἶ 4, ΕΞ ΞΕ π᾿ νος στ . " ots ‘ ; © - " " " 4 ἣν a 5 ν t . ᾿ ὅς "« . . » . κα Ν . τ κα : at Ἀ ἀ + ae “ " 2 πλὴν ἢ . " rE - ‘ , . " ᾿ ἷ ἊΝ + " Ε * 7s “ad " : “ “+ ra " 4 " ἊΝ . . » 7 7 . , \ Pon ΝΝ ᾿ " -, εὖ oop toa de ΝΗ at . f footw ‘ . ‘ ' ᾿ ' ey τ * νος ᾿ ; . ᾧ,
we . me SHENG} ᾿ ἱκεροὴ . = " ee ed ee eC τὸς
el ory Levee
{xrro ΗΝ ; rope t
“,
es ae tee al Le .
4
τ πον et
"πη τ iad - oe uy
---, ᾿πῆραν τα
h + ‘ ἣν al - --- πὰ oti ταῦ κι τῆ τᾶν ἰὰ εν ee οί, απὸ eee ee:
- . ᾿ t+ at a a . ἢ ἢ οὐ ἢ . te x Γ a "" ᾿ - Η | ‘ % . x Ἶν . 4 * ote _ art Fe “fe . oh , t " ᾿ Ξ τ ‘a ak i h εἶ - a . 4 τ > Ξ τ᾿ y τ κὰκ Γ ' ἐ rr : _ * 1 ‘ ns or 7 a f f t . - yj i Py . t aq , ᾿ -" ᾿ t a Μὰ ἘΠῚ “BR, " } my : t 1 oie ele παν μὴ
4 - " ete eee - τ wan oe ae : ™ . ἊΝ - κ
τας νιν τος θυ το ἀν ΟΝ . owe
’ ΘΌΜΜΙΒΙ τ᾿
τ of State and CIA by senarete Rote
*-Tolson- DeLooch
Mehr =a -
Wick Casper Callahan —-
Sullivan —, TOV] pacers
Trotter παῦςς ς
Tele, Room Holnegs | ἘΞ - Gondy Ls
. LEGAT, Ottava
Pizector, BI (aoeaaninsty
. Ὁ Promptiy 2
‘of our informant. -
Enclosures ‘a 3 oe
τς NOTE:
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
6/21/67
4 ~ μές Nossbirg.. 1 - Hr. R. H. ‘Horner.
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA _ oo
| INTERNAL SECURITY. ~ σ
to
‘There are 6 closed. hrée’- copies of. ‘letterhead siemorandum classified. id captioned δε; ‘above.
to ‘your: source in the source should be cautioned that it is. essential that no distribution or use of our: intelligence, information be. -
undertaken which would ‘be. Likely. to jeopardize the security .
1 ~ Foreign Ldaison, Unit, (Route?
(6),
Enclosures classitied ree βεμοῦ induthorizéd
ον disclosure: of this: information could réveal the identity of
the source (CG .5824-§*) who is of continuing. yalue and such
> revelation, could-result in grave damage ‘to ‘the’ Nation.
Information ‘in LH obtained froti source during
trip 5/26~29/67 Ato. Toronto, Canada, ald while in. conversation |
with William Kashtan, General Secretary, CP -of, Canada, and. .-
Norman Freed, Natinal Educational Director, CP of Canada.
Data axtracted from Chicago airtel 6/8/67. captioned "Solo, Is-c. "
*
This information has also ow tunis Dna ten
abe ΒΕ;
δ τῇ 9 08 εἢ
| Scull 23.1967
TELETYPE UNIT [. : a ~
° (ake ΡΦΖ ἀδεζε Ὁ35 5]
OH ἈΠΤΕΘΕΤΈΕΥ DERIVED FROM:
ve 7 = a ΠΡ ττα κί αν αὖ απ
Ἕ On BOTT
DECLASBIPFICS
ἐὸν a τὰ is τὰ al fe i 4 rhe ΓΤ a μὲ a πὶ τι im a lt | I
eS. ORourE IN ENVRLOPE " - ᾿ . ᾿ | Ὡπεσῖῖςς _ Δ « ur, Hossbure
1 > ur. 8, H, Horner
’
| Juno 21, 1967
COMMUNIST BARTY OF CANADA
~
ΓΠᾺ source who hes Zuiniehed reliable inforziation - dn the past recently reported the following,
ἣ delegation oz Cana disn-Ukrainians, ‘Recompenied by Tim Buck,. National Chairian, Gomsiunist Party of Canada (CPO), was gecentiy scht by the CPd ot a visit to tho Soviet Union, The Calegntion returned to Canada quite dissatisfied with theiv trip. Discusdtons held by the delegates WLU représentatives of ths Communist Party of the soviet Union concerning mnttovs. of interest to the τ
- - Canadian-Ukraininans did not satisfy them. Tin Buck, WhO ᾿ | - AS ἋΣ tha latter part of Hey, 1967, bad not returned + | Canada’ atid whose vhereahovts aud date of return vara unknown to the Canadian Party joddership, had made no xeport to the leadership of this trip. “
- Source furthor advised that the Canadian Party . ia havihe trouble if Yaséouvey,. vitish Columbia. The ΕΞ British Columbia provincigld Loader of the CEC, Nigel Noreen, Ν liege besr absent. fron nis dutica i beceusa of gickness. En. hia absencg, Groups composed of “keftists and pro-Chinese" comiumiets have started ares ARS: problems which Axa tar from. soLved,
Soureea vent on to stave. that the youth weeting | ankled. by the OPC was held Broa Apri 20822, 1967, and WAS coasidersd s succsssful, τὸ Was held an a Location | aporosinately 325 niles Reusicy Honteoat * git Was vitended . τ . by about 85 young beopie, Among those attending were
: Sane axatists, nnarchints, mil communists. Ft was agread. set up a youth or gitign tion Which would ho Harsitate- onionted but not actualiy a communist organization,
εἰς 100-428091 . jelsn ————~- QRIGINAL AND TWO ΤῸ LEGAT, ORTAWA BY LETTER DATED 6/ 51. 67. New. Ἃ Ὁ Foreign Liaison Unit ti ἘΠ τάπης ()
Callehan Contad ..
ΜῸΝ aueery | a Felt < Gale
"ἫΝ ROSEN ee,
Sullivan ees . “ Teves ‘
Trotter —_*’ }
Tele. Room ρας, 4 Holmes Gandy
Ly RONTH IN ENVELOPE
»2. Date: 6/14/67 ες ἢ ᾿ Ι Ι
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via AIRTEL _ REGISTERED | Ι ᾿ ΝΣ (Priority) j “ΜΗ
TO * DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM :_,SAC)"NEW YORK (100=134637) (41) A tn SUBJECT: SOLO | ™
ReBuairtel 6/13/67, inquiring whether tad NY 694-S* may have meant Yugoslavia rather than Austria with regard to opposition to the convocation of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, between April 24-27, 1967.
On 6/14/67, NY 694-S* advised that his source had spécified Austria - not Yugoslavia - in this connection; that no reference had been made to Yugoslavia, which in 8, matter of this kind is considered by his source more as an "outside party," not one to. be invited to a meeting such as. was held at Karlovy Vary.
hy ΝΣ Lng 1-464 WO te) suse (RM | REC 3 fe O -~ fase 77,“ 085). NY 134-91 (ow) (42) pice revere temas Δ. « New York α΄ ΜῊ 21 067 ors .: 5 ΜΝ ~~ ὐ pds "ey pul :
QV
Approved: ve Ft Sent UM Per . = 168 ἈΝ Gl Agent in Charge 6 τ ub. 926 (Se
DECLASSIPICAT
OR AITTHOR
FR GA
w
* DeLoach .
- Wick ” Gaspet
. Conrad , Felt
i Tavel z
TY BERTYED TON (Ὁ
PRON:
AUTOMATIC PECLASS WER GS-O7-Z0Le
ΝΣ 0 T~pste’
- Subject:
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
ΜΝ i ee _ BY LIAL ON June, 19, 1967 mS πὶ 2.ὦ Liais n To: ‘Director 1 = Mr. RNC, ; - Central Intélligence Agency “. ; ᾿ ΡῈ ΝΕ “Attention: Deputy Director, Plans 70 Fron. τ sohn Edgar Hoover, Director h be» MEETING OF EUROPEAN σου ἐδ. PARTIES. AT:
KARLOVY VARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA‘ eee 24-27, 1967
Referetice is made ‘to: ny ‘etter dated: June 14,
᾿ς 1967, captioned: as above (your file: CSCI-316/02485-67) ,
which ‘stated οὖν source ‘was. being recontacted in response to: your inquiry. as -to whether ‘our source may not_-have . -_ meant: Yugoslavia rather: ‘than Austria in line four, para= — graph four of my letter of April 27, 1967. _ Upon recontact our source advised that the information given clearly “specified. Austria was in- ᾿ - τς opposition to signing a resolution against the North - . Atlantic. Tréaty Organization. ..It should be noted that. . Ὧν our source obtained this information in. early April 1967, - “ well in advance of the meeting in Karlovy Vary ys
_ Gzechoalovakia,. (cdg REC. 5 jo ὁ -- ~ $43 SoG 05" 55
NOTE: ᾿ By iste dated 6/2/67, CIA furnished details. of = ‘What. transpired ‘in the meeting at. Karlovy, Vary and questioned | information ‘set forth in.our letter of 4/27/67, Bureau letter 6/14/67 ‘advised wa were recontacting our isource: (NY 694-S*), _
‘who obtained his information fro Nikolai Mostovets, head: of τι
᾿ the ‘North -and ‘South American Section, Internatioiial Depart~
Tolson
Mohr
Calishea ,
Gale
Rosen — Sulbivan nena
Trotter .
Tele. Room 2. =
Holm a isan BHD
- On 4/5/67. 7
ment, Central: Committee, Communist. Party ὋΣ ‘the Sa Soviet Union, Of course, CIA was not told where Py, iuR BT Bsr
‘pobtained his information, Ekimagiectsaner ane ‘Classified " ‘aince unauthorized disclosure’
of nad information conte; vevbaidtiontity of the. source (NY 694-S*)
_ Who is ΟΣ continuing: va and such revelation could. result in “grave damage to the ες be ὃ. ‘nation, Data extracted from ‘New York. airtel of “ἢ ᾿ ἌΣ 6/14/67, captioned "Solo,.
τῷ
Is-c. ‘t ; Excluded RCP :dmk. downgrading and (δ) declaséification
ΜΝ
TELETYPE UNIT oO
100-428091 Ne
LEG-7 (Rev. 12-22-65): Mm OPTIONAL ORM NO, 10 3010-196 “
ra MAY 1962 EOITION .
4
Oba Ctx, “a6, Sat, i?
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum
TO Director, FBI ¢ 100-428091 ) DATE; 6-15-67
: Legal Attache, Ottawa ( 105-684 (ὃ)
~~,
[ὦ SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA τ So Lo > 1S - CANADA (00: Bureau)
ν΄ Reference: LHM dated 6-8-67, at Washington, ἢ. C,
Dissemination, as outlined ‘below, was made on dates indicated fo foreign agencies listed.
One. copies of Te LHM
ἘΞῚ Pertinent information. from
Name and Location of Agency Date Furnished
= 7D
6-1f-67
D
446. -Y2G09).
NOT t RECOR 3 - Bureau RDED (1 - Liaison. Section) 3 JUN 19 1967 1 - ofT . | MLI:jhe | πον rm A (4)
BAIUN 21 1967)"
a ae τ τσ ἀρ ee ΔΝ ΕΩΚΙΒΗΝ ΕΝ, δ:
AUTOMATIC
VECLASSIF
E O3-07-E012
‘
ἀν ας , ἍΜ“
Fale. Room, —__ nn
Holm Sats ny oy rs; Go je se ἐμάνη
CAT
ON GUIDE
ὀδός ὁ ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
SAC, Chicago (134-46 sub F) 6/21/67
; Reurlet - 6/13/67 which gets forth information. that Gus Hall » Genoral Secretary, Communist Party, USA,
used ‘Solo rtgage in. the amount. of be $16,500 ὁ o the benefit of CG 5824-5*, RIC tt further states that Ha 5 instructed that the. monthly
payments made on the mortgage t+ be made to CG 5824-S*'s personal account at the First National Bank of Lincoinwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois. Hail further instructed that, upon - accumulation of cach threo months! payments amounting to $369 60, CG 5824-s* ig to add '$5.40 bringing the total to: - $3751, Then tho informént 15. 0 p 500 Series E ΝΞ to hor. bond in the name of Hall’ and forward it
o her.
Your letter notes that, CG ‘5824—=5% recognizes this
= iP
instruction made without prior eonsultation, ‘thoresis. no apparent way for the informant to extricate himself at this
‘time... EX103 REG “59 we foY/ - 6354 Howaver, no Beation is given in your letter
ras to how this apparent interest income for CG 5824-S* will be handled with respect to the source's income tax or how he contemplates obtaining funds-to pay the additional tax necessary. This is a matter of: extreme importance and ‘should be thoroughly discussed with the informant. The Bureau should be promptiy advised of the steps that will be taken to insure that this activity does not result in CG 5824-s*: becoming involved with the U.S. eee Service,
4-= Now York (100-134637) 6 JUN
21 1967 co NOTE: This is anotherinstance where. Hall h h ThFormants to feather the ‘financial nest of hi
who is the “apple of his eye." In order to ful
our sources, we must insure that the matter of income tax is handied in such a way as to preclude an unnecessary investi-
ROP: dnik (5)
\
NOTE CONTINUED:
RE: ‘SOLO ΝΞ 100-428091 - a 7 . .
-
gation of the informant's financial activity by IRS.
If the taxes are properly paid the sum paid by Halits daughter could be concealed in the informant's investment ‘income which is substantial.
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FED FROEH:
SECLASSIPICAT ΩΝ AMITHORITY FD
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-1 - Liaison ~
- ; ; ΩΝ αν “ΕΝ 2 - Ἧς, R. Cc. Putnam La,
l ᾿ πὶ : ΝΣ BY LIAISON A Date: _ June 14, 1967 ey
&
ρ΄ Soviets that ‘this was a. very ‘good idea.
- Tolson τον
Beige —~ from the CP of Canada at the: meeting: in Karlovy ‘Vary,
Whek
Conrad
“Gollehon Στ Wey pe De ae Fe (δ ‘
eevee RECEP - ls Ea str dae Me: 1004428097.77 434 YL
Tavel
Trotter Tele. Ros mn
Holmes
᾿ Gandy
p) ᾿ς “Bocialist UAity Party of Germany: (CP of East'Germany), held - —_
Tos Director ~ τ Central Intelligence Agency
Ι
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans ~ { oP ΝΕ
From: ‘John Edgar Hoover, Dixector
Subject: HEETING oF EUROPEAN οὐ ΜΌΝ ΒΤ. ‘PARTIES AT - . KARLOVY. VARY, _ CZECHOSLOVAKIA , APRIL 24-27, 1967 ©
Referral/Consult τ΄
ack regarding: 8S mat ie. following —
additional information has been developed. concerning the .
_ ‘meoting at Karlovy ‘Vary by another: source who ‘has furnished ΝΣ
~ reliable Anformation.in tho "past. - ΝΞ ΞΟ ΨΩ
; In late autumn or early winter: 1966, 1 William.
- Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party’ (CP). of Canada, - ~ applied throtgh the CP of the Soviet Union for an invita- —
tion for the CP of Canada. to send an observer: to the ᾿
Meeting of European Communist Parties δὲ Rarlovy Vary, =
Czechoslovakia. At that time, Kashtan was: informed by the
When Kashtan. attended the: -Wth Congress: of the.-
April .17-22, 1967, in East. Berlin, he was in contact with raternal delegates of the CP of the Soviet Union, the CP - ὺ- ‘of ‘Czechoslovakia, «and others. who. were: going to attend the gy Rarlovy Vary meeting. , Howaver, not one of. these Andividuals ~ said anything. to hin.regarding the attendance-of an observer
Czechoslovakia --
__ SEE NOTE! PAGE-TWo,-
aly" ee
RCP: :dnk/est
Ὅθεν
BR 9BT a unit [1 -
DiFoctor Contra}. Intelligence Agency
| As of this tina to infornation 4s ‘available to andicats that thoro will bd αὶ folloyeup. nocting to the Karlovy vary conferoneds, - ; Referral /Consul ε
i]
- NOTE:
Classified 7 ~ since unauthorized. disclosure’
of this. information could reveal identity. of the source | CG 5824-S* who is of ‘continuing Value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation. Data extracted
from φα airtel 6/8/87 captioned "Solo, 15 ~ c. -
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τς ΕἾΡ238 (Rev, 5-22-84)
Transmit the ‘following in -
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ἊΣ R . FBI OUT an ; Date: np Ἢ IN “NV er,
(Type in plaintext or. “coded
Vie. AIRTEL REGISTERED . | 1 ΝΗ͂Ν ᾿ ΝΗ " ' (Priority) ᾿ TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100=428091) FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100- 134637)
SUBJECT Se } 5-0 Ὁ
On 6/20/67, there was received: from the Soviets, . via radio, a partially coded-ciphered message » the ‘plain text of which is as.follows: | | ᾿
"To Gus Hall:
"Editorial Board of magazine Problem of Peace and Socialiém want to know whether ‘CPUSA. ‘Yepresentative will attend conferénice. opening in Prague on: June 22, or will you Send ἃ report. Editorial Board discussed this. matter with
BY TLUMER.' cel - Fo TP ἐ wr, 3 Buréau (200-428091) (RE 102 . —
~ chicago, cera τ B) ἴηι ἘΝ)
1 - New York. (134-91 | ‘thoo-i3hes7) ta (De Ἂ foo 4 YASCY 0356)
1 - New York 100-13 6 JUN 23-1967
ACB: emda (7) =
Sent —___ MP
ἢ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
τὰ
- τ’ aM “τας “OPTIONAL FORM NOv τὸ
‘MAY 1982 EDITION: ᾿
ΒΑ ΡΡΜΗ ( CFR} 181. “iL -
Δ ‘Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI (160-428091) | - DATE: 6/13/67
FROM as CHICAGO. (134-46 Sub B) Ν .
SUBJECT:
1s=6
Enclosed herewith. is. one Xerox copy each for the ‘Bureau And New York of an article entitled; "The 'Missile ‘Baron: The Real Man ‘Behind the Halo of Publicity,," which in English translation appeared. in the Supplement dated May: 23, 1967, of "Daily Review, Translations. From The Soviet Press,” published .by Novosti Press Agency,, Moscow, USSR, The article originally appeared in the issue of April 6, 1967, of “Krasnaya Zvezda," organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense - This article concerns ‘Dr, WERNHER VON BRAUN, rocket expert who is now Director of the George
¥
» C, Marshall Space Flight Centér of the National Aeronautics
and ‘Space Administration at Huntsville, Alabama. This article is. a condemiation of the activities of Dr. VON: BRAUN dur ing the time he was Director of the Rocket Research and
Development ' ‘in Hitler Gerriany.,
CG 8824- 5:8 Suggested. that this article be called to “the attention- Of “the Bureau. because the prominence given to this. article and the fact, that. this lengthy article was - printed: in full in translatiot. ‘léd him to the 6pinion that this is but ‘the opening salvo of what may become. 4 full-scale assault to discredit Dr. VON BRAUN..
This office has not observed any other ‘such articles
concerning Dr. VON BRAUN: in: the socialist press nor were com-
U.S. press in connection with the ahhouncement in early June, 1967,..that Dr. ΟΝ B UN. ‘was to. receive. the Langley Medal
ments of the type set forth in this article observed in the tL from the Smith ni nstitution ; Apnsneton D.Cs
ἰ-δι TDS Ν (2)-Bureaw coat 1) (RM) tie ee 5 CaM) os YY 1-N York (100- ΩΝ - ἘΜ - 1-Chicago se ἥν fie. | aan ᾿ /a δ “Ὁ nd 8.- it * ππ ᾿ WAB; MDW Ke ΤΩΣ 3 bt δ μου οὶ «οὐ ΡΥ a | τ ἢ
per SO - a.
al
+ . ENCLOSURE, TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO
1 Xerox copy of article entitled, ‘The ‘Missile Baron': The Real Man Behind the Halo of Publicity."
RE: SOLO . I8-C
. ; _Bufile 100-428091 CGfile 134-46 Sub B
Transmitted via CGlet to Bureau 6/13/67
--
» ¥
op MISTER BARON! RHE, READ MAN BERIND THE HALO. OF PUBLICITY
the History of the πα “tradi sfigurati ont of tlemnher ἢ ‘- ; von Braun - ΄ ἘΣ ἷ ;
ul, Rébrov, Engineer Major τ΄ *
wihiy
- ᾿ - . ᾿ + . 4
“ag Head of the Marshall Space Plight Centre of the +, .Matiohal Aeronautics and Space Administration at
" Huntsville, Alas, Dr, Wernher von Braun Ls. the Key men behind the Saturn V tocket that is bo. snd. ἀβοτὶς
-
cans to the Moon." -” United States News ahd World Re ort, December 1966, )
ay 7 - 1 : som νὰν Peay * . . Pr . * boy μ tT. 4 “ “ - -
‘4 .
woo
x. x x
“While Wernher von Braun is receiving: ‘the’ Gababéxt Prize int Agtronautbics,. the former prisoners: of Bucheowald~ ‘Dora concentration: ‘camp express their “protest against such
‘honours. lg
. (Prom. the Statement of the French, Organisation of the Former ‘Prisoners of the Buchenwald-Dora Concentration Gemp, March 15, 1967)
ΝΣ [00 - αλῦο8! --ἰ»35:7
ΝΞ , ]
- ea Why the Praise?
The account below igs not a collection of detective stories, military episodes “or other chance events not connected with each other.: All this is more serious than might séen' at first sight: History,does not tolerate falsification and especially the history of the past war, fox it was written in letters of blood, and nothing has been forgotten. ΞΕ
Τῷ is ncbody's secret today that rockets paved the way into outer space, and that in the: past years the deve- lopment of world astronautics has been induced by two differ- ent motives: a daring quest and a desire for the, advancement of science, a yearning to unravel the mysteries of the Universe in the interests of all mankind and its progress. The other motive was that of profit, selfish interests and . the policy of military gambles. aoe
at en
Some may ask: How can one deflect problémd of a scientific. technical nature into the channel of morality? ΤῊ reply to this we can say that,: first, this is justified by virtue of an objective assessment of facts, and, second, we are for morality not for the sake of morality, but because we -are convinced that astronautics should engage in creative ‘endeavour and discovery not for evil but for the good. and prosperity of mankind, And this. means. that the pedple . behind astronautics should have clean hands,
In April 1946 a mysterious clause appeared in the US Air Force Research Programe, It dealt with the "flights above the atmosvhere, including space bases and various ᾿ appliances for the use of space.” The Jupiter-C rocket was selected for launching America's first artificial Earth satellite. The first stage of this rocket was an improved variant of the ballistic missile V-2 which-in times past was dubbed as Vergeltungswaffe (the weapon.of retribution) by the Nazis. ΕΣ |
There are many talented people in America.| And among these one can name famous men of letters and actors, aip- Lomats, politicians, arcnitects, scientists and engineers... However, there are also some others who have acquired American citizenship, yet it is doubtful that they could’be an adorn ment to America, even though some of these are now said to be in the category of "space genuises," and hopes are being expressed that they will help to raise the prestige of the nation,
One of these is Wernher von Braun, a scion of Prussian
barons, Himmler's close friend, member of the Nazi Party,
SS Sturmbeahnfuhrer and cavalier of the Knight's Cross for Merits with Swords -- one of the highest Orders of the
Tvird Reich (an account about all this will follow). Wernher von Braun was the man who dreamed in 1944 about firing missiles of his design at New York, Moscow and Leningrad.
In the '50s he deseribed to the Americans his plans of waging a war in outer space and developed the strategy of Space espionage. .
τ cen value ἕν τῳ a Loerie " ad He wag the one who offered the Pentagén his "boys which became the predecessors of Polaris and Redstone missiles for which the SS criminal was decorated with the highest Order of the American’ Army.
or One of the issues/the magazine Missile Design and Development said that von Braun was “probably the only man, nov counting the President, who’ could get a billion dollars from the Congress and even more..." Coole ag
at
“Astronautics is tly only interest." Von Braun uttered these words in a very’ much advertised film called "Wernher von Brapn: I Yearhn for’ the Stars." Apparently the missile baron has learned +6 “juggle phrases. And the thing which formerly sounded like “world domination" is now being camouflaged with the words "world space,"' as though there was no such thing as the Nazi medieval period, ‘the grief of lacerated Europe, the hopeless gloom’ of Buchenwald and the horrors, of Doras, Ss τι,
The film itaclt, the numérous' statements ab press conferences and the effective posing before TV cameras and
πον thany other things done by Braun and his bosses jare aimed at
Ὁ poinging: to“*naught Braun's past and showing that America's space genius is irreproachable morally and politically,
δα πῇ
ρον «so Weapon of Retribution’! . a...
‘. We shall yot delve into the méaning of ‘these words invented by Goebbels, They are clear enough, What is
not clear is against whom this retribution was and for what... However, there‘is another point to be raised,
Does von Braun remember the meeting in the "Wolf's Lain" (that was how Hitler's HQ in Rastenburg area was called) and the: words which the Fihrer said to hint "Thank .youl Why Gidn't I believe in the success of your work until now? I was simply badly informed.,." On that ‘sane day Hitler personally granted Braun the title of professor.
Lated in one of his friendly talks with Hitler (these talks had become quite customary) Braun described his plan of developing a missile for shooting at America. The. bloody maniac: was fired by the idea and promised the baron all the gold of the world. He also demanded “to reduce the testing period ‘and“immediately start industrial pro-
uction, '
Having lost the capacity for offensive operations at the: Eastern front, after its inglorious defeat |at Stalingrad, Kursk, and Oryol, the Wehrmacht nurtured the vindicative dream of achieving a turning point in the military opera~ tions with the help of a “wonder weapon." On November 8, 1943, Hitler proclaimed that the hour of retribution was near. "nTf we cannot reach America yet, we have in immediate proximity ‘Go us one state, thank God, and we shall not let it got"
1 ε"
dado tp rh ge yg ethers MMM ν ςς Ν : io τως ΉΝ ae ΒΝ tes - _ ait a . ‘ i ᾿ ἢ tot"‘Having xeburned:from λύουσι headquarters .on January 5, . 1944, Doctor Josef Goebbels hastened: to-raise: the morale of the’ amy with the following statement: "The Mihrer and I, look~ ingiat-alarge-scale wap of Londen, marked the most import- or¥ant Sargets.2On.the. narrow areaoccnpied, by London there mactare twicecassmuch people‘ diving as:in Bexlinsivl know!” : what this means... There have’ beentno airs alarms: in London ἢ for more than three and a half years. You can imagine it what aiterrible awakening this will’beli.e" τὸν
Ὁ ‘li .tWhat was'it: that’ the issile fanatics, including “isron Braun wanted.to- achieve, “There.cab be only one, answer: the: mass-sealé destnucbion of ‘the civil population of other «countries, i2héy-were in a‘great.hurry. 7On June 15, 1944, _«Golonel Wachtel watted: sith impatience, for an order with itithe:code name: "White Bear, "..Immediately.on receiving ‘the order urgens instructions were issued: Open Lire at target No. 42, use a warhead." Two hundred and forty four launchings _ had.’beer made- before thes afternoon. of dune 16, and 73 one Phying: bombs: had hit: Greater: London are a before ‘midnight Do ofthe next days. f So tra on eta A AOL Βοος
" ᾿ dan ey
*. “ ΚΑ δας
οὐ Οὔτ June 18, ἰδοῦ 91. οὶ regiment launched.its 500th flying bomb. The skies over South East Britain turned into
were Shpposed to point out. the placeg pit by the .bombs. which
Σὰ would possibly reduce the: range of the flying hombs. a " me aw oe Fae los " “ΝΣ wt wo" κα
ly south of London.” .He insistedion cancelling: the M.f, plan, and.gof thevsupport ofthe Gabinet, “-- en ΣΣΤΉΣΑΝ ᾿ wit oe a” ΩΝ aL - ᾿ ." ws a . ane π " Ν τ :
ἐλ xsHowever, invreality everything remained thé same. " Pato. dna hie
He -»
fhe Failure of Opetation "anvil"
τ μὰ mysterious name was invariably connected with notion of top secret and thorough preparations. The operation began’ on’ August 12, 1944,
iat l?hrs 52 mins a Liberator heavy bomber carrying the'number 32271 and american identification marks took off from the Winfarthing-Fairsfield airfield in Norfolk, Thé equipment and the crew.of the plane were just ag unusual as- the assignment set to the British pilots. Tostead οἵ the maximum bombload of four tons the Liberator carried "Ὁ . 380 boxes of explosives with the total weight of more than 10 tons. Instead of a crew of 10-12 people the machine had “ only two lieutenants: first pilot Joseph Kennedy, 2, the elder brother of the future President of the United States, and second pilot Wilford Willey.
Raking off after the bomber and following the same course were two Ventura type suidance planes, one aerial “photography Mosquito plane, one B-17? bomber and a flight of air cover fighters. @heir destination was the secret "weapon of retribution," the launching racks of the missiles which the Germans had been using for several weeks for firing at London. Loe
a
Phe plan of the operation had been worked out, thoroughly: Kennedy and Willey had to leave their "infernal machine" over Kent, before the. armada reached Dover, and the rest of the job would have t6 be carried-out by the Ventura suidance planes. In that.way it was planned to do away at a single blow with the secret weapon of the Germans. :
At 18ers 20 mins the groundstationgs received the code | message saying that everything was all right; and that the Buckles control point was in sight, At ‘the same moment the Liberator went ableze like a lightning. Two explosions shook the skies with an interval of one second, leaving.
nothing of the machine.
‘What had. actually happened? Had this been sabotage or, an accident, or an ordinary human mistake or a case oF ἢ’ technical miscalculation? Phe reason of what had happened has remained a mystery forever... The "weapon of retribn- Vion" also remained a mystery. Ἀν
The δ ‘sauadrons of the Allies continued to bomb the - launching pads in’ Wortthern France and incurred great losses, though they did not.achieve any substantial success.: There: ' vere 450 planes dowied and 2,900 pilots lost. Such was the * result of ‘these operations arter which the Germans continued , to fire:at the British capital. - ᾿ ᾿ ἷ
_ The offensive which began in France seemed to have made things easier for the British Isles.
, Ge
The last flying,-bomb launched from. the Prench territory reached Britain on September 1. The same day the British civil defence agencies stopped planning precaution measures,
"| On the ‘evening ‘of September 7, Duncan Sandys,’ British Cabinet Member and Churchill's son-in-law, announced at a press. conference that the war against flying bombs was over. He was too hasty, Next.day the German troops deployed
. ΄
in Western Holland launched: the. first: one of the thousand /V~2. missiles which.were destined to. fall on Britain, A
" Panic began in London: hundreds. of houses were damaged or ruined every day, hundreds of people. perished and a sixth part of the capital's production, capacities were idle
though they were of a decisive importance for the war effort,
Even before that -the battery stationed.in Oiskirchen got orders to start firing at Paris at which 19 missiles were aimed. However, the unsuccessful launching of the: first missiles (they exploded right on the ‘Launching pad) made it impérative to postpone the oneration.: Later General Eisenhower said: ."Had the. Germans managed: to complete the .develdtment of* this. new weapon and use it gix.months earlier, ‘the landing’ oZ.the Allies on the Huropean continent would have been exceptionally difficult and perhaps impossible..." ‘
Not Forgotten with Time
The allied ‘bombers did not solve the, problem of fight} ing against "the wéapon of retribution." Hitler as formerly staked on ‘von Braun's missiles considering that missile ὁ. terror would make the British and the Americans conclude a° separate peace treaty with Germany. He kept nurturing the dream that he would beable to collect hig forces.again and erush the Soviet Army. a
., - the manufacture of missiles was organised at a new: place, in an underground plant not far from Nordhausen, Iwo tunnels “‘éath two kilometres long were: built under a 7O—metre layer of ground of Mount Konstein. These were connected. with each other-by 46 transversal. passages. - Lt was there that. thousands. of. people brought from different concentration camps had to take part.in the production of - flying bombs. 9. 4.06 0 Πρ ρου ΝΞ
There is no describing the extremely difficult conditions in which the prisoners of Dora had to work, The horrors of Buchenwald pale when comdared-to what these people nad to © g0 througn, In only six. mouths betreen September 1943 and- March’ 1944, 50,000 people ‘perished in the suffocating and wet pits. ‘Underground transport treits with "manoowext! arrived “every week end.on some occasions ‘several times a week, Hach such train carried 700-800 people, and these could barely make up for.the human.:losses of the week..
ΠῚ weet wae
The sate carriages took back to Buchenvald corpses of people maimed by tortures, men hanged or shot by the firing squad, onaciated’ by starvation, by inhuman work and infectious
diseases. |
Did Yernher von Braun know abou’ all this? Yes, he did. He was the "master" of this underground inferno. Here’ is the testimony of only a few of Dora’s prisoners.
Prisoner No, 138708 (yes, the people who were in Braun's underground dangeon had only a number, and no name, However, -We know the man; He is Communist Mikhail Stepanovich ‘Zabochen who got to Dora as a boy and carried out various assignments of the local underground organisation. He is now a Major of the Soviet Army): | “ -
ἼΛΗΣ have been in Auschwitz and Bucnenwald, However, even these seemed like varadise when compared to the under- ground shops of Dorae People died in tens and hundreds every day... In Dora, Braun arranged feasts for the Nazi generals in honour of the launching of the first V2 mise siies. He was a crucl man. Perpetrating atrocities together with him was Oberschahritihrer Sanger. On November 19, 1944, the 3S men’ announced that a Bolshevik underground organisation had been Giscovered, After that they hanged and shot many peoples... a
. "On April 13, 1945, waen the ‘end of the Nazi Reich Was near,‘ there began a heinous extermination of people “to conééal the crimes and keep the mystery of the ‘secret weapon.’ Dora prisoners were poisoned, shot ani burned..." Vasily Vasilyevich Ivanov (former assistant commander, . reconvalssance platoon, 376 Howitzer Regiment, Secretary of: undergrouhd Party group, now engineer of Lengiprotyazhmash):
"Braun often appeared in Dora. He wags a tall, neat and lean maa. He wore a felt mufti hat and an oil cloth vaincoat reaching almost to his ankles and concealing an
. ΒΒ. uniform with the scull and cross bones emblem. All the πο subordinates used to stand at attention before him...
*: "He used to pass the stacks of corpses with an indif- fereit smile pretending that this did not concern hin. I recall how one of the SS sadists from the security group
ὦ; Was beating up Dmitry Bidenko (he now lives in Odessa and
age WORKS αὖ one of the local colleges) at the entrance to the
i tunnel, The hobnailed boots trampled ruthlessly the man lying οὐ" -the ground. At that moment Wernhér von Braun ap- peared, He-could have stopped this ontrage with a single ges- ture. He could, bub he didn't, Braun calmly stepped over the blood=stained man‘and walked on, - ss
“Br . |
In one.of the shops some executed Dora prisoners hanged for a long tine on 8 travelling crane they used to hang sixty people at a time), Vor Braun would pass . under the crane with complete indifference noticing only - the things which were connected with the production process. What he wanted.was speed of production cb any cost.”
Adem Gabala ‘(Polis afti-fascist, former political prisoner No, 13573): \
'The German sciedtists under Proféssor Wernher von Braun saw all this. ‘They sav how the prisoners were VOLK. ing and sweating it out and how, they were being humiliated, Weroher von Braun did not protest ‘@ single time against — this cruelty and inhuman behaviouri,.. On a small platform nexs to the ambulatorium building *there were piles of ὦ corpses of the prisoners tortured to death by unbearable ‘Labour and the ‘outrages ἀξ the vindictive overseers.
From afar the corpses looked like an unending grey mass. Brau would go by very close, almost touching the corpses, Tt's hard to believe that this sight did not affect him in any wayee. I do not think that he was .engaged at that moment with only his thougats.onv inter-planetary space without seeing the people dying in dirt and excrements.
He certainly saw them! But why did δ keep quiet?" .
Why did he keep αὐλοῦ
"Many people, including soldiers, scientists,and others realised that they were serving a regime whose legality was more than. dubious. Hevevés, what can a single man do in such a situation? Should he flee or firmly hold his post? I decided to stay...” 0. - ἐν :
These words" of yours’; Wernher von" Braun, are false | through and through. aAndther thing that has not been. for= gotten with time is one more of, your, admissions: "Tt is September 7; 1944: the long awaited moment. bas’ come and our 'toy' has turned into ἃ weapon of destruction."
‘ Perhaps there might be ‘some pangs in the conscience of the "missile baron" shoulé he recall the mysterious death, in an automobile accident of engineer Klaus Riedel, who declined to don the SS uniform, whith Wernher von Braun had put on. es ee
It is worth recalling that still alive are many people among those who. remember Braun's servile attitude to Hitler, who will never forget the death which he brought to London, Antwerp, Iiege, Remagen, Dilte, dnd Paris, the ones who remember the ‘piles of corpses in Dora, the hanged and Lacerated people who refused td’ verform the "deadly jobs .'"
_ Oe
A Sbrugzie of Valour
Dora, separated fromthe vest of the world with conerete
atid barbed wire, SS troopers with machine guns, search lights
aud dogs, became ἃ domain of sadism. There were about 5,000 Soviet prisoners in the camp, and not a single one ‘of them believed in the chance of salvation, However, nobody wanted to forget the meaning of the word "Life." 4% first this word meant that it was necessary to .escape , ana then it became a symbol of struggle. Stubborn efforts were made to weld the He gastarce forces, The Soviet group of underground workers/ ἢ er Semyon Yalovoi, a military flier downed in ane of the dog fights in the area of hodz. Tre conrades who joined the war at the airfield in Prughany, “where the 30th Fighter Wing and the "4th Assault Plane Wing were stationed, should remember hime *.. |.
The first organised manifestation was ‘an’ act of gabo~ tage; the refusal to work and mass-scale boycotts. However this did nos bring success. The people who ventured to do
this were tortured and Killed on the spot. “Dora was under the personal surveillance of Himaler, and reports came to ‘him eyéry day on the state of affairs there. Carrying out the Tihrer's order, Braun was supposed bo ensure ‘the “maxile num build up-of fixe power with. the ubilisation of an unlimited ‘number of .amunition,"
_ ‘The camp's Resistance Committee insistently sought for new forms of struggle. Taking place one day in February . 1944 was a séoret meeting which discussed the question, of skilled technical sabotage, the aistribution of people. and . propaganda on a wide scate., -Then it all began. tte
«eeDuring the hydraulic testings some nysterLous .force erushed the aluminium tanks for liquid missile fuel, There was a large percentage of spoilage appearing suddenly in the section wnere parts of the missiles were welded.
». Thoroughly concealed defects apveared in the section which engaged in the assembly. of -the remote control instrue mentation and radio equipment. “These defects were 50 in- conspicuous that even the SS men and the specialists with their strict check-ups failed to discover then.
Alien metal objects “forgotten” duxing assembly con- stantly appeared in the vulnerable places of the. missiles under the fuselage. Parts ‘and materials of which there was an acute deficit kept disappearing without trace from the plant's shops. ΝΣ ΞΕ ,
...fhe "clumsy" Russians damaged the missiles when they Loaded them on flat carts and when they took them =: out of the main tunnel. . They pub out of comaission: machinery, mechanisms, machine tools and used every convenient oppore tunity to do this. “
οὐρα '
Φ
The underground, group had its, own radio receiver assembled out of parts of missile radio equipment, Despite ‘the conti~ - -gvieus surveillance of the security agents, the prisoners s,managed to listen in to Moscow, The reports of the Soviet Information Bureau were written down on paper tape. Used instead of ink was a solution of manganese dioxide. Leat~ lets with ‘the slogan “workers of the world, unite!" were
disseminated in the camp.
* . ‘afters each report about the successes of -the Soviet Army the spoilage ‘in the undexground shops increased. The military kept making complaints about Braun's missiles.
One of the documents of that period said: ".,..coming from ‘the command of the Wehrmacht aré: ferocious protests addres- βοᾷ to the general administration of the plant, for a subs stantial number of V-missiles prove to be useless," Later
i became known that every other missile could not be fired at the launching or departed from its course of flight.
. €his wag the result of concealed spoilage. | . 1
ves _ Such is the answer te the’question why Y-missiles did not-take off, a’question for which those on the West are _ trying to find a different explanation, oe
*
+ =:
ηρὸ Sovieb underground group was the biggest, -and' it inflicted thé main damage to the enemy. Among: thoge ‘who fell in the struggle the number of “our compatriots was’ - . prevalent... Braun should remember the Foul provocateur from his.secret. service. If he does not remember him, we can tell him thé man's name “τ it’was Grozuo, He was ‘the one who tore the. thread connecting the bold and. daring priso- ners; he betrayed many of the tembers of the National ." committee and the’ leaders of the general udrising which was being prepared by Semyon Yalovoi. The uprising was to - start, on the: night of December 24, 1944. ° But it was: not
destined to take. place. ἮΝ
Before he was executed Yalovoi organised the escape
»*.of 17 prisoners from the death bunker: The executioners
-seiged the courageous Communists. The Soviet people mef, their death with the .words: "Long Live, the Red Army! Convey:
our greetings to our country!" ~ ΝΝ
‘The struggle continued.
Not _to Be Bombed .
ΝΞ ΈΕΕΕ was: hidden It was February 10,°1945, and Dore/in sinister gloom.
Bombs exploded somewhere nearby. The searchlights on the
corner towers of the barbed wize entanglements were switched
off. There were only thé signal lights at the high tension
wires shining like opantié teddish-viclet eyes and giving warning of death, τος ᾿
τε es he
τὸ
o Ldn
On assigntaanG of the Resistance. Committee six Soviet prisoners were supposed to escape from the camp. in twos they climbed over a board laid across the humming wires.
At first the first pair, then the second and then the third disappeared in the night. Everything was quiet at ‘the camp. The guard was hiding in bunkers, and the prisoners were driven into remote pits. ©
The underground issued the order to meet the troops in the offensive and tell them the bearings of Dora. This - was a tremendous risk: previous escapes did not bring any success. "And still we have to test fate, realising bhai the measure of risk is one's own life," says Vasily Vasilye- vich Ivanov. "All the six of us had hazarded to risk some« thing more. The International Committee had assigned us to reach the front and give the information about Mount Kons- tein in the bowels of which thousands of people perished and weapons were made for the destruction of tens of thousands of other humah beings. The names of the killers and the killed should be known," yee
The Committee decided to'put itself under fire so as
- to save thousands upon thousands of inhabitants of the
European towns from the nazi flying bombs. Quite a Lot ‘could be said about how the six courageous men. acted carrying out
the assignment of the underground +- how they singed their hands with lunar caustic to remove the concentration camp nunber: how almost losing the last of their strength and’ |
half naked they weit through deep snow covering up their
tracks with red pepper, how they stayed in aiding in woods, avoided ‘lange roads and ate bark so as not to starve to Geathers
The only ove to reach the point of destination was Goluzov. He reached without. too much trouble one of .the US Air Porce units and saw its Chief of Staff, He told hin about the request of the International Committee and. gave him the bearings of Dora. The Soviet patriot insisted on the bombing of the underground death camp.
However, the officer, having heard what Golugzov had to say; did not hasten to carry out his request. ‘The: /merican had before him the map of Southern Harz, and the place where the underground plant was situated was ringed with a red pencil, This meant that this area was not bo be bombed. Already then, at the beginning of 1945, somebody had appa~ rently decided to provide protection for Braun's "enter: - prise. " -
"who gave this order?"
The US officer spread his hand as if to show that he did not knows. ΝΣ
ae
mle. ὦ"
Nagi Germany lost the war. Ou May 2, 1945; 55. Sturm bannfthrer wernher von Braun surrendered ζο the Americans, and, his new ‘bosses certainly liked their "GROPRG yw t Phis is .the only thing that cad explain the fact that in November of the same year, when ‘the Nuremberg trial began, Braun was nob in the dock. ν᾿ .
"Had we got him in 1945," said Lee Thompson , the we lle kaown British public figure, "we would nave certainly pnt him before a military tribuaal and he would have probably
᾿ been hanged." .
“[u maybe assumed that in the days so alarming for London, the British did. not suspect that an unparalleled combat between men and rockets was telclng place in the Qrifts of the Harz mines. But why-should this be kept, fron. the public today? The memory - of the. heroes of the Dora underground ἄπ aot to be wiped away, *
‘ To tne present day millions of people caerish in Baer hearts a warm feeling to those who αὖ tne price of theinx- lives strove to interfere with the shelling of tee British Isles with ‘the Braun missiles. This is she memoxy of the hearts. And what about the memory incarnated in a monument. There is 0 such monument “in Britain. Yet, there is some~ thing else: the British Interplanctary Sooty nas avarded ἃ gold medal to Wernher vou Braun. ,
- -
‘ Quite recently the "D1ue blooded” paron was awarded "
the Galabert. Phizge. This act evoked resolute protests An France. General Gustave Leroy, of the French: Alr Force, Chairman of the Society of the Prisoners of ‘Buchenwald-Dora and Cavalier of the Legion of donour, sent Braun the follow ing telegram: ᾿ . mM
"On «my own behalf ane. on behalf of the prisozers which! have ‘survived as well as ‘in memory ox the thousands of people who died in ‘that camp T would like to reming Wernher von ἢ Braun of the time when he was in charge of. the work... and book part in. the atrocities, Perhavs today he should skow ere ater modesty: rememoerdng shat only yesterday ne. was: the cladercmient! of this death tunel." Loto,
+ 4 <ife ν * ΓΝ Foo
- NAsbroneuties is my only interest... “ey
"And whas. about more than 50; 000 people who died ins. the- “‘aungeons of Dora? What abouts che 13,000, killed and - * 40,000 heavily wounded innaoitenss of South Britain and : Belgium?
Mey the fear of retribution always harass you, Wernher von Braun. You. are a criminal! toe law be”
(Krasnaya Gvegda, April 6 and 8, 1967. In full.)
yg τ πππτπτ΄ π-- : fat ΝΣ MO TELEROPIER APIAINAL Se | “ | Ζ ἊΝ VN - peti Cheol ΄ τινα ily “tists δ ἡ Ὅλα 3 Last night I met with ~ when we first net he told “Ὁ me he had a very important oral message t6 give to ne for ὡς Ἢ my general ΒΟῸΣ Gus Hall. Pook cut ἃ spaliplece ef paper 3 with an outline to tell ma the vollowing. ‘that this. oral = a staterent fromthe σα of the CPSU ia the position of the ¥ % ϑονάοῦ covernmmnt. and that on theedteation in the Mideast, “ts ἣν on the crisis in the Mideast, and is to ba given in this ἂν me nenner only, orally, ta the heads Of all δα af the world.: ἀπὲ δι ι (1). That the Μὰ in the Mideaat waa started under the “ἢ > ᾿ instigation of the imertalist countries of the United States, 3 » Great Britain and West Germany for the 631 imperialiate of Ws thepe countries against the Arab netions. in particular and : ss * the hational lineratign progresive movencnts of thabe 3 countries in general who: have been successful with very δ “ "ἘΣ progressive moverants and] fphendship towards the USSR and {
/ ᾿ ὶ ‘a themselves towards scelalistic dims. That ἀ nes . ΕΝ portant for the impertalint doustrles to déstroy and root, ὁ. . > ‘out the national. Uherttion novenents which have-bdéa-nisickey - τς > Great progress in these countries headed by Neasggn 22 1967 (2) That it is most ureent αὖ this netoniite pointcut to Gus Hall and to whe heads. of ell Cbs throughout the world the distortion which the bouxgoise of these imperialist
] - countries are piving In the near Best. situation today. That they
ae nar δὴ [ἐπ situation before er ει BES orting now and haye distorted» :
oat the war ond before thacease Tira.
t
4 th _ -ι Ὁ
ἊΝ ὅμαῦ 46 λα nost ὁ urgent ag-this nonent to point owe
to Gug Rall and to he heads of all Gta throughout the world. she distortion which the pourgolée ‘of these inperislist .
countries are giving in the near Rast piiuetion today. That they τῷ distorting now and nave: distorted the situation vofore the war and péefore the cease Lira, - rr and state their policy
(3) That they wish to emphasize the. outarent of. the Ὁ Yor, how and why
and Soviet position hefore:
\
4
a
re ae ee
οὐ νῷ. TELECOPIER ΗΜ. they supported the cease fire resolution in the United Nations during this period at the time when they did, together with the Arab Nations, and their policy trom the time of the cease fire to the présent period. .
Tt ds the position of the Soviét Government given by the CC of the CPSU to all heads of the CP throughout the world explaining their position during atid ‘after.
Kosyein will pursue this line at the UR.
That this position 48 stated to the heada of the CPs. shveughous because tho bourgeolse of these countries is distorting the real situetion. -
This distortion began innediataly after the military activities of Tsrael began. ‘Therefdre the reason why they . must tell the heads of the GBa, Attempt of imperialists te leash ἃ war to stop advancencnt being made by Arab
nations, such as United Arab Republic, Syria. and AMgaria, ἢ becanse
at that time the dmpetialist countries were Losing their influence both politi¢aily and: comidredally in this area and in these eduntries. Shey #iied at that tine to use the ruling, circles of Syria to atop the less of this influecne.
ut Ee! iat
Therefore that explains why the Israc el. was beitig attacked
ad =
along the border of Syria by Syria ριον to outbreak of hostilities. ‘Imperialist countries: ‘were using the ruling circlea of Syria to harass Israel.. This the impertalists did not. suecead. Meanwhile during. this period, he anti- imperialist sources of the counties ὩΣ ‘the United Arab Republic, of Algeria and Syria ἢ were becotiing atronger and
-p Mine - etd Moar
- “- Ξ Ὁ ἃ " Ma, wed + ἣν we ' 7 “ἘΣ we ae "μὲ a ΓΝ f a r ἄνελεν Wey ow - tal κα ᾿ a αν τί, Bes ae) δα 4, τς 38. 2: Vaden ΕΣ : er oe ἧς Trae τ ει oa nal aay TEE Ξ “ΟΣ Bee
ante oe £2: ae
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es ee ae
ook. Ὁ THECOPIER mgs ος
Pek ey eT aT a Pein oan
ESATA RARER EIR S RIOT ENA MYT a RRR AER RRL OE RR - gs “YORE er and they were tes ΒΟῸΣ 8.119 Re ba vLOL
While they were harassing and proveking incidents agains’
the Israel countries, the énti-imperiailst movement was,
strengthening in these countries, the national Liberation: ΕΝ ΝΣ . movements were strengthening and in these countries they - ae
were inclined towards sooialist orfentation withtin tes .
+
their countries and they were strengthening their . τ' friendship towards the USSR and the soctalist ΟΣ. ‘When they saw they could not .succead, meaning the inperialiat “Ὁ countries, it was then that they started strengthening df their support of these countries against Israel and provoking them in the war against these countries.
| He said, further, our Central Committee policy was
| | based upon. the following: chat the Arab Nations was given our support. in both economic and otheraid 85. ἃ bulwark | against these imperialists, particularly. U.S. diperialism, in ts sphere (the Mideaast). Strefigthening the whole camp of anti-imperialists and their soqialist aims ageinst Israel and the militery click which responds. for the imperialists
| in their war aginst the United Arab Republic, Algerto. and
Syria. ᾿
The military circles of Israel invaded and ‘pecame the ageressors against these countries; In the” UM Security —
Council, “why did the USER Delegation aupport the cease fire resolution inthe United ations, He: said, ‘because on the evening of June 6 we received information. from the VAR that
. τ Rr oa ~™ -3 ee oe eh eee. ” Brine ate be ey ey, bee serene παν. :
there is ἃ very critical situation on the front and the UAR 5.3-
in
ἴω
eof age Se 55. ES PT Beets “eae ΑΝ εν τους ae CP Sat μὲς Tig. ANE PM ye
os yecaute-or the ‘ente-fiportbiteta,. ἜΝΙ
- 7 τι af ela
Ὁ ‘TELCO mei
asked the USSR government to stop. mdad.texy action Ὁ 11. the morning of June 7 and to help solve ‘the problem in the United Nations in the Security councii.. He aaid, the USSR delegation in the United: ations and the ὍΔΕ representative siipported this resolution to conte: ‘fire. “When Israel continued with the war (this was Tne 6). Nasser in conaultation wth the Soviet government (date Was Ἁ PH Gf time, June 7) — informed them that the aggression was Bt. going on, and at that moment the Sovis governiiont: gent ἕν note to the fsrael Ambassador in Moscow thet 4¢ you don't stop this war. immediately we will brealt relationg-with you. On June 8 the Soviet government introduced a Aratt resolution to condem Terael as an aggressor, and told israel that. they must cease fire and must withddew behing ‘the truce lines, meaning the bounderles as proclaimed in the: ΧΟΛΉ after the 48 war. At that moment (June 7) Nassar asked, the Soviet government to solve the matter in the Sequrity Council and Nassar emphasized ἐμὰν he did not want thé Bovigt Union to be : involved in this war, ‘Then, thé ‘Gentral Comiites of the CPSU called a meeting of the socialist countries, Bulgaria, Czécoslovakia, Hungery, Romania, Poland, Rast Germany, in Moscow in which the agends was: to ΟΡ the ἌΣ in the Mideast (heads of ges cPts), τ
We are strengthening this cat: then and now doth economically and militarily and. the yeeson ΚΘ 8:8 doing this is !
I oa μι ἐτ tt απ soe td mF
ae
ΠΟΥ Ττοὺ5
παν
ory ΡΝ πον "πὲ π-π
We are strongthening this camp then and now both economically and militarily and the reason we.are doing this ig
because of the. anti-inperialists, national liberation. and
socialist aima of these countries against these imperialists,
cont εὐ Ὁ, THECOPIER ORI,
‘i 2. itty countries (us Imperialists, | Great Britian ‘and ὌΝ st Germany).
ea ae aig We consider. this to be the corract policy in thie aLtuntion = 7 particularly bacause of the national LiberatLon: MAvEnene. Beofre this crisis our governnent {USSR} rendered , moral support to these coungrida, strengthentig Out
position there in order to create effbotive ἘΔΆΠΌΣΟΣ to
"AAP ER
preserve peace and prevent ἃ crisis of the beginning of a war in that area. After the situation. becane: ageroveted in thia ‘sphere (meaning the ἄγαν, Hétionay 18 “fa the renult of the. actions of the Israel inporailias forces ition 5 st supported by Ὁ, S. imperialism, Great γιά δα West Germany. Therefore, we saw the followng in thi's area. Ὑπὸ -clush of tee policies (1) the part of the socialiat national Liberation movement and the imperialists (2) ccheretely, the-Sovlet government made this statement, of thege to clashes, in the United Hations and outeaide of the Soviet Union accusing the Ieraclist militarists and wagterh powers that they are unleadhing ἃ wal dn the Midewst (stitnont meade May 23 in the um). | os | At the very beginning of dune,: theSoviet’ government tried their very best. to lessen the ntessure of theas woetern powers againat the UAR in the Gulf of Ag. and efnultancously whenthe. winiatexs αὐ the YAR, arrived, at that moment. whenthey made this. Statement, simultaneously the Ambedaader of the-UAR and the President of Syria ward meotitig in Moscow -disqussin this serious situation, 7 The soviet government bid we told them to ὁ their beat to keep off actions, (Held them not Ὁ close the | duit of Ag) and τὶ ssdd We Were agedat, to.x cortein extent, 7 sone. of whe migration wh vial ae == cm Lacon τ: ἐλ ΥΝ San
- Sal
D- crm Mert ΤῊ ὌΠ ite Ἶ Catan ΒΩ AEE “ἝΝ σ΄. - πα Ὡς:
eva” Ὁ TELEROPIER ΘΠ
within the Arabian countries. It was ἃ mistake to have sealed off and cloged the Gulf of Ag. Told this to
_Aubassador of Kaypt and to “yria. We warmed them that this action Would lad to a vioee serious problem. We told then not to do it. At the beginning of the invasion dn the part of Israel who unleased the war (this dated June 1). the = Soviet government qualified or accused Teradl ag an aESreOBON and demanded that they stop the military aggression agatist the Arab nations and to withdraw their troaps behind the aa truce lines of the 48 war. It wad then that Kosyein seit ἃ letter to Israel Embassy in Noncow, pointing out thea ageTession arid it was then that thia point was atresadd, “the: point that Israel is an aggressor in the United Nations -
Security Counesil and the deletion waa so instructed to pevent accepting ὑπὸ US delegation resolution: which supported the Israel action. ΝΣ ΝΣ ΝΣ
Why did the Sovietdelegation support the σθᾶσο fire —
resolution? Becauseon the evening of June 6 we received information from the VAR, meaning Beppe, that there was ἃ véry critical situation on the war front end asked the Soviet Union government to stop the military action ΠΤ ἢ ‘tha morning of dune 7, ‘To solve the problem in the United: ations. This is the reason that the USSR and the UAR yopresentative supported the
_ gegolution to cease fire. When 85 :851, continued to fight, in
__.consultation with Nassar, he told then to ston. the-war (this was
at Ἢ PM etc) At that tine Teracl wetold by: the Soviet Union
perma
τιν
6 ὲ τ + ΒΗ." att Shy
etn oy not, eset Β ks Tr sage ᾿ eek ν- Thee Ries RE ΒΡ ἘΣ ΩΝ ΣΝ ΙΑ sytney, wade Se mate ee
roams ΟΣ ite
y
war be stopped. ‘They met on thot (1) conge | fare ust ἀκα
destroy them cotipletely. and therefore they did not wart
Israel -was instructed .b these LAURE ISLE to. withdvow hohind, the cms
render 61] hecessary aid, both economically and military (equipnent}
eT ree ar ee Seem .. ὅ0 ,..........
oS . TREO Tees | . sd bo " Γ
that if you don't atop the war immeditely πὸ WLLL break relations with you. Then the Soviet government introduced drart resolution to condemn Taracl ad an aggressor.
On duke 7 Nassar agked ua to solve this matter in the
Security Countil becaveo he did not want the Soviet Union
%6 become fnvolved in this war. Then a meeting was called
of the Communist countries in Moscow with the agenda that this
toke place imidcdiately and (2) that the penal “Of the importalist. forces (U.S. eta) wag to ctop progressive regimes in the Arab countries, for example, UAR and Syria, They were oat to
any wore deatraction to. take pines. At this mooting, truce ines of the 48 Wart ond +o establish a permanent paace ins this sphere. Algo at the same tise they agreed that they would |
to liquidate the danage that ‘wad one dud to restoring ἃ norinn} aitatuetion in this area, Also a} thia meeting, it fwas most-essontial for thesé comtrica to ‘support them
more than ever before to strengthon the antivinperdalist forges ond the progressive forces, which, the war did not ἡ succed in dentvoying. These dnperialtete forces gould not 1} 11, their 81} in destroying also the puogressive tegimes
of Yassar and Syria. In fact, the progressive forces were — strengthened end that Ris chown ‘by the axanple where the people,
refused to accept the yasimmation of Teasar ΟΣ the Syrian
# governnen’ resignations . " im ν 1 eon . . \ ΝΞ ΞΕ ᾿ς Ἀ σον ὦ ΝΌΟΝ cites std nz word FR me MRS ge ee τα μεῖνε AARNE Yee th a, τὰ, ag ya a aang
we, ἐπε : ῳΩ ει ΜῊ , ΠΝ 2 Bu .
Wiat 15. the objective in informsing all of the CPrts : throughout the world, that now fore than ever before to __ : stress israel as the aggressor and that they σὺ withdraw : behind the truce Lines as establiched in 1048, and towards ἃ, pexmament pedsée in thie sphere. That in tha case of the
_ socialist ‘countries, European, countries, that at 4% necessary to liquidate the bad and to restére a, normal situation. - Again, to support the anti~imperlaiiset forces of these - nountries both politically and ΙΧ morally. - ~ To paralyse the thesis. of the bourgtoge propagandists " againat the Arabs and the socialist countries ΟΣ the .Ν worid, τς ΝΣ τ} to re-emphasize on 81} fronts for the restoration of | 7 ag, the-border positing hich were lost Ὧν the: Arab countries, , a τ to ee retain then. so that they shoud not. be Lost. 7 : | "In conclusion, that we consider that the oridis shows ᾿ ἷ ihe neceseity ΟΥ 811 our CP movements throughout the | world, to show openly and prédominantiy proletarian ἢ intetnetionalisn aginst’ this situation. | f
Ne
| GAG/ET Last night Ὁ ποὺ with - ween ve first met he told
me he had a very important oral regenge to give to me for my general gecy Gus Hall. Tock out 4 smallpiceea of paper with an outiine to Ecll π΄] the following. That title gral - stotenent fronthe σὺ of the CPGU is the position of the Soviet governtwnt and that on thesitoation in the Hidcast, on the crisis in the Mideast, ond is to be gives ia this manner only, orally, to the beils of ΔῚΣ OFa of the world.: (Δ) ‘That the was in the Fidearst was started wider the
instigation of the imnerieliet counties ef the Uilted States,
Great Britain and West. Germany ror tha O11 imperlaliote of these countries againgt tha Arab ΤΥ, in powtiieular -and the. notional liberation progresiva movexenta of these counties in general who have been succonsful saith yory Progressive movements and friendship towards the USSR and _ dn themselves towards socialistic sins. That it was. | Lmportent fox the imperialist countries to deatroy anid root out the national Liberation movencnis which have been raking great progress 4n these sounteilos headed by Nassar.
(2) hat it de moct umgert ob this Equent to point out to (us Hall and to he heads of ell Ofs throwshovt the world the digtortion wiiier the bourgolco of these imperialist
ecuntries ave νης in the nent East situation today’. That they —
are distorting now and have distorted the oituation before
the war and before themes Lira.
ὦ ΕΝ 4¢ Ad mont i urgent ἃ at tthe montent ‘to point out ᾿ to cua Yall and to bho heads of all GPs throughou® the world the distortion which the bourgoise of these trpertalist ‘countries. ave giving in tho near East gituation today. That they distorbing now and have distorted the nituation before
a.
are the war and before the caase fire.
(3) That they Wwioh to etphasiae ond outnreak ¢ of the war, how end why besser
ac be ele ai aaa ah dt stint ane SRT ᾿ en eee ee ae ae
gtate their policy
| | and Soviet position before the
Lee OT ie te πα πὸ ἀν : :
we
wom amy Et ig ay Macc wee omg te we TTT foe ἐ' ἐν a Foe * at, wre
they supported the cease fire rerolution in the Uditea Nations during this period at the tame When thoy did, together with the Arab lations » and their poliby: fztou the time of the ὁ cease fire to the present pariod.
It 1 the position of the Soviet doveranent given by the CC of the GPSU to wih heads of the CP throughout the worke expleining their position during and after.
Kosygin will pursue thie line at the tt.
That this position is stated to the heads of the cre shvougheus: becausé the bourgeoise of these countries 15
, aistorting: the reak situation.
This dkatortion began inmedlately after the ndlitary activities of Israel began. Therefore the reason why they must tell the heads of the (Ps, Attempt of imperialists tO ieish & war to atop. advancement being made by Arab netLons, such es United Arab Ropubidé, Syria and. Algeria,. becatise at that time the imperialist countries were ldésing their influsnce both politically and commeraially in this. area and in thése countries. ‘They gilded at. that time to use the ruling circles. of Syria to Btop the oda. of thia influecne.
“Therefore thet explains why tie Israci.was being attacked aLong the border of Syria by Syria ‘prio? to outbreak of
hostilities. Imperialist cduntries were ‘using ‘the ruling circles of Syria to harass Israck, This the imperialists . did not ducceed. ‘Meanwhile during this. period, he anti- amperialist sources of the countries of the United arab Republic, of Algeria and Syria vere becomiig etronger and -
- - ΕΝ LPH woe .-- owt EPL Bee Tha he ee bee! Bla ee
ie oak al ΜΝ ad sa
κ
i A -—- - - Tone αν = -- “τ - -- ἈΝ. τ- - - --»- τ - “π΄ eos Se eww otro - - ad : i - - Sal | ; οι ΠΕΡ ) mE,
= stronger and. they” were inclined
ards doctalist orientation, aga ΕΝ ἡ πα έσῳ Ὁ " ' Me LT, - Oy ti δ
7 White they were harassing and provoking indidonts. against
the Ieracl countries, the antivimperialiat movement was
. strengtirening in. these counteiog, the national liberation ‘movements were strengthening and in these counteies they ware inclined towards sodialist orientation withtin their their countries and they were strengthening their friendship towards the. USSR and the soclaligt camp. When they sau they could not stcceed, meaning the imporialtat countries, 16 was then that they started strengthening sf - their support of these countries against Terael ang provoking
‘then, in the war against these countries,
He said, further, our Central Committee policy was ἢ. based ‘upon the following: That the Arat Nations wig given our support. an both | econonia and otheraid ab 8, bulwark against these. impetielists, particularly U.S. imperialism, in tis sphere (the Midesast). Strengthening the wiole camp of anti-imperialists and their socialist aims. against Isxvael and the military click which responds ξόχ the iuperieliats in. thot war agingt the United Ard Republic, Algeria and — Syria. | Ν | ‘The military circles of Tarael, invaded dnd becane the ageresnors against these countries. In the UN Security | Council, why did the USSR Delegation gupport the cease fire
resolution inthe United flations - He said, because. on-~the | evening of June 6 we réceiyed information foi. the UAR thot
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asked the USSH governnent to stop “military action until the morning of June 7 and to help solye the problem in: the United Nations in the Securdty Council. He said, the ussk delegation in the United flations and the UAR répresentative geupported this, resolution to ecase. fire. When Israel : continued with the war (this was dune 6) Rasser in consultation
wth the Soviet governmant % (ante was 4 PM ΝΥ wines ὁ June Τὴ
paella
and at that moment the ον. government sent. B note. 6 ‘the.
Israel Ambassador in Moscow that Lf you dont, stop this. wor iumeddsterly. we WLLL break, relations: with you. On dune 8
the. Soviet government Sntroduced ἃ draft resolution, to condemn. Israel as ‘an aggressor. and told’ ‘Teraal that they muse. :
eedse fire and must withddaw behind the truce ‘Lanes, heaning .
thé boundeties ad proclaimed in the treaty after the 48 war. At that moment (dune 7) Nassar asked the Soviet government
᾿ to solve the matter in the Sequrity Gouried arid flagcer
emphasized that he did riot want the Soviet Union to be inyolved in this way, ‘Then, the Centxa) Commitee of the CPSU. called & meeting of the soolalist countries, Bulgaria, | Czecoslovakin, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Rast Geimany, in Moscow i which the agenda yas to stop ‘the War in the Mideast (heads of gee cps).
We are strengthening this camp then exid now, voth
economically and militarily and ‘the veaabon we are doing this is
A
rn δ οι Ὁ πρῃ 5 ᾿-
Ve ara strengthening this camp then and now both economically and militarily and the reason we arg doing this is - because of the anti~inperialists, national 11{beration and
socialist dins of these countries against these inperialists,
κῆνπαύφασα
4 é 4
‘countries (US Inperialists, Great Britian and West Germany}. ἢ
᾿ “We consider this to be the correet poliey in this situction ᾿
policies (1) tha paxt of the pocieide notonel- Liberation Hoveriant and. the inperlalista (2) concretely, tha Soviet
‘Taxaclisé: wilitentats and barter powera that they arc
the UAH in the Gulf of Ag. and einultoncously whentho, minister of the UAR, arrived, at that women} whenthey made this
‘Président of Syria wero meating In Negcow dlaqusein this
τὴ pct ee ie NS
O Tem 9
particularly because of the national Liberation moweme rts Beofro this, cridia our government (USSR} rendered
rowel support to these countries, strengthoping our
Rosi tion there in arder to creéte effeative metauras to
preserve peace and prevent ἃ exisis of the beginning of δ.
Wax in that. area. After the situation becatic aggravated |
in this sphere ‘(neaning the “ran πὰ δ πα) 46 fa the venules
of the actions of the Terne] ἀρδοχδάλλ Foxeon Wileh tye
supported hye U. S, ἀπροχλαλέρη, Great Teiteadn and Weot Gourmany,.
therefore, wo faw the followmg in thig ares. The-elash of ὑκὸ
goverment made this statement, of these tro clashes, tn ὑπ. United Nations and ‘outadde of the Soviet Unlon &cousing the
unleashing & war th the Miderst (statuent nade May 23 4a the unt}. | | . At the very beginning of dune, sheSaviet governnont tried thet: very best to lessen the prespurs of these wanvorn powers ageinet |
statenent, simultencously the Ambansedor of ὕπο UAR and the
gexious mitugtion. # The Soviet rovermmont said we tid thom te o their best to keep of f actions (told thor ποὺ te close the
Gule of Ag) end Ἡ δολὰ we Nere sgehat, to ἃ certain axtents nore ef he miso. 85 Wrich yory ede Oy Ὁ ἀπ μ᾿ neo ne Leeiess αὖθ
MO Rl So ΚΣ anny) Sat sin Hain ite ἘΝ naan co cae se HEARN ὌΝ ἄν ὯΝ ἈΠ a ayy
TAR im is fees RecN Peake eh, ne Rect Re 1.8 Gases ae DNS ah
ERE
within the Arabian counties. It was a misteke to lave sealed off arid closed the Gulf of Ag. Told this to Ambassador of Fyypt and to Syria. We ¥Yamed them that this action. would ad to 8, tore gevioug problem. We told thett. not to do it. At the beginning of the invasion on the part of Israel-who unleased the war (thie dated Juné 1) the Soviet. governmdnt qualified or acauped TaraelL Og OM averensor " and demanded that they stop the military aggression against the Arab nations and to withdraw théir troops hehing the truce lines of the 48 war. It was then that Kosyein gent
& Letter to Terael Eubassy in Moscow, pointing out their ᾿ aggression and it was thet that thie point wad stressed, the | ‘Point thet Terael is an aggressor in the United Ratione Security CoyunaLy. and, the aélation Was- 80 instructed to pevent accepting the Us delegation pan which supported the Israel action. | | a |
Why did the SovietdeLegatiion support tie pease ΠΝ
_ resolution? Resauaeon. the avening of Juno 6 we recdived .
information: from: the UAR, meaning Reve, ‘that there Was &
govertinent to stop the military ection until the momning of
- June ue fo solve the problem in the United Yotions. This is the reason that the USSR and the VAR representative supported the resolution to cease fire; When Teresi continued +o fight, in consultation with Nassar; he told hhem to atop the war (this was: at, ἡ PM éte) Ag. that time Terael we told by the Soviet Pnien
! mw * ' . -
᾿ t - Tele ἐς > - a wee ” τ he -ο- + ope -- τ . os aars te Ro en ee ἢ λα ΠΥ ΤΕΣ oe ρας. »π τ ἔα ΟΝ stata ἘΔ ἐστον πος ἀπ ς Boe να τας ὁ ὼν Ν ahaa e wn, eh
ΓΝ ay δῷ eee ὑπο ee, pete i ΝΑ, ΤῈ πα i ὥπερ Ue ea eh α΄. aS ES Te ἐν τ πεν ee ee OO A ee RR ay τηγησας.
@hat if you dontt stop the "ἀπ jromedd telly Ve WLLL break relations with you. Then the fowlet government introduced Qrart recolutinn to condor Isracl as af aesrepror. Qa dune 7% Nassar asked us to solve thin wetter an the Security Countil because he did uot want the Coviet tnioz | to become Involved in this vax. hen a weeting was eolled | of the Communist countrice Τὴ ΠΌΘΟΝ with the ancndsa that thig | war bo atopyed. They ποῦ οὐ thet (1) cease fire muct the take place imicdLately and (9) that the δῶν ὁ or the ἀπο δ forces {},..8. ete) vas to atop progressive regimes in the Arab
Ν᾿ O ἢ τ΄ | nn
countries, Tor exanple, UAR and Syria, Thoy ware. out to
dcatroy then . completely. and therefore they did not want
any wore destruction to take place. At thie meeting, | | *T[é6Pael was anstructed hb. these “οὐρα 40. ehahdpart behind, the veer trace Lines of the 48 wer and to establish ἃ ταφὴ pence in this sphere. ἴσο gt. the same tine they arrecd that they would render all necessiry aid, both economically ond military (equipment 40 liquidate the dauage thet wat one and to restoring a normal sitetvation in this areca. Also of thin meeting, ἀν Zwas
4
mogt creenbtial for these σου Ὁ τὸ support them more then ever before to strengthen the enti-imperialist - foreca end the progressive forecs, Which, the war did not
| sucead in destroying. Thee irperialt{ets forces gould. not fulfil their aim in destroying also the puogressive rogimes of Kaocav and Syria. ‘In fact, tha progressive forces were abrengthenad and thet Mis show by the example where the people refused to accept the resignation of Toshor or the Syrian
government resignations.
va ae, - «- es -ο so, mee 2 ἃ . ee re) - . Ν τ ato ae τὶ re να oe mo
i ee I re πὶ
«Ἐς
thet 46 the chjective in imformsins oll of the Cpe throvchows the vera, that now burs then over before bo stress Toracl an the aroxescor chad thot they πο witharay behind the truce ines as cotelbiichcd in 1976, cud texards a permanent poaca in thie cphara, ἄπ in the σαπρὰ of the rocialist counties, Durepean ecunteles, thet AG τὸ neccocary to liquidate the bad quid to restere & normnL obtuation.
Again, to supyert the ardeirgertalist force of theao cominmies Hoth politically and Ate ey morally.
To paralyze the thesis of the bourrkebs proporendiogr arainst the Arabs and tho semiatict cauntraes of the world. . > To rGeonphaclae Git all frente for the restoration, of the border positins vbich vere lust by the Areb countrics
to te rdétoin them so that they should not ba Tost.
ο΄ ἴῃ, cenelusion, thet ve toneider that the ericie shows whe necesnity of All our CP noverents throughout the world, to show openty and predednently proletarian internmationalion agsinet this situation.
ΜΡ ΟΡΠΌΜΑΙ FORM RS, 16 3Oto=104 ὅρασις (ὦ telson i} 4 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT cela \y TE om — |
: PX Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE ΞΞΞΞ ᾿ ως Fete Το : Mr. comaa WG DATE: dune -20, 1967 " , oe FROM >: CF. Domi - jp 35 = | (Rap) [ve - πε --------- ᾿ OLO ᾿ 3 ν᾽" ΠΥ ὖῪΗο ἹΝΤΈΗΝΑΙ, SECURITY - Ὁ μδέεξω
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable-conti ential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.
On 6/20/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 217 GR 65, was intercepted.
The. plain text and cipher text are attached.. The New York Office is aware of the contents. ACTION: by
For information.
Energie
1 - Mr. Conrad 2- Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. Je A. eo Mr. R. C. Putnam)
1 - Mr. Downing: é 25° vi 1 τ Με, Paddock ἢ e “2: ἡ ῴοῇ otf
-- - SP
"133 af ΠῚ
fl HS:drv aa . gpI ° νὰ — | (1) Spel pre EO, —_ re
65 JUN 2. wa
b
56158 67347 35095 04993 54955
79328
96437
03797
51605
98424 18385 48480 70742
78070
Ο | O 6/20/67
4 NR 02147 GR. 065 V6/20/07
97692 40882 51404 91014 38256 701496 87205 09474 41171 71459 42325 59769 56645 03404 77652 42712 13427 63736 37933 13729 94250 54487 93826 72773 U3996 $5959 02737 63155 41214 1413/3 97656 62328 49556 42772 32334 45779 20518 00344 95998 54034 28876, 8808 70471 36990. 15544 09901 23964 88051 82796 21099 93366
NR 0217 GR 065 06/20/07
Ire rex, Jevi TORT aYeoaeMorfHacazue)pRowenorlreacdan
YSoCi AL TSHWANT|T OK NOWMHETHEHCOXp[COXREPRESENTAT I νει
LUcaFiT con eRewceoren eli noré rcefonpuneh2elfory our. Lsennprer ory ΕΟ Tor aLfpoadyp 1 scusseyra SMa ΤΕ ΝΜ! THA . SHajasH|ss >
we ee es περὶ anes eee pore .
-
Lb 6A [272----55
Ὁ" weet = aloe ᾿ \ , ον ὦ ας -* FD-36 (Rev, $5. ὦ . ας νον ὁ τλλδε
; 44, . os, : rr Ι "ἃ . . ; * 0 , oa ἥ “ἐν x qh } ὩΣ . q OR . O 1 ee i ΝΞ ΕΣ ; ἐς . BSE i . F] . κ᾿ ; ει " , | Ἂν «Dates 6/16/67 | . a " ', , ἮΝ
Transmit the following in
‘(Type in : plaintext or code) ATRIEL . an
5 00000ΨΟΟΝ : .
: ; _ ra
: ᾿ — en a ee
a as 5. ar ΝΕ ΝΕ "αν “ (4 op ; TO : DIRECTOR, . FBI (io0e3. 63). ne Ἔ
FROM SAC, NEW YORK (190-7560) | a SUBJECT: CPUSA-FUNDS . ἢ τ τὸν Is-c ΝΣ
1" τς
at
co.
CG 5824.-s* advised, on: Αἰ Μόν, that GUS HALL will
AB receive $250,000 on 6/16/67, or possibly 6/19/67, for the
' purpose of buying equipment’ to: set w "The Worker" as a "| .,
daily paper. Since this is such a. large outlay of money, it ¥ x -
is essential that we verify this. expenditure as well as 6 a additional future expenditures, ᾿ς fy
The fact that the. Party: is proposing to publish a daily newspaper has Peon. appeared | in the Party press and the fact that negotiations have been. ‘conducted for. the purchase of
a press must, by necessity, ‘be mown to several persons in Party eirtles.. ΠΝ
CG 5824.S* has informed. that expenses for printing equipment will run in the vicinity of $200,000 at this time. 7 NY 694-S* advised that the CP has‘ ordered an off-set printing | press costing $70,000 from thie’ firm of’ Miehle-Goss in.. ‘Chicago...
Jot téh ordi: - (pe ureau (100~3~6 ὮΝ 5 νῶν κῷ REO?) | 7
Fae oe 28081 Ἂς __Nor πο RECORDED (4-100-134-46-Sub B) (S0L0): a 140.dUN 91 1967 1-NY (97-169) (PNP) (421): -
1-NY (400-13 1637) ) {Sou0) ὌΝ Oe vs : - —N
ΤῊΣ (100-754-560 oo ΕΥ ᾿
ΠΩΣ ; ΝΝ Ὁ Ε : Lemesed
(11) re a om Ewe, 5 “- ——— Le “nN Α Ν τε -
“yybet
Specily com in Charge cos
NY 100-74560 oe mw
i
, ,,vhicago should review information available to " CG 5824-S* concerning specific purchases by the CP: and purchases contracted for, to determine exact amounts involved in these transactions. ° A '
ες “In addition, if ‘secure ,, contact Niehle-Goss to δ τ κ ascertain details -concerning the purchase of a printing press, " including price, method of payment, where and when equipment is
-
to be shipped and other aveilable ‘data which may assist in
locating additional purchases. ae
- The NYO has’ placed’ stops on bank accounts. used: by . the Worker" and Party. yh |
-Ν κ i)
f
ἢ é
eae
entice "
|
PD- “36 ἔχω 5-22-64) O ο Ι . |
J
ig Date: 8, 20/67
Transmit the following in !
- πὰ ee ee oe "...
(Type in plaintext ar code)
AIRTEL _ REGISTERED MAIL |
(Priority) |
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
ROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
te &
Re previous correspondence to the Bureau and NY re the current investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of the USA, SDNY, into alleged manipulation of stocks being traded on the American Stock Exchange,
For the info of the Bureau and NY, CG 5824-S*
thi ed in conversation with of the First National Bank ncolnwood, 111... that IRVING PROJANSKY, prother-in~
law of the inforiant, and President. of the Lincolnwood Bank, along with Dr. FRED WEITZ, an officer of the Lincoln- wood Bank, accompanied by their lawyers, will appear volun- tarily in NYC on ‘Thurs. or Fri. of this week for an interview by the SEC lawyer and AUSA LAWRENCE NEWMAN,
Lertate that_he has been in_r conversa-— tion with Jawyer[__—sdiin whic chided ᾿
for persecution of innocent businessmen to which o ἂψ
replied with a sneer, ny t guy CHILDS?" evinced curiosity as to wh eak so sneeringly of CHILDS, The informant To he had
ng idee 1 πασσαα should speak in that manner. @ Bureau’ (RN) REC 10 “Ὁ -γαξε 7, 360 l-New York (100-13.4637) (Info) (RM)
J-Chicago a
WAB: MDW : S JUN 26 1967
(5) 5. ΠΡ
bee | 1 “-.-.-..
Approved: ἢ ΕΠ: Sent eM Per
655 - je m2 very Agent in Charge
151: πο
a re,
CG 134-46 Sub. B
CG 5824-S* stated that[ __] informed: him that numerous businessmen have been getting letters from the government asking when they bought Hercules: Galion stock, from whom, in what amount, and other questions relating to their Hercules Galion transactions, ‘These. businessmen have expressed discontent over this and at least one attorney, in Wisc., replied with a nasty. note telling the SEC and the.
‘“AUSA to miind their own business,
The above is for information purposes only.
ΓΟ
‘PD-36-Mey, 5-22.64) CO | ef “oe ᾿ ὥῶ
-., =
ft el =
1 Gy ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Date: 6/20/67 7 {: |
᾿ Transmit the following in
| - {Type in plointext or code} ° I
| AIRTEL : . Vio rel or ΨᾳῃΙῃΕΝ = (Priority) 4 | an ne ee ee ne a
ΝΒ το. ς: ῬΙΒΕΟΤΟΆ, FBI (1002428091) FEOM 3°“SHC, NEW YORK .(100-134637)
sonrecl © sexe) «ἢ ne be
εν On 6/20 or 21/67, NY “Ἵ intends to pass $2505 000 to. ELIZABETH HALL for delivery to: GUS HALL. NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S* have stated that this money is to be used for the
+e δ iy purchase’ of printing equipment, and. other items nécessary to: reinstitute a daily paper for the CP. Leads have been set forth |
for the.-Chicago Office unde? the caption of GPUSA-FUNDS to ἐμῶν details of the purchase of printing equipment. Stops
-
ἡ: 4 - Θ.» Lull “stad.
os Lb tary ὦ,
SS
Py wageges
have, been placed at banks by the NYO. where it is likely some of this money may be deposited.
The. NYO: wilt institute acfull security: plysical fsurveillance of both GUS HALL and ELIZABETH HALL in an attempt
to determine how they dispose of the. moneys
‘GUS HALL ‘has. told informants that he wants to be given another $250,000 towards the end of June, 1967. He has stated that. he will pick up this money in Chicago, Tllinois, ᾿ (ἢ while en route to. Minnésota (apparently to. vacation with ee
brothers) «
~Fo4 ἀ “ὃ ΣΤΥ (1002428091) CRM)
- Lo ) at 1-inpeepelt ro SUPE RD eT gd — ἘΞ 7,677." aut
ar bh,
Ged
ῃ Η i
(| τ᾽
ΠῚ ah gS : ὶ im 5.037 σ 7.115 “5 ‘JUN 26. 1967 zk 8) ΟἿΣ — μὰ 3 f ι "
Φ
Sent MOP er
NY 100-13}: 637 - In order to prepare for this withdrawal of the next $250,000, the following is set forth:
The NYO has available (exclusive of the $250,000 iow packaged for delivery on 6/20,21/67) and processed:
$110,000 Safe Deposit Box of NY 694-S* 40 000 . Safe Deposit, Box of NYO © $150,000. Total
In addition; the NYO has $718,000 row being processed. The Chicago Office has available through CG 5824-S*
(per Chicago letter 6/1/67) $122,320.55.
In order to comply with the Bureau's instructions as — well as to assist in the smooth transfer (811 processed money). of funds; the NYO proposes that the $250,000 be prepared for delivery accordingly:
$110,000. From safe deposit box of CG 5824-S* (money: all processed)
$100,000 From safe deposit box of NY 694-~S* _ (money all processed) $405,000 From NYO safe deposit box (money 811 | processed): '
| This will leave the NYO with only $10,000 of processed money available. However, if an emergency comes up, we will check with the Voucher Statistical Section at the Bureau which has started to process $530,000, to determine which amounts ‘may be yeleased.. The NYO believes there will be no problem for us.
It is realized that the Chicago Office will have .only $12,000 available. However, this should not be a problem as withdrawals from CG 5824-S* have generally not averaged over $3 , 500 a month. To help to replenish the Chicago box at this time; the
Da
NY 100-13}}637
WYO. proposes ‘that NY oust write a check now.on the. JACK BROOKS: accounts for $15,000.
Reaue st_-of Bure eau -
No. request is being made of the Bureau to release the
second $250,000 for GUS HALL.. However, we should be prepared
for a smooth transfer of funds. |
Therefore, the NYO requests that we immediately withdraw $100,000 from the safe deposit ‘box of NY 694-S* and $40,000 from ‘the NYO safe deposit box for a total of $140,000.
Authority requested to transmit the $140,000 to Chicago by one Special Agent ‘as, couriet.
Bureaw authority requested to have. NY 694-S¥ write
‘a check on the JACK BROOKS aécounts to. total $15,000, which
will ‘be forwarded to, Chicago td be. cashed by CG: able Co
help. replenish his. account. «
τ " ὃ 36 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
4 _ ae . 6/23/67 ly a Ἅ ὦ Mr. DeLoach / Airtel 1 - Mr. Sullivan. - A 1 = Mr, Ο, D. Brennan ΝΩ 1 «Ἰὐ, R. C. Putnam
To: SACs, New York (100-134637) Chicago (134-46 Sub F)
_pRPOH: Director, FBI (100-428091) ~ Choro ͵ ;
INTERNAL SECURITY ~ COMMUNIST
ReNYairtel 6/20/67.
_, , Authority granted to withdraw $150,000 from Solo funds in New York as ‘set forth in reairtel for transfer to Chicago by Special Agent courier,
_ Authority is dlso granted to have NY 694e8% write | a check on his account totaling $15,000 which will be forwarded .~
to Chicago to be cashed by CG 5824-8* to replenish Solo funds ‘) \ in Chicago. an
RCPidmk % ς΄ -- ᾿ REE. ἢ 30 fIfOH, - 029%
NOTE: 8 υὖν 26 1.6
ΜΝ _, 866 memorandum C. D. Brennan to. wc. Sullivan, Ww 6/22/67, captioned as above, prepared by RCP:dmk.
Oo
Tolson ms BeLoach Mohr Wek ue > Casper mes Callohon ; Conrad ——— eee - geo Felt — Gale νώνςςς Rosen —
3 _- + Ξ . σοι τ-
Salliven _ ΕΝ : Tavel : ᾿ | Trotfer ντος, - . Room τ. +5 : Ν : wood Gi ὕεται yr Dirrobt eLeTyPE unit L_ fF > * .
Tele.
Holme
Gand Rho
MAT'1 P42 LOLTION οὐὰ σεν, κεῶ, MO. a7
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BK Memorandum «' *
DATE: -6-2067
¥ LEG-7 (Rev. 12-22-68) ΝΞ ᾿ ΟΡ ΟΗμλί τόκα HO, 4 O $910 108.
Diredtor, FBI ( 100-428091 ):
TO
‘Legal Attache, Ottawa
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA INTERNATIONAL. RELATIONS: 15-Ὁ ες 900: ‘BU) Reference; LHM dated 6-14-67, at WDC
Dissemination, as-outlined below,, was made on dates indicated
to: foreign agencies listed.
x7] One copies of re LHM. J
{7} Pertinent information-froni- ae
Name and.Location of Azeticy Date: Furnished ar te i eel Selenite ‘mien rem eat arta le
Joe~4 42604 —
NOT E RECORDED | 1 JUN 23 1967 3+ Bureau ᾿ 8 (1 - Liaison Section) went avon 1 - OTT MLI: jhe
(4)
65 JUN 30 ioe
Ib 7B
‘LEG- "7 (Rev. > *12°29-65)
st en © μὴ oO UNITED STAT ES: GOVERNMENT Memorandum TO
_ Director, FBI ( 100-428091 DATE:
: ‘6-20-67. » : Legal Attache, Ottawa ( 105-684 )( Ρ» : SUBJECTCONMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA | 15-Ὁ py (00: Bureau) τὶ Sala Reference:
LHM dated 6-5- 61, re "Planned Attendance of Canadians at International Lenin School,
Moscow, USSR, During 1968, forwarded. with BUlet dated 6- 13- 67, bearing instant. caption, - Disseinination, as.outlined below, was made of dates: indicated
to foreign agencies listed.
[1] —One__copies of re ‘LHM-
- ἐ [᾿
ἘΠῚ “Pertinent information:from
Name and Location of Agency
Date Furnished ᾿
6-20-67
joo~ - 42504! .
NOT RECORDED 3 | 16. JUN 2S 1867 | nN . E°_. ον Ε ; — me v M53 .. oat se 3 - Bureau. δ q A) ἐ yey - (1 = 'Lidison Section) ᾿ ΠῚ KH ΝΟΥ wo Cc = : A (4) ὃ " ee | |
Tolgon κ΄, DeLoach aap eenee Mohr Bishop “τ ππτα
COSPet πωρτωκακσι,
01} Ὁ ΒΟΗΘΌΝ - Conrad Felt Gale FO SET centre, Sulliiven πος
Tavel
TOUT meme, * Tele, Room wena
δεν i aad wer ᾿
SAC, New York (100-134637) Attention: SAC Dillard W. Howell,
Director, FBI (100-428091)_ (362 acc: 4
TRAMUS
Reference is made to your airtel of 6/20/67, captioned as above, in which you forwarded 2,328 pages οὗ Xerox reproductions: ‘of money in the amount of $210, 000.
‘Serial numbers of the money on the 2,328 pages have been recorded in the Automatic Data Processing Unit. These numbers will ὍΝ compared and added to the index.
‘There are being forwarded to your office-under separate. cover 2,328 pages of Xerox reproductions.
1 - SAC Dillard W. Howell (with Xerox reproductions) 1 - Mr. Row
MAILED 4 SEP = 7 1967 Ἃ δομ ἐδ
—r “3 ' . ' τ" ink . 35" 22.584}
ἜΣΤΗΝ
Wheaties ROUTE TN ENVELCPE αἰ: 6/20/67 Transmit the following in -- ΡΡΑῚΝ TEXT {Τγρε πη plaintext-er code) ΄ Ι Vie AIRTEL __. Ι εν ᾿ (Priority) ---π--ρ:;-- se ee ee ee ee ee eee ee — ee ee ee ee AX | TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM: ἔβας NB YORK (100-134637) sonra Goro, “Is-="¢
ReNYairtel 6/13/67, captioned as above. TRAMUS
Enclosed for the Bureau are 2328 pages of xerox of money representing $210,000.00. Of this amount $160,000.00 is in $20.00 denominations and $50,000.00 is in $50.00 denominations.” This amount along with $240,000.00 sent to the Bureau on 6/13/67 totals $450,000.00. This represents part of the $530,000.00 reteived by NY 694-S* from the Soviets on 5/20/67.
Records of these bills should contain the refererice, "NY 65-17696-A1391", It is also requested: that the record contain the page number of the xerox which number may be found on the lower right hand
¥ } corner of each sheet.
4 et ῷ ᾿ The enclosed material should be returned } δ νι ϑ a to the NYO after processing. ; ern ν ἐς ͵- ove) ψ “7 fofy pox 101 δι - 5 + i? 3 3 i is 3\- Bureau (Encls. 2328) (RM) “ [5 C- YAfa γ΄. bbs en {1 - VOUCHER STATISTICAL SECTION) ff ss ‘fg i - New York 65-17696) (343) (ae) eit PAY 1 - New York (41) 7 REC: “7 # 2 JUN 2 ¢ ἀν σειῖνηρ ty A 1967 τ ἰ (6) : ep ee OE 2 1A join Ἂ + x
δ ἐν - Sent
Approved: Ν Special Agen nen rge
-.-υ Ἂ r ‘ ᾿ “ _ OPTIONAL 402M HO, 16 3010-106 ἢ μον too. ; MAY Mies ADITIOH G54 GEN. AFL HO, 27
Tolson ΞΒΟΨΟΝΟΝΝΝΝΝ
4 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT -
x” Memorandum ROUTE IN EN VELOPER=
Pad 2 ; μ᾿ “ Gented τ τ é ᾿ ᾿ " δαὶ . - TO Mr. W. C.. Sullivan DATE: 6/22/67 _ 4 _. 1l~-Mr. Deloach © | - τὴς πο τς FROM :C, D. Brenna 1 - Mr. Sullivan _ Holmes : 1 - Mr; Ci D: Brennan Gandy = O 1. - Mr, R. C. Putnam SUBJEQT SOL, | Baud SECURITY - COMMUNIST Ww
5°
- wo Solo is the codé word used to refer to the liaison
operation performed by our informants between the Communist
Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.
PURPOSE : τὰ
This ‘memorandum advises that Gus Hall,. General Secretary, . Communist Party, USA, has indicated he may need an additional $250, 000 for the fund to establish a daily communist newspaper by the end of June, 1967, Hall indicated he may wish to pick this. money up in Chicago. It _Yecommends ‘a securei method to have this money available should Hall
nt
desire, it. τε ἘΣ BACKGROUND: ττ ὦ τ Ε = 2 ened τ
ne My_memorandum of 6/15/67 advised. that. Hall Wanfed ~ - $250, 00026" “purchase supplies “and equipment to re-establish
a daily=¢ommunist newspaper. Hall's wife Elizabeth obtained this money the night of 6/20/67 from our informant for delivery to Hall? Hall has indicated he may need an additiaial 250 ; 000 for thé paper fund by the end of June, 1967, and that He would like to get this money when he is. in Chicago at the end of June, 1967.
\. _This is a favorite. tactic of Hall. He has taken
trips, picked up Solo funds in Chicago, and upon his return to New York implies that the money camé from "Party angels," It Should. ‘be noted that the $500 ,000° involved represents the” money: turned over to the Communist Party, USA; by the Soviets through our informants in May, 1967, and is one half of what the: Soviets have _ Promised, tor the entire year.
(100=42809i ἬΝ an ΝΕ ᾿ EnctSgure,, " gs. SCONTINUED' = OVER: RCP :dnk ye BY spy foi — polo 8: wei (5) Tre ep AMA £0 NB REC- 100 6. Wu 28 1567
- κι . " ᾿πουσόνων oe ee
ὁ 5, JUN 30 1967
ne
|
Tr
Memorandum to Mr. W. Cc. Sullivan RE: SOLO 100-428091
We are closely following this matter of the re= establishment of the daily paper. There have been continued discussions by Party leaders regarding it. Hall has said it will require one million dollars to start the paper and a $600,000 annual subsidy to keep it going. Discussions by Party leaders. have indicated that there must be substantial cash available before the move to start publishing the paper is made. Considerable equipment and supplies have been ordered and the importance of a daily newspaper was stressed at the recently completed meeting of the Party's National Committee.
Since Solo funds currently available in Chicago do not equal the amount Hall is interested in, our New York Office has proposed the following secure method to get these funds to Chicago. New York will send $150,000 to Chicago via a Special Agent courier. This sum will be added to the approximately $100,000 currently in Chicago in a safe deposit box to be held pending Hall's decision. Since this will deplete the funds in Chicago, NY 694-S* will write a check on his fictitious name account in the ποιῶν of $15,000 to help replenish Solo funds in Chcago. This transaction will serve to remove the account of NY 694-S* from a dormant state and make it of no interest to bank officials who are interested in dormant accounts.
RECOMMENDATION :
Attached is an airtel instructing New York to transfer $150,000 from Solo funds in New York to Chicago by Special Agent courier and to have NY 694-S* prepare the check as noted above, It is recommended this airtel be
approved and sent.
A, Wat
ἘΠ
LASS wake ΓΝ ATTHORITY DERIVED a . — LT.
Fy] ae
i ο.
AUTORANWIL DPECLASSTRICAT ION ἘΠῚ , ROUTE IN EN YELOPE VATE OG-O 7 ABOLE ; ate Ε Ss} ἰδ Ns 1 ~ Liaison
- ΔΝ . ΕΝ ᾿ ; ο ἢ 1 ~ Mr. R. Cc. Putnan
(18) 1060-42809 By ΧΗ͂ΔΙΒΟΝ : ax : :
Date: dune 27, 1967
To: Director
- Bureau of Intelligence and Research - ~ Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director | | rm 4)
Subject; COMMUNIST PARTY, USA / INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The following was supplied bya “Bource which has furnished reliable information in the past.
Janes Jackson, Chairman of the International
Affairs Department, Communist Party, ‘USA. (CPUSA), has been designated by Gus Halt, General Secretary, CPUSA, to ba the Party's representative at a. symposium or seminar
᾿ scheduled for August, 1967, in Moscow, Union of Sovict
. Socialist Republics (ussR). fhe meeting has been called. in the name of the Institute of-the International Workers Moverient, ἃ departnont. within, the Central Committee of the. Communist Party of the. Soviet Union by. the Director of
' the Institute, Timur, Timofeyay. .
a The meeting is to be a: gathorig of the leading theoreticians of the communist parties throughout the world ao
to discuss the role of labor in various. countries. . } i ἣν Timofeyev ‘had hoped, that Gus Hall would attend this nééting ~ 4S
as the CPUSA representative. — ΠΤ τω
‘Jackson has. accepted this assignuent beacause of ᾿
ὑπὸ following: The CPUSA. had originally reccived. an 4
- invitation to sand four or five top leaders to the. calcbration 3 |
of the 50th Anniversary of tha Grent October Revolution to: qu) be, held in Moscow, a Foyenper 75. “he. This. invitation .
REP jest “ rz] ~Yo Yodel Ξ van | Ὁ 100 ASZCH
‘SEE NOTE PAGE THO. 8 JUN 28 1967
Tele, Room wn ἣν τ
Salva --- ΕΝ docly pifieatt OM ͵ Ν J THOU Gy pny ᾧῷ ν Ἢ S6aIN N 30 1082s ὙΕΓΕΤΥΡΕ unr L_] - -
Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research
has now boon increased to seven. Gus Hall and Eenry Winston, Rational Chaixvman of the CPUSA, and their wives have beon invited to attond this colobration., Jackson believes that he would certainly be dacorded lesa prominence and prostige if
he visited Moscow as part of a delegation including Hall and Winston than he would if ho were alone, Thereforo, he has ΝΣ decided that ho could improve his prestige in the intornational communist moveriont by attending tha sominar, which will be
conposed of leading communist theoreticians.
Ὁ ὦ Director Central Intolligence Agency
C3
| | rH) Attention: Deputy Director, Plana cP . NOTE:
Classified "Speaqi" since unauthorized disclosure of this information couldreveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.
7
Data extracted from Chicago letter 6/21/67, captioned "James Jackson, IS ~ Οὐ" .
° 6/23/67
AIRTEL REGISTERED WATE
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-63) _
- FROM: SAC; CHICAGO “ (100+33742),
CP, USA - FUNDS is-¢ (OOTY)
Q
Rebuairtol dated 6/16/67 captioned "SOLO; TS-c"
ον nd NY¥dirtel to-Buréau dated 6/16/67 captioned "CP, USA -
‘FUNDS; 16-0" relative to dispensing of 5010 Funds to GUS. HALL, and the terestablighnent of a daily newspaper by: the. CP; USA,
' As the Bureau and NY are aware, HALL was furnished $250,000, of CP, USA funds on 6/20/67 through | his wife, ELIZABETH HALL, Furthermore, HALL will pass through: Chicago - during the last week in June at which tine he expécts to pick up an additional $250,000.. CG 5624-S* advised. on 6/14/67;, according to relYairtel,. that GUS BALL. is gatheritg this money for ‘the purpose of exponditures necessary for the re- establishment of a daily Party paper.
@pureau (ae) 2.
(1 - 100~428091) SOLO) alee York (aU op “- ; > £09 /= (1 ~ 100-745 CP, USA ~ Funds . --
(1 = 100-134637) (SOLO) [09 - -¢ ἕ 2-Chicage NOT Sor eFeORDED
“CL. = 134-46: Sub 8) 170.JUN 30 1967 | Mapai Oo mins eit ABE iy
ἄγ 5 GJUL 1088}
ORIGINAL FIL τα 592 - .5.- 62 #7 ~
᾿ ΒΝ νὰ - ae « we - amt ¥ - ἢ ¥ a - “ a εν - = τ ? --
᾿ ͵ - : . a
= ΒῚ * al z
* aie. ΐ . 4... - a ΓΖ 3 + τ
ἢ . ᾿ -
CG 100-33742
CG 58.24.55 advised on 6/21/67 that dn the basis of his past discussions with GUS HALL during the period of thé informant's last trip to NY, 6/6+16/67, it appears quite obvious to the informant that HALL is putting aside these funds for the "Daily Worker." It will be recalled that CG 5824-S* has previously advised that anticipated costs in the first year to get the "Daily Worker" started wili amount to $600,000, According to CG 5324-5*, the Party hag made only a down. payment on the machinery required and, | thousands of additional dollars will be necessary, —
_ CG 5824-8* advised that GUS HALL stated he Will - come into, Chicago during the. last. week in June hut will stay in Chicago, no, more than ἃ couple of days if he stops in Chicago at all, Then, he 1s going on to Minnesota for the ~ . Stated, purpose of straightening out a factionalist situation existing in that_district; According to HALL, the trouble centers aroin n Minneapolis who is charged with being tod mechanical In her dealings with people and who' is the causd 62 some problems. HALL stated that this is the reason that he is going to Minneséta. CG 5324-5* stated that since it is, his belief, based upon his discussions with HALL (although HALL did not so state specifically), that HALL is putting aside. these large sums of moncy toward the initial yéar's, expenses of a daily paper, this trip to Minnesota is serving a dual purpose for HALL, CG 5824~5* pelieves that HALL will probably salt some of this. money | away with his family in Minnesota and perhaps some of it also with MATT SAVOLA- in Wisconsin. Furthermore, upon his _ return trip, HALL might even go ‘td Cleyeland, Ohio, to
secrete some of these funds. ᾿ ᾿
CG 5824-S* recalled that at an open meeting, HALL had bragged about the progress of the fund for the daily paper, HALL stated at that time that this fund is growing "and will continue to grow. He said that finances are not _ the limiting factor in the re-establishment of a daily Party
press.
; CG 5824-8* voiced the opinion that the itinerary of this trip by WALL may woll indicate those arcag where TALL Will salt away this money, Sitice HALL is putting the money aside, it should not then ‘be anticipated that there will be
large immediate expenditures.
“-ὃ «
"03
rn
-nished the following information:
te a van παν ΟΕ v om ? . Ν . * rere * Β * on ον Ν . ry L : . - , π " Cj 2) ° <4 i " - 4 r
CG 100-33742
Ié is recalled that it is a practice of HALL, fre- guentiy observed in the past, to take trips throughout the country prior to. which or during which he picks up substantial suns. of CP, USA reserve funds from cither CG 5924-S* or NY G94-8*, Upon his réturn to NYC, HALL then turns this substantial sum over to the National Office, CP, USA, and. states that he collected this money fron some of his private "angels" during the course of his trip. It would appear possible that HALL is setting up such a situation in this case utilizing his relatives and old-time associates in Minn, and perhaps Wise, and Cleveland. 7 - '
ReNYairtel requested Chicago contact Miehle-Goss, if secure, relative to details concerhing the ‘purchase. of a printing press by the CP, USA,
national Division, Divisions of Michle-Goss-Dexte j . 3100 5, Central Ave,, Cicero; 11., at which time fur~
a On 6/21/67 ἦλθ LELAND G,. RICHIE and_Jo TOE <eontacte (protect ~ requested), Miehle-Goss-Dexter-Americus Compdriy. and Goss Company, inter.
By. purchase contract dated 5/22/67, the Prompt Press . Printers, Inc., 418 W. 25th 8t., NY, NY, agreed to purchase a Goss Suburban Off-Set newspaper press from the Goss ‘Co,, a’ - - division of Hiehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc, This press Will print. up to, ἃ maximun df 24 pp. of tabloid-type printing-and this press is to be shipped to the Prompt Press Printers, Inc,., at the -. above address in NY during 10/67, The total cost of this: préss is $60,625. plus $2,425 for NY sales. tax. This contract also
includes an option whereby the Prompt Press Printers, Inc.,
- can purchase an additional unit within one year from the date
5/22/67 for the price of $13,125, If purchased, this additional unit, could be utilized of the above press to increasé thé page capacity. The aboye contract was signed by KARL LEICHTMAN, Secretary-Treastirer, Prompt Press Printers, Inc., and one DAVID U, FREEDMAN signed the contract as a witness. This con- tract was accepted by the Goss Co, on 5/26/67, Terns of this contract are as. follows: ;
$6,000 was paid at the tine the cdntract was entered into by a, check dated 5/22/67 (this check is not available - inasmuch as it has been processed by the Goss Co,.); $20,000 is
Ἂ . “πὸ
cc 1060-33742
to. be paid before 1/Vsis $12, £00 is tobe paid one week prior to thd. shipment. of the prods; $15,156 is to be placed in escrow by the Pronpt Press: Printers, Ine. to 86 paid imnedihtcly upot delivery of the press (no further info avail- able concérning who is handling these escrow funds); and the balance of $9,094 is to ‘bé paid 30 days after the installation
Of ‘the press.
ntain a letter dated 5/25/67. Prompt ‘Presa Printers,
‘Inc. ; 41 [ St., Ny, authorizing the purchase of ἐμ
agbove press, :
. The above records contained no ‘into. ré ahy purchase of any additional printing eduipnent ‘and records’ oontained HO additional pertinent ifs, .
πὲ τ that upon the receipt of the paynents” in the. future on this contraét he wild ΠΟ ΕΘ, available info τῷ the method of payment and will make available checks if chee used for payhents Chicago: will maintain contact πα re above,
ΔῊ accordance with rebuairtel, CG senda has been
instructed τὸ deternine. everything possibie relatin# to the
resestablishment. of the daily press, with particular enphasis ‘upon the financial commitments made by the cP, USA and/or:
᾿ς GUS HALL, toward the purchase of equipment or supplies. The
Bureau and RY. will be inmediately: advised of pertinent info as developed.
---------πππεεστυτ....------ -------’-------ς-.--- - --- --- = “==> 7 τ —_= ἀπ. Nay cat ΚΑ΄ κ 3 . τ =e 4 ‘los vanes iar st * Senate ae el le Cie “- £ a: ae) Ν
ii
- 6/23/67- AIRTEL -
TO : Dinecron,. FBI ΦΆΟΣ +: SAC, CHICAGO (29-2790)
SUBJECT: UNSUBs ALLEGED POSSIBLE. FRA. VIOLATIONS AT THE FIRST NATIONAL 7 BANK OF LINCOLNTOOD, LINCOLNVOOD,.- ~~ ILLINOIS. Ξ PRA
Re New York. airtel to Bureau 6/12/67.
™, .
On, 6/21/67 Ast sare πο rer ot Division, Chicago, teZephonically advise 9 he
eeh in contact with USA KONGENTHAU of Now. York Yegarding captioned matter.
He stated that it was the desire of USA MORGENTHAU and USA TANRAWAN in Chicngo that invostigation be instituted in this
hatter as it was his undorstanding that such ‘Anvestigation.
would not fidmper SEC investigation.
a στε ἐξ advised that. ‘dt was the unders
standing of the. Chicago Office that, the USA's Office. in Now ες Yorls desired that οἷν investigation in this matter be held in
dins complotion of SEC investigation.
4 ~~. Β rae 100426091) 2» Row York: ᾿
Ὁ -- 106~134637)
| (8)
| a be 53 Ὁ} 241967 ;
|
2 ~ Chic τ ᾿ ᾿ on ΄. . KGCslac :
AUSA
766
was advised, that contact would be made with the. ce in Now York to further clarify this matters
«ἀὐόζέ,
Not as LS 172 Ju 121967
τμαναρδωιδομδν ἃ
ΓΝ κυ
- 4 wv” Fa Ν
, CG 29~2790
| New York is requested to contact Sh MORGENTHAU concerning thig matter to insure that premature investigation is not instituted pending desires of USA, Now York.
| No further action being taken at Chicago pending advice from New York, -
κων, BELPER IN ENVELOPE fo ; RQGTE IN ENVELQE
Je.
an ᾿ ΕΒ. ζ ‘Date: 6/ 26/ 67
Tash the following ἀπ : ' “τ (Type in plaintext or code)
AIRTEL REGISTERED . | 1
> Vid
(Priority) ~ " Ϊ ; ae em ce ee re mer a ee ye ee ee πὰ oe ee ae L ae ὦν ee ey -« — TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM ἃ NEW YORK, (100-134637) | suByECT. ἫΝ
“t=
- ReBulet. to espieege, 6/7/67; copy to New York, enclosing CIA letter dated 5/26/67, latter letter requesting information 5 concerning Soviets associated with the Institute of International | Workers Movement.
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau, are the original and four copies. of an LHM ‘captioned "Institute of thé Internatione Hh. Workers Movement."
The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was obtained..as the result. of an indices check and review of pertinent files in. the NYO.
The enclosed, LHM. is. classified TSooeG" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set rth-~in particular, that obtained originally from CG 5824-s* and NY 694-S concerning TIMUR TIMOFEYEV~-could result in the identification of these sources, who. are furnishing information .on the -highest Level concerning the interriational Communist movement, and sincé fe b! such disclosure could adversely affect the national security. we
eet
Also enclosed herewith for transmittal to CIA. are two photographs . of T A PIMOFEYEV and one each of EDUARD ARAB- OGLY', YURI ZAMOSHKIN < ! NIKOLAY KOVALSKIY.
| a Fog 4 er Stel, (Spurl ΩΝ ῃ | Bureau (RM) (ER τῇ Ν . Δ - New York ΨΩ 2 ων Joo ti t- “(ἃ f. β - δ » -
ACB:msb i we Ἢ ν᾿ ἣν . ἦς 6 yun 28 1967
ΝᾺ ζ Ye f % " ΠΝ meee κα ΟΝ | TT Se
-ς " ᾿ . A r : nia pp τας = i Ny τας Sent MOP er.
ΝΥ 100-134637
As reflected in the LHM, no identifiable references were found in the NYO files concérning a number of Soviets associated with the Institute of the International Workers Movement, in whom CIA is’ interested.
In the interest of security the LHM is 5 being datelined Washington, Ὁ. C.
-2-
PECLASSLEPLICATION ΑἸΓΤΗΠΈΕΤ ΤΥ DERIVED FRO: FRICADUTOMATIC BECLLSS, ‘PTCATION oo Ik
woe τ΄
ὰ ΤῈ O8-O7- BEBE - -1 aye
4 me a τττο: - ᾿ - “ΠΣ - τ πω ἢ ΗΝ - - ΕΝ ~ ων τ τΞ- . 2 ΕΝ 4 - ᾿
ONETED: STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE τ ὁ ΄. . τ᾿ τς FEDERAL BURBAU OF INVESTIGATION et os 1" In Reply, Please Refer to Washington D.C. ες ΠΝ ΝΞ File No. oo - -sune hs ἐροῖ - =: | ee Institute of ‘the International Workers Mevenene ὁ -
‘Reference Gentral- intelligence Ageney letter dated.
ΒΞ “Mey 26, ree captioned institute of the Thternational Workers = πὶ Movement! at "
In sane, 1967, ὁ ‘a, ‘Source ‘that has furnished reliable.
- --inforebion in: the past’ furnished the. following information -- | : concerning’ some of the officials of ‘the Institute ‘of the ΕΝ Daan international Workers Movement: -
-- * 4 oe =
Tiniur τι, Timoteyev eee - nee
a
-Ξ ἘΞ
vat +
a ἊΝ Ῥιοξογαν wes. bein Noveniber 30, 398, in- - Evan usae OE
an Ε
᾿ North American area. - For.-six years his Work | Was related ot North - -: κου ς ΤΆΒΘΣΞ οδὴ; radio and: he: became ὦ Specialist in. this. field. ogre t eer
4 Be
οἷς “Her also taught Marxisn=Leninism αὖ 8 “govnet University. 7 “ahd was.on ‘the staff of the. "World Marxist: Review" in. Prague for’ a & years sand a half. “= .
- ᾿ ξα΄
᾿ “th “February,” 1960, ‘he pecamé ἃ top-level “exéeutivé of o - τ΄ thie World: Institute. of Human, ‘Affairs, which is a department of - , τος ες Ν the Central Committeé-of the Communist Party-of the Soviet. Union . - > (CPSU), and travelled extensively in the satellite ‘countries. He ~ pre ee, has: δι » reputation | as: an, author and -has. written for “Pravda ε' "
“* . ¥
yh |
‘this document eontaing - neither recommendations nor τς ΠΣ seonelusions of the FBI.. It is. the property of ithe: = oe FBI and is: loaned to your -ageney; it and its, - . ne contents aré not to be distributed outside. your agency.
stitute of the Intemational Workers Novonent
Ih October, i960, Timofeyev came ‘to the United: Stabés as. a member of the entourage of Premier Nikita Khrushchev, . who. attended the 15th session of the United Nations ‘Assembly:.
In 1962 he became Deputy Director of thé Institute, of World Economy: and Intetnet}onas, Affairs, “Academy of Science
of the USSR.
e is. deseribed:: 6.8 “haying ‘plack hair, brown eyes; - ‘and: being δον τῇ height. TIMOFEYEV is also. known’ as: "Tinimy . Dennis.’
_ Edvard Artutovich Arabs ΞΟ. ᾿ ΕΣ ra
᾿ Arabs «ὀρῖν
was- born October 13; 1925, - in Tbilisi; ussr. -
He studied at the Institute δὲ Foreign Relations and was expelled - invhis. third year -for having returned laté, from a ‘vacation. - He | was a very. ambitious young man and completed his. education: as a correspondence student at Moscow University. ‘After graduation. he studied philosophical scLencte at the aforesaid university».
- and. subséquently- held ἃ position in the- philosophical departmént
ΘῈ the Foréiign. Lite)
Patiire Publishing Housé..
; Thereafter, he pecame associated with the Tistitute of
ΟΣ the ‘World. Marxi:
i re” en
aw and. eventually. Was: : appoginted, to the editorial ‘poard..
Bt Review" ain’ Prague. He: 15. known. to. have bean
Between August 31, 1962; and Septenber 16, 1962, he was _
“in the United. State Tnternational Socio
himself as “a scientific Worker.! Marat, Vikturovich Bagley, |
s as one of 8. group of Sdviets who attended, the logical Congress. At that time, he descfibed
Ν
. Baglay,. who was νοχὴ Mareh 18, 1930; in Baku, USSR, in October 1960 was a lawyer employed at “the Institute’ on, State and Law. In October 1960 he applied for a visa to visit the USA
as a wember of a So
Viet delegation that came. to thé USA at the
‘invitation of the Council on Student Travel. He was not listed,
however, among the October 26, 1960.
τς information concern
Soviet delegates ao, arrived in the USA on The. sourcé could furnish no additional - ing Baglay..
De “Ὁ
aap
- Institute of the: International Workers Movement - | ᾿
Yuri Aleksandrovich. Zamoshkin ᾿
Zamoshkin, a. ‘sociologist, was : in the USA between
+ guly 8, 1958, and August 28, 1958, as a Soviet Ὁ delegate to an American, Friends Service Convention...
Between March 29, 1961, and Septenber 26, 1961, he Was employed at, the Soviet Mission to: the United Nations as. .8, scientific worker. At this time, he- resided at. 50 Hest 47th: Street, New York City.
He attended an International Sociological Congress in the USA between August 31,-1962, and September 22, -1962,, ends ewes
an East-West exchange student in the USA between May 233 1966 and June 13. 1066...
" After his 1958 yisit to the USA, “δά Was highly eritital Ὁ of all phases of life in the USA, asserting that the USSR Was far more advanced, in 811. “respects, than. the. USA.
Ε vile is described as follows: τ ΝΕ
Birth ΤΟ ΟΒόχῃ dal Moscow, USSR, wT a ~ an “ September 10; 192% . ἐν ~ > Hair - 2. 7 Fair - - - ”. Byes. * τ Gray Height -ὖ 7 ΤῸ" ‘Weight ΄. ες 166 . Build : . . ϑιῖρηῦ . Complexion Medium
Nikolay Aleksandrovich Kovalskiy ΕΞ στ ς
ΕΗ
Koval sky, a Section ‘onde of thé Institute of the triternational: ‘Workers: Movement; was in the USA between. March 6,- 1967; and March 29; 1967, as ἃ Soviet delegate to the 18th session Of thé United Nations Commission on So¢ial. Development. He had Soviet diplomatic passport #016551. His description. is as. follows:
Institute of the International Workers Movement SO "" =
Bixth - . ‘Born October 12, 19255 in
. ΝΕ Leningrad, USSR Height 179 om. Hair 7 ‘Brown .. Eyes ᾿ Brown
The source could furnish no ) further information concerning Kovailskiy.
The source could Fusnigh no inforiation concerming the following, who are mentioned. in the. referenced CTA command cations
-M. K. Maiiardashvili
Yu N.. Davydov . L. P. Delyusin -— | Ae
Υ. Pérevedenstsev -
. "ONE. Novikov . . 7 oF ! - Ye A; Ambart ΝΞ
ῬΡ 39 Rev. $2269 ROUTE IN ENVEL§P Ei Ζ, | ! “2: A FBI . Date: 6/ 277 67
oe -
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or-code?
Via AIRTEL ᾿ Priority) | --.-- -....-.-.... a ee a ee Loe, TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (00-428092 ) FROM:. ἐπ = YORK (100-134637-)
sumer oto gana)
On. 6/27/67, theré was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered message, the plaintext of which is as follows:
“To Jack Brooks:
"We recommend you to burn down 40 unused. groups in: your code", .
ταν τσ
group of gammas ‘used in Soviet. radio transmission. to thé CPUSA.
| Ϊ . ᾿ς New York airtels, s/AT/6T and 6/19/67. Pare CS) a j
~ cago =46-SUB B) a δι 1 - New York (230° -91 (41) “24: θ-Ξ fe ῥοῦ - 63 οἵ
1. - New York (100 2.) (41)
ai ἐπα ne 6 JUN 80 1967 Ἷ on | ' om
ST-115
Avbrovetn AF = nce . Sent. . Μ᾽ ΒΡσγ, 65 Jbe \ ὉΡῈ ial Agpat in C atge
OPTIONAL τόκα NG. 10 J0O+ 108 t MAY 1862 EDITION GSA GEN. REG, NO, 27 Tolsan
(; UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ake
Wick
ἄς Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE =
: Gole «ὦ Mr. conrad AED > τ ° pate: June 27, 1967 | Sd oz
GVO) a Lyf Teeter ele, gom FROMEZ 6 F. Downing, /
Holmes
Gendy .
: το) Ν ; SUBJECT: σι" {un} RNAL SECURITY - ὦ AN τῷ
γα Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable:-confidential
informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted:to him by radio.
—
On 6/27/67, transmissions were héard by the Bureau's radio . station at Midland at which time a message, NR 471 GR 23, was intercepted.
The plain text and cipher text are attached. ; “ες "
The New York Office is aware of the contents,
ACTIONS ,
For information.
: 0 ν
ἊΣ δ “ἘΠ ΠΟΪΟΒΌΓΘ | S
1 - Mr. Conrad
2- Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam) 1 - Mr. Downing 1 - Mr. Newpher
1 - Μῃ. Paddock REG BA fe O- L2bCA 0368
HS:dry ἮΝ Γ A190 (7) ws
6 JUN 29 1867
Weenie
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O 6/27 /67
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NR 0474 GR 020 06/27/67
63015 22067 34508 58252 44898 99624 35886 28696 32694 99588 ‘~~ $4222 53524 65922 68546 91358 $0542 71710 13119 52806 19979
41478 24631 94870
Me tee ok ert ΒΝ
NR 0471 GR 020 06/27/67
[rds nelelre commend our doursfpovua ddunusensroveshy
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ENCLOSURE
. * O Θ 2 A fj a i ᾿
SAC, New York (100-134637) Attention: SAC Dillard W. Howell September 27, 1967
REC- Director, FBI ΤῚΝ - 23 67 SOLO. το 15 -Ὁ ph. SRERE IN ENVELOPE TRAMUS
Reference.is made to your letter of 6/28/67, captioned as above, in which you forwarded 1,999 pages of Xerox reproductions of money in the: amount of $80, 000.
Serial numbers of the money on the 1,999 pages.have been recorded in the Automatic Dafa Processing Unit. These numbers will be compared and added to the index..
| There are being forwarded to your office under separate cover 1,999 pages of Xerox reproductions...
of f ‘Sp, (6) |
1 - SAC Dillard W. Howell (with Xerox reproductions) 1 - Mr. Row
Jolson w= - sy MAILEO Au ise «=| SEP 2.71967 -
Bish smewererenem
COS Pel τω, - Callghon means COMM-FBI Conrad ane : ᾿
Fett
Gale nan, —,
Rosen ὁ
Sullivan -ς-.- A A
Tavel %,
eas a 2 _ * Tole, Room ewe 1967 a!
Holmes Gandy - uait ool] τανετυρε τ] ; ἫΝ
soa ee = OPTIONAL FORM NO. τὸ oo
δ GSA FPMR i or) 1118 . * * UNITED STATES GOV MENT © Γ sMemorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 6/28/67 (ATTN: VOUCHER STATISTICAL SECTION)
Sac, NEW YORK (100-134637) all yy
3 TRAMUS al;
“TP
-5 Enclosed for the Bureau are 1,999 pages of xerox ὁ money representing $80,000.00 in $10. 00 denominations. This) represents the final amount of the $530,000.00 received by NY 694-S* from the Soviets on 5/20/67. iF Records of these bills should contain the reference, "HN 65-17696- ~A1391i". It is also requested that the record cohitain the page numbers may be found on the lower right hand corner of each sheet.
The enclosed material should be returned to the ᾧ _ NYO after processing.
- Go" FAD . ! Bureau (100-428091) (Encls. 1,999) (RM) Υ y ἥ G ~ yWoucher Statastical Section) | - W τὸ - : V2 1 - New York ἙΞΕΣΕ (deo. γἢ J) beth» URE Ὁ 22-- ,- Gz 3g 4 JFL: gmd + -Ὁ5) ΝΝ δ Ὁ ΜῈ JUL 6 1967 : 7 “haan Shy Ack 4 Qn- cn AP: ΔΚ
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Ki τε κα Η : 7. —_r ς΄. ΄ -« τα - 7 τ: 1 ΜΗΝῚ ᾿ - a ᾿ς BDR6 dHev. 5:2. ἊΝ SD ὧ ᾿
ΟΒΟΟΤΕΡΙΝ ENVELOPE
Date; 6/23/67.
Ἕ
I | Ι I | | I Ϊ { Ι f |
Transmit the following. in
(Type in plaintext or code)
| Via __ AIRTEL . ΝΝ | | ΠΝ | (Priotity) a
sf | τὸ : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM : SAG, NEW YORK (100-134637) Vex HaN6 SUBJECT: SOLO ~
: -͵ ΔῈ ΑΝ ‘On 6/20/67, NY -694-S* and wife were observed at =, 3:30 pm, to enter the: building. housing International Publishers, |-. Park Avenue South, NYC, carrying two bright orange shopping [Δ᾽ bags (total weight 25 lbs.) containing $250,000, At 4230 pm, , ELIZABETH HALL was observed departing this building carrying ΟΝ two bags identical with the ones delivered by informant. She “1 placed the bags in her car t and then. drove 7 cross: town, picking up her then drove the St car up town on the West Side Drive, fisur discontinued at 92nd St. NYC. They were observed entering their basement garage, ς |. Yonkers, NY, shortly before 5:30 pm. The time interval logically | precludes any stop en route.
After arriving in the garage, GUS HALL, who had | returned home from the Communist Youth School that afternoon, was observed to walk around the rear of the car in. the garage | carrying at least one of these bags. He had apparently entered © the. garage through the basement éntraince and exited the same way.. |
the residence the evening of 6/20/67, in his car,
Fisur throughout the night ard morning disclosed that | xert δι 3 = 03 ᾿ - A a ; - {2 ad i fe 90-4 GbD ΕΝ 100 γαΐ 7/
. \ABsBureau (100-428091) (RM). emai i 5 ae 7
> “y-Chieago (134-46-Sub F). CRM) OF 10} 1 3 1587 .
~ 1-Minneapolis (Info) (RM) -͵ . th {deny (3191) (lav) (at) sree memes Ὁ i
L-NY (100-134637) (421) Ld JKsrmv £7) 8
Approved: S-\tvea ἜΒΟΝ Sent __- eM Ροι:
65 JUL β {87a Agent ii Charge
NY 100-134637
remaining away for three hours and ELIZABETH HALL left the residence in her car, remaining away for one and a half hours. No effort made at surveillance. Since this is a basement garage, we are unable to observe activity therein.
On 6/21/67, : a arrived at the residence on time. ELIZA an
HALL entered the car with their usual equipment, purse and envelope briefcase. There were no bulges indicating the fact that they were carrying any sizeable amount of packaged money. τσ τιοτνφαεπτν : ΝΣ feat
GUS HALL was observed entering CP Headquarters at his usual 8:35 am, and ELIZABETH then proceéded to International Publishers, which is ofly.a five minute walk. At abdut 9:00 am, NY 694.S* checked with ELIZABETH HALL and found all systems. A-OK, There was no, whusual activity that day. Fisur maintained on residence throughout day.
On the evening of 6/21/67, GEORGE MEYERS arid his son (wé assume) drove GUS HALL and BLIZABETH HALL away from ΟΡ Headquarters, arriving at the Yonkers res ‘at the normal hour. During the evening. 21/67, GEORGE ‘MEYERS, GUS: HALL and a friend ὁ left the residence for a period of time, but-no unusual activity was observed throughout the night and early morning.
The HALLS were picked up again on the morning of 6/22/67, and on this occasion HALE was observed to bé carrying a grocery bag which. did have bulk. - He placed it in the trunk of the car and they drove away. They were next observed to. arrive at CP Headquarters on time. HALL was extremely security conscious as he drove into the block. After the car was parked, HALL-was observed to go to the trunk of’ the car, It mild not. bé determined whether HALL. took the pag out of the car. -
ELIZABETH HALL entered International Publishers carrying a _ purse and sweater. Shé had no.nusual activity that day. -
On 6/22/67 [den employee of "The Worker" made-a deposit of $10, 78 in the Publishers New Press account and a deposit of $20,000 in the Committee For Socialist Education (an account éstablished for a daily paper).
a2 =.
bg -
bic
ΟΝ 100-135 637.
Fisur discontinued afternoon of 6/22/67, ag any further activity would seem to be inconclusive.
‘The residence of GUS HALL is a big rambling house ~ " with the basement garage holding two cars. The garage has ‘been constructed within the past few years at a considerable expense. We must assume that HALL has retained some of the
money in his house in a segure. location... He is then able to act as his own depository. and dispense money aS néeded.
FD-36 (Rav. 5-22.64) O | | ° “Ὁ ROUTH aN BN OPE
Date: 6/26/67
Transmit the following in —
' (Type in plaintext or code}
να. AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL 7 ΝΞ ᾿ oe * (Priociy) Ι |
— ee ee ee ee; y 7 7Y
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
. FROM: SAC, ‘CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) (© sor0 ) . IS=C. te ᾿ ᾿
. ReBuairtel ‘dated, 6/1/67" directing that Chicago should immediately. Start preparations. to remove ali Sdlo Funds into safety deposit boxés éntirely controlled -by
this office., leaving a Limited amount ‘not exceeding $10, 000 in the custody: of CG 5824~-S*. :
On 6/20/67 CG 5824-S*' tuéned over to this office
« the entire amount of Solo ‘Finds. in his custody with the
exception of $10 ,.000- which, remains in the “RAROLD. M, JULES"
safety deposit box δὲ ἐπέ ‘Mid~America National’ ‘Bank, Chicago,
Illinois. Access to the "JULES" box’ can: be effected by
CG 5824-S* under the above name; his wife, CG 6653-S,. under -
the name -GENKA Ἐς JULES; ox, by NY 694-S* undér the name of
JACK BROOKS,
On 6/21/67, after a complete inventory of these funds, the entire amount was placed in safety deposit ‘box #C1880 at. the LaSalle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access limited to the SAC and ASAC of the Chicago Office,
The above is for the eo of the Bureau and
+ New York, ᾿ ΤΉΝ (ΜΝ) ST. 15 492: 10-f 2S O ggs~G3Y | - l-New York (100- 134687) (Info) (RN) 2~Chicago 6 JUL 3 1967 (1-134-46 Sub F) WAB s' MDW - | | —_— (6) a —
aos δοηῖ.-.. ὁ. Μ OPer - ent in Charge
δ 5 ogg
ο ROUTE IN ne “LOPE
FBI
- ; |
‘ Date: 6/27/67 | l
|
FD-36 (Hey. $-22-64) 4
~ - 4
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
(Priority)
(ytd TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) ᾿
: «ἡ wer FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) v (ie ο΄
τι ReCGairtel dated 6/23/67 concerning disposition
being made by GUS HALL of Solo funds being furnished to him at this time by CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S*,
—
tion relative to the reasons which might be motivating GUS HALL to make this large demand for funds from the informants: While it can be understood that these funds are eventually
to cover the expenses of setting up and running the new
daily paper of the CP, USA; there still remains some question as to why HALL would ask for $500,000 unless such an expendi-~ ture would be made in the immediate future. After all, these funds have been in the custody of our two Sol6 informants
for many years, and whenever HALL had need of funds he had only to ask for them and the informants produced as much as he desired from the Solo funds, There has never been any delay and the funds have always been available.
On 6/26/67 CG 5824-S* was engaged in a conversa~ Q
CG 5824~5* stated that he can only express his opinion on this matter since he has no way of being sure. However, he noted that HALL has always operated on the prin- ciple that he can only trust himself. By force of circumstance,
/~ 70¢ Fed δὰ
Β (RM) - {5 Ve "New York (100-134637) (Info) ( Ss /04 “2722 76 77 57 i-Chicago ee WAB : MDM ST-115. sg gut 3. 86]
torn fh Sent — uM Per 6 5 JUL 6 196% 1 Agent in Charge
CG 5824-S*, and ‘by. extension upon N¥ 694-S*, for the difficult
CG 134-46 Sub B
he has had to rely upon NY 694-S* and CG@ 5824-5*, but this does not change his basic operating principle. Thus, HALL may have become somewhat uneasy when he thought of the growing amount of Sdlo funds in the sole control of these two brother informants and of the fact that an additional $500,000 will soon he coming into their hands also:
HALL's concern for the, reinstitution of a daily press is. intimately involved with the future financial security of the CP, USA and himself; It must be remembered that the justification of the annual subsidy of the CP, USA : by the CP of the Soviet Union has beeh predicated in part wo | ‘each year for a number of years upon the re-establishment of a daily paper. Therefore, HALL may well feel more secure himself by actually having the funds in his hands with which to iftisure the financial base of the paper. Granted, HALL ~- Inay salt some of ‘this money away with, some members. of his family, but since it is his family, HALL, believes this is the samé as. having it in his own ‘hands, according to the opinion of CG 5824-S*,
As to the question of whe ther er not this sudden large demand by HALL is an Adumbration of a diminution of tiust of thése informants by HALL, =S¥ stated and the Chicago Office agrees that there is -no. other fact or circum- stance, concrete or intangible, which would presage such | lessening of confidence by GUS HALL. While HALL bestows far greater trust upon these two. informants than ttpon any . other individual known to us, we are nevertheless aware that any trust by HALL is by nature of a limited character, It is possible that these informants at this time have reached the limit to which HALL's confidence can be stfetched. At the same λα, HALL remains to ἃ large extent dependent upon
task of convincing the CP of the Soviet Union to continue its subsidy of the CP, USA each year in such large amounts.
‘The, above comments are being furnished to the Bureau for whatever assistance they may ‘have in the Bureau's considera- tion of this entire matter of turning over to GUS HALL at this . time the amount of $500,000. !
ἊΣ Pr
ἊΝ
ΞΙ ΈΘΑΤΤΟΝ ἢ πυῖδε
aie OPTIONAL Form I νῶν 19
OSB O ROUTE IN τῇ LOPE
Seen ear
ΩΣ
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
_ FROM x4 SAC, CHICAGO: (134-46 Sub B) | SUBJECT: Ssoro > 3 — CRED
; ReBulet dated June 21, 1967, -coeerning the fact that GUS HALL used Solo funds to ma] amount, of $16,'500 -on. the home of hi to the penef it of CG 5824~S*, Relet inquires . LS apparent interest incone. accruing to: ‘CG 5824-$* Will -be handled with
. respect to the source's income tax or. how he contemplates, ob= taining funds to pay, the additional tax necessary.
i nena ne EF
‘This situation was discussed in. detail with CG 5824-S*
on June 22, 1967. CG 5824-S* advised that. ‘the apparent interest. income accruing to him will, be reported as ‘interest income on hee his 1967 income tax return as. well as in ensuing years. As. the Ὁ Buréau is aware, CG 5824:S* has had his personal: funds entwined
with. the ‘transactions involving Solo funds in the past ‘both for the. it Sf the CP, USA. and for the benefit. ot ae Some: of these investments of Solo funds have been made in the name of our Solo informant wheréas the. pr derived therefrom ‘have, in fact, been. turned over to the
in Such past instance 2S¢' ransactiotis: for the ᾿ be ‘benefit of the Party and/or’ pes have -beeri: made. 70 in ‘the informant's name’ have, been recorded: on the informant’ ‘Ss. se ‘income tax return... These transactions appear on both. ἘΠΕ: "true! return and the "open" return which is filed openly with the __ Internal Revenue Service (IRS); The. amount by: which this ‘apparent income increases the informant! Ξ tax. payment. has ‘been
deducted asa business expense from the payments made to this informant by the- FBI for ‘services, and usual. expenses. τὸ is. recognized, and the informant ‘is aware, that through the use
of such. a device the informant does not recover the full value of the payment ‘that is made. to IRS, ‘As a consequence, the
informant has lost substaiitial personal. income in ‘the ‘process:
ον de φρ Cy σ΄" "EC. 90 @)Bureai. CRM)
+ I-New York (loos 194887} C08 ἐδ (i814, /00- Y2GO9/—
1-Chicago aa “τα Meret sremecmc,, oh? UG oe e “sollte
No 3 τὰ δ 26 ssiftention Ins mind ᾿ς μι 5 eee - ao
ΜΝ - Peo” -- «- - -“- “-
CG 134-46 Sub B
¥or the purposes of maintaining the security of the Soo - operation and precluding involvement with the United States IRS, CG 5824=S* has been willing to accept this loss. Τὰ - is. noted, that the informant has also accepted the loss of
several hundred dollars cent.xe-purchase of invest- ΒΡ ments in the name of λοι in Hercules-Galion stack b7c and stock of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood through
the untimely sale of securities and premature cashing of -
time déposit. certificates. -
Such ἃ. practice of the informant absorbing such personal loss by virtue of his. involvement in the GP, USA funds Operation which is being conyerted to the benefit of GUS HALL's children cannot, of course, continue ad infinitum. However, in thé present situation, CG 5824~S* has expressed his. willingness to handle the income tax liability generated με by the mortgagé -on ᾿ξ a τ" in the Same manner as wie ες in the past and to accept Such personal loss as this entails. This office foresees ho likelihood that this detivity will : result in, -CG 5824-S* becoming involved with IRS,
MECLASS TPICATION AUTHORITY DRBIVED FROM:
FE
~ RUT OMAT : DECLASS FICATION CUIDE
SAT
Bp ae 4
δ ΔΝ that the interview had been conducted by three "young kids”
ΠΥ e.20-00 9 ὃ ROUTE IN EN y ΡΕ
Date: 6/27/67
os
Transmit the following in.
(Type tn plaintext or code)
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED 11,
(Priority)
——— ee er ee ce i rer rm ere ee ee ree ee eee er ee ee ee eee ee .--
os
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
Ssou0 ““TS=¢
-C
Re previous correspondence concerning the current investigation being conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the USA, SDNY into alleged manipulation of stocks being traded on the American Stock Exchange.
On 6/26/67 CG 5824~S* advised that he had engaged in a, telephonic conversation with his brother-in-law, IRVING PROJANSKY, President and Chairman of the Board of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 11}]., earlier that same date.
Ν SPROJANSKY informed CG 5824-S* that he had. been in NYC on - ne Thurs,, 6/22/67, for an interview by the SEC and USA, SDNY, ΚΘ the above-mentioned investigation. He further stated
ΑΝ Min their twenties rather than by the USA. They talked about } Ny general problems and never did get down to a concrete dis- cussion of the problem in which he is involved, According to PROJANSKY, the whole thing was a waste of time. As a result, -PROJANSKY is to go back to NYC for another interview sometime during the week of 6/26/67, the exact date depending upon the office of the USA.
204 The above is being submitted for info purposes only.
ὃ
Aone, (RM) 21). 1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (Ri) / “4 72.277 6374
i-Chicago
WAB: MDW ay 4 ἘΠ JUL 3 {957 Class} = by. aoe ἡ πὸ δὲ ᾿ al - ὥς ᾿ a
Exe
Date of De a. ἡ ie ; ᾿ γῇ 0 td ἐν ἊΝ ite i Appra AMT At. Sento MO Per ὃἕῬ'Ῥ'
65 min fag ΝΣ in Charge
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 16 s * “MAY J¥62 EOITION : ‘ - , °GSAFPMR (41 CFR) 101-186 ᾿ : » RIF
_ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum
TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 6/26/67
| 57 yy
} ReBulet to Chicago, cc to New York, dated June 7, 1967, which énclosed. a letter ‘dated May 26... 1967, £rom . CIA concerning the Institute of the Ix ernational, Workers Move-
~ ment (IIWM). ‘ReCIAlet classified "Bae set forth informa-
tion, concerning individuals’ connected with. the IIwi and
requested any additional information or photograplis which
the FBI might have concerning the leading functionaries and/or
activities of the Institute,
- On June. 1, 1967, CG 5824-S* advised that he could ΝΞ furiiish - ‘no: additional information concerning the. Institute, . its activities and/or its leading functionaries beyond that ἡ prey.iousily. furnished and which has already. been disseminated : to CIA, ᾿
- In light of the negative character of the informa-—: tion furnished by CG 5824~- S*, no: ΤΗ͂Ν is, being Prepared Setting . forth this negative contact,
J-404 7D - ΝΞ " ¢PBareau (RM) | ; . - ἼΝον York (100-2184607) (Info) (ni)
1-Chicago
ΑΒ: MDW ce. 9 ἮΝ a | - -" «gg 65 6. .
of τ’ -
ἜΝ pr? | 4EGOUL T1967
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regulany on the Payrall Savings Plan
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-125943) 6/16/67. - sac, men rong] | amy | Rel¥let, 2/14/67.
i. Rec ouméndation.
It is recomended. that.
2s. Reésiderice ond Emp loyrent.
3, ‘Gurrent Memb erehip ἢ in xi aniza ions -
4. Summary of Infornotion Furnished During Pertinent Period 7
aS. been ἃ "GOTkE™ GO and that he, W 69 «δὲ, would deverm sould do. in the future. πος
er Dot. with informant ‘and E s
φ Ξβμεοδα (i
Kes 100. 426091) 1 =~ New York ᾿ “For NOT RECORDED-
ROVED jn 2 8: - οὐδὸν ΒΟ ΤΑΣ 112 JUN. 19 1987
im
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- OHIGIMAL ‘FILED IN
7 ες Jeo gape”
ὥς ΤΡ: jay Οὐ. . a + 865 ἰβθϊθοη ee ΟΝ
family at his residence i New York.. Informant 's ‘assoctation W & being made with | eloping . δῇ associay on betweert Informant and
Comerica ia eficial to the Bureaw in the vestigation o : Ce
Be Amounts Paid for Services
Date ᾿ Services spenses February, ΕΠ δοοι δ - April, 13e6 200.00 - me rvs i967 $250.00 $15.00
. ype anid Nomber of Meetings. . Attended. and Other Activities
WES unber of reports submitted
ve μα “AL Pry ry , ἂν -
8;- Information Furnished of _ Unusual ’ falue
ng thig se Fine
~ 2
lo 7B
oP and ρ΄ “Τ7λ8 υμῖε Section o "ἢ ᾿
9. Approximate Number of Persons. on Whom informant Ἃ “Furnished information ; ΝΕ
ΝΕ Informant furnished information on sixteen (16) people.
- Steps Being Taken to Advance Infortiant_
P=3 4ls ΓΙ pe NOLed AG
rection of the Cr, which ts ¢
a εἴ
CS Φ ΦΨὍῬΨθυξ:.ὃἝὃἝΕὃὉὃὉΒῈὃ οοοκ».ς.-..ς..! of the CP, as well as] ὉὉὁὶἃὲὃὁὃ ΘἝ89ἋἝΟ [εὖ his residence; During this: period
fon iY AGT
res Gence Lor dinner. il. _ Stability and Reliability
During contacts yith| al nothing has | come to the attention of contact ents cating
12, Indoctrination Against Disclosure
Every. opportunity has béen taken to properly indoctrinate this informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with the Bureau by any means whatsoever.
- 3+
fcontinues to be encouraged
78
13¢ Action on, Information Furnished
“
Appropriate aétion has: been taken.on all. informa- tion. » duind shed by this, informant,
crs _Miseellaheous,
None, “-
uo
bem πὸ ΝΞ ΕΞ Te 7A 7 - τι πεν ἢ τ πτοπττσττ
ἘΒ 86 ΒΕ ὧν, 5-22-6 47
| 0 ROUTE JN ENVELOPE
Date: 6/ 30/ 67 |
Tratismit the following in.
* (Type in plaintext or coder ‘ AIRTEL ὴ ἣ ‘ {Priority}
᾿ Η ; -
‘Via
ee re spy ee eee ee ee
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
t 7° ROM: SAC; NEW YORK (100-134637) ; . οι ϑύβσεα εξ ϑοιο ᾿ :
Re New York airtél, 6/26/67...
. On 6/29/67; SA THOMAS J, DEVINE as courier transported $140,000 in cash and’ a $15,000 certified check to the Chicago Office. ΄
$100,000. was taken from the safe deposit box maintained by NY 694-S* and $40,000 was taken from the safe deposit box maintained by the NYO.
- “The chéck of $15,000 répresents funds drawn. from the JACK BROOKS ‘checking ‘account.’ This money is to help replenish Chicago Solo: funds.
AY " - τὰ ot} , - Υ3 ἐ Bureau 4100-28091) (RM) 1 - New York (100-134637) (41)
| "00. y28091-b3 Yb
JdK: gma
(6)
. 81-106. 6 |JUL 5 1837 π᾿ ἜΨΑΥ͂, cane! U7
Approved; οὐ «οὐλὴ : : Sent MOP er 65 JUL TSU Rien τα σαῖς
11 MAY 1942 LOITION " ὰ GSA GEN, REG, MO, 27
fe emia "QUITE TN ENVETQUE ᾿
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT . ᾿ " Memorandum |
TO i ‘Mr, Conrad Swe oars june 30, 1967
_G Adgns Javel —————. a QUOT τττνάτττι.,
FROM C, F. Downing 7 ΙΝ Tele. Room —— ΠΟΥ papers SUBJECT © S010 Ὁ) . ΧΕ NAL SECURITY - C 090, On 6/29/67, the Néw York Office furnished the text Sr of πον messages which the informant desired to send and
requested that they be enciphered, The cipher text was furnished to New York on 6/30/67.
The plain text and cipher text are attached. | é a ACTION:
For information,
Enclosure
. Conrad
Mr
Mr, Sullivan (Attn,: Mr. J. A, Sizoo, Mr, R, C. Putnam) Ny. Downing
My, Newpher
Mr. Paddock
bel bet ΗΝ με Perera
PWP:cca
Wer το it 290: 4/2 0 9/- 0377 Sigg
ἊΣ oxy 6 {JUL δ 1967 oe | yor” oe | ern
fa
RANE οὗ JUL 1 196!
Ο CG 6/30/67
εὶ -
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$1955 94977 79596 66972 76145 47417 24044 62394 28108 12902 57039 80415 42843 75829 “.
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STSTERAILL TELOSEDLURGENT}-\e0h Of I STERELL αμονραύωυιν
asda af ‘WSoap [ML SHARP]. {SPRING|, ο £00-4 F Off - 6377
τὶ (DST Bt wegen s mae
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ee ..-0-ττ'΄' ΠΡ ῸὉ-3
Ν ° ROUTE IN BN /LOPE
FBI Ι ΝΕ {
Date: 6/27/67 ! j
π
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
για. AIRTEL ——s—«©_—sS®ISTERED MAIL (Priority) ee eee ee ee ee Loe - ΤῸ : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) al yt iW FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B , Ae ’ ( ) (pif 4 soo) Qe ἡ Το G /
ReNYairtel to Bureau dated 6/19/67 setting forth results of personal contact by NY 694-S* of his Soviet principal on 6/16/67,
On page 17 thereof is set forth a message to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from GUS HALL concérning a CPSU request that HALL write an introduction to a book being assembled by PHIL FONER. According to New York, that office has no further information regarding the above, On 6/22/67 CG 5824-S* furnished the following information concerning this message:
HELEN WINTER, who led the CP, USA May Day Delega-
yf tion to Moscow, and HYMAN LUMER, who was a fraternal delegate = to the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, <4 had both brought back word to HALL concerning this matter.
τῇ In conjunction with activities planned in connection with the
celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October 3 Revolution, the CPSU intends to publish a Russian language edition of a book being published in the U.S. by International cc Publishers. This book is being assembled by PHIL FONER and is ty to be published under the title "Attitudes of Americans Toward the Soviet Revolution." FONER is collecting material on the
γὰρ. meta (RM) «ὦ 100 . ! ἔ |. Ἴςνεν York (100-124637) (Info) (RM) [00-F Ζῇ OL —6 396 Ds 1-Chicago
= ae 6 JUL 6 1967
Approv “3 | Sent Μ᾽ Per | 6 5 we 1 ΝᾺ nt in Charge
Ο τς Ὁ
CG 134-46 Sub B
_reactions to thé Russian Revolution of 1917 of prominent Americans such as LINCOLN STEFFENS, WILLIAM C,; BULLITT, RAYMOND ROBINS, General WILLIAM S, GRAVES, etc. The American edition of this book will contain an introduction by FONER, For the Russian edition, the Russians want an introduction written by GUS. HALL in addition, to the intro- duction written by FONER, ‘The message from HALL to the CPSU merely asks for additional verifying information relative to the type of introduction ‘the Russians wish him to write for the Russian edition of the book,
Another message which appears on page 17 of reNYairtel concerns a "Montreal Trade Union Delegation," concerning which the New York Office also states that. details are known to CG 5824-S* who requested this message - be sent to the Soviets. CG 5824-S* advised that he learned f£roin- HALL that a message had been received by the CP, USA that the CPSU wanted a delegation made up of five trade ubion, people to cone to the USSR, CG 5824-S* does. not know. how this message was received nor by whom, The CPSU wanted the delegation to bé in Montreal by 6/28/67 and the CPSU was to pay all expenses, Other détails ate unknown to
CG 5824-S*, According to the message, itself, HALL had only received this message on 6/15/67 and he was "raving™ to CG 5824-S* that twd weeks was not enough notice to get such a delegation together because people like that cannot “just drop everything and run, .off to the USSR on such short - notice. CG 5824-S* does not know what efforts are being made to assemble this delegation nor who is getting it together.
For the information of the Bureau and New York, it. is noted that 6/28/67 is a Wednesday and on that, day, each week, Aeroflot Flight #2 leaves Montréal at 3:45 p.m., ‘arriving non-stop at Moscow, USSR, at 9:20 a.m, each, Thursday.
a 4. ΜᾺ TELETYPE] - oar Ἶ εΣ ἣ . O JUN 2 9 1967 ' Ο ᾿ _ENCIPHERED 7 he
ston ἦ go α ROUTE A BrVELopele
if UR GEA T 629-67 EH,
TO DIRECTOR AND NEW ‘YORK
Ὦ , ".-Ν - Miss Gandy... Anes NEW YORK VIA WASHINGTON -ENCODED~ pes Raney 4 Ὦ 1 SRY Crom CHICAGO δἰδὴ 8 “ Sy TERA. sScuritys Con mousy Opp 3 KS0L03J1s=c. fe {2 THE ‘BUREAU ἴδ᾽ AWARE THAT GUS HALL 15 EXPECTED TO: ARRIVE
MIAME SOTA CHICAGO MOMENTARILY EW. ROUTE MINN AND WILL DEMAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ‘DOLLARS OF SOLO FUNDS FROM CG FIVE EIGHT Two
εἶνε DASH S ASTERISK, THIS. AMOUNT AND LIKE. AMOUNT DELIVERED TOPHALL ΒΥ. ἜΣ: SIX NINE FOUR «S$ ASTERISK JUNE TWENTY, LAST, “BELIEVED ‘FOR PURPOSE
C.D. (Pane ᾿ ὅλα Ἀῖτον
comau ΜΙ per yort
> Wr FINANCING ‘NEW DAILY PAPER OF CPUSAGT INFO AVAILABLE -CHICAGO om - INDICATES. ‘ESTABLISHMENT -AND. FIRST YEAR, EXPENSES OF: DAILY. PRESS: _ EXPECTED TO COST SIX. HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. INVEST IGAT.ION
Cgnt any enst FARCE ose !
AT MIEHLE-GOSS ὍΟ “9 CHICAGO, REVEALS CPUSA PURCHASING ONE
PRESS) FOR: NORE THAN SIXTY. THOUSAND. DOLLARS... NEW: YORK
“INVESTIGATION REVEALS ‘RECENT. DEPOSITS TO ACCOUNTS OF PUBLISHERS NEW PRESS AND “THE WORKER™ FUND. AMOUNT. ΤΟ. MORE THAN THIRTY THOUSAND
DOLLARS» CG FIVE EIGHT TWO: FOUR@S ASTERISK OF FIRM- OPINION HALL
yan:
ΝΖ / ACCUMULATING: THESE. FUNDS FOR PAYMENT ABOVE We Ab. BAEZ 2 63 7 4 N 4 —
ae o END PAGE. ONE
6 JUL 6 1987
a 65 JUL 10 1967
Thy, 7 | 09 δα ες |
eet: PAGE’ Two EXPENSES. OF DAILY PAPER.. REQUEST BUREAU AUTHORITY FOR CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR@S ‘ASTERISK TO FURNISH TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS TO HALL.
PESSIBILITY ‘EXISTS HALL MAY ARRIVE CHICAGO’ DURING THIS. WEEK END OR JULY
6 FOURTH, NEXT WHICH ARE DAYS BANK IS
‘CLOSED AND FUNDS. IN GHICAGO: OFFICE. SAFE DEPOSIT VAULT ARE NOT AVAILABLE. HALL WILL, EXPECT FUNDS TO BE AVAILABLE ΟΝ,
HIS ARRIVAL. BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO FURNISH FUNDS -
_10 CG RIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR-S ASTERISK JUNE THIRTY NEXT SO FUNDS WILL
ως τοῦ eee τς Seno TELETYPE ᾿ BE AVAILABLE’ WHEN BANK ‘CLOSED. .REQUEST BUREAU SUTEL AUTHORITY
BY ‘NOON, JUNE THIRTY, NEXT. ‘ENDADK:
URL R RELAY
FBI WASH. DC.
τὸ ae
00 MR, SULLIVAN «Sor, ΖΖφεα
- = *
SS
Sullivan Tavel Trotter aaa --
Gon
$OLo”
ROUTE IY ENVELOPE
=r
SAC, Chicago. (134-46 Sub Β)
Director, ΠΝ 1 o=d08092) ἰ, 4 KO ; .
INTERNAL. SECURITY <= C
Reurtel June 29;. 1967.
. This is, to confirm Bureau telephone call 6/30/67 to SAC Marlin Johnson which granted authority to furnish CG 5824-s*
vith funds: as sat out in retel. 1 = New York (100-134637)
RCB:est-ol © GE sastcol
‘NOTE:
Memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. ἢ. C. Sullivan 6/30/67 vacommended ‘authority ‘be. granted to transfer. Solo funds: to informant for eventual transfer to Gus Hall,
General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). needed ‘approval prior to noon 6/30/67. . was. handled by phone 11:15 a.m., 6/30/67, after riemorandum
was approved.
iL 10 196
MAIL ROOM
MAILED 2 JUN 30 1967
TELETYPE ἍΝ
6/30/67
" i ~ Mr, R. Cc. Putnam
Chicago Therefore, matter
ae
: OFMTIONAL FORA NO, ἢ BC η UTE ‘ i MAT 1992 EDITION ° f
501106 Oba δεν, Βιεῷ, νῷ, 22
IN ENVELQPE . _ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT | |
“Memorandum
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach TO
Caspet - 1 - Mr, WiC: Sullivan Callahan : Mr. W. C. Sullivaf,
Contad eae 1 - Mr. C. D..Brennan
DATE: .June 30,° 1967
| 1. - Mr. ἃ. C. Putnam FROM : C..D,. Brennan ait ΕΣ
SUBJEC
RNAL SECURITY -C
oe.
Αἰ π'
operation performed by our informants ‘between the Communist -
Party, USA (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world. PURPOSE: ᾿
a}
To recommend Chicago be grantéd duithority ‘to furnish _CG 5824-S* with -$250,000 from Solo funds for éveritual’ transfer sto Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, upon his request... :. “BACKGROUND :
praens
i
My memorandum of 6/22/67 advised ‘that Gus" Hall iidihtea he itay need an additional $250,000 for the.’ fund + to establish a daily newspaper by thé end of June ,. 1967;
- το Memorandum recommended a secure method to transfer néedéd., funds from New ‘York to ‘Chicago- in. order. that. it could be... available on Hall's request. ΝΕ 4
4, -- tS a -
This is a favorite tactic of Hail. He has ‘taken, trips and picked up Solo funds in Chicago: and upoti his= return to New York implies that the money came from’ "Party.
angels."
Hall has said that it will réquire. $I, 000, 000: to -Zstart the paper and a $600,000 annual ‘subsidy .to keep. ait “going.
Information available indicates that Supplies ‘and‘ <équipment for this paper are being purchased by the Party, ΕΞ
as ὧν
Chicago has réquéstéd authority by . not on today,
3) 6730/67, to turn this money over to CG 5824-S%: bon finds
ν᾿ , fufnished the CPUSA by the Soviéts througit olir Anfoxmants
ἮΝ 80-1 δ᾽ that the informant would have it available in the event OHA; contacts him on 1 Saturday, . Sunday, δ κα ayas if Enclosure
holiday) WTR UA αἴ 100-428091
00-4280 | ΠῚ 796 - 42409). _L3¥0 “eo wa
pe
CONT'iNtED - over ὦ UL 6 1967
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan RE: SOLO| 100~428091
when banks are closed. and there is no way to get into our safe-deposit box where the money is held. The informant must give this money t Hall on: request or the entiré Solo Operation will come to an end. It. should. be noted ‘that the Soviets have promised to furnish the Party with an additional $500,000 this year through. our informants.
: U ae Attached is an"immediate teletype authorizing Chicago to make this money available to the informant.
RECOMMENDATION ; re gbavdred: bf Phowe_ That the attached teletype be approved and sent.
4
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Gi
TO
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ae it
OPTIONAL #924 KO, τὸ 5610 π|δ6 MAY 1942 ΕΌΙΠΟΝ ' GSA CEH, REG. NO, 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BeLocch —
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE #===
pera’ eos
>: Mre Conrad pare: July 3, 1967 Ro
i γιισπαδιισ παι πῥ πηβπλνλας, fi? vel TOLLE E meres Tale. Room
« Fe Downing Holmes Gundy -
INTERNAL SECURITY — C
᾿ Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-8* who has been receiving com- munications transmitted to him by radio,
On 7/3/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's
radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 357 GR 29, was intercepted. The plain text and cipher text are attached. The New York Office is aware of the contents.
ACTION: — Δ, D (ee
For information.
Enclosure ΝΞ ΕΝ go
‘4 - Mr. Conrad
2. Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J» A. Sizoo, Mr. Ἐς C. Putnam)
1. =~ Mr. Downing 1. - Mr. Newpher 1 =~ Mr. Paddock
HS: csp Cage
᾿ Χ «ἣν (00h 777, —b2 ὃ) «ὦ
Pe ὑπμμασαααδα
| sence 6 JUL 6 1967
ve τς
ee
65 JUL 10 86
4 2 | τς δηλ
NRMO357 GR 929 07/03/67
79365 49920 88663 64704 35476 22808 49727 71046 46904 13426 49214 $2026 57645 25935 08577 71345 38/428 27023 $2651 45047
54125 83009 06150 $5112 32756 467714 0/191 28212 12580
NR 0357 GR 029 07/03/67
| NAccoRDANCaW I THy OUR sHes||sPeedlorpuKdu iL ΠΕ]! NCREA seltwot IMestsTART νἀνεχήρυκε! {ce ἠρκεραβει.
BOLE Ὁ o-4+-2809/—G3kl
FD-36: (Rév., 5-22-64) ROUTE ΤᾺΤ PNVETOPR | ὩΣ ΣΑ͂ ἢ ΗΝ;
ΕΒΙ Date: {7 32) 67
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να... ATRTED ᾿ ᾿ ἽΡ ΠΟΙ α TO: DIRECTOR, FBI .(100-428091) ᾿ i (ATTN: FBI LABORATORY) β } Bi FROM: SAC; NEW YORK. (100-134637)
νος On 7/3/67, there was received from the Soviets,
via Yadio, a ciphered message, the plaintext of which is δῷ follows: fk
"In accordance with your wishes, speed of Radio will, be increased two times starting next Radio, Get prepared: '
' Regarding the above nessage, NY. 69H- δὲ advises -that at the. time: of his last contact with, TALANOV, the latter inquired whether the informant used a tape “recorder in — connection with the monitoring of radio messages from Moscow, The informant advised TALANOV that he did; the latter
stated that he would arrange that the speed of radio messages be inereased in order that more information might .be transmitted: during a Single transmission,
i]
be Got, 4}... Ὁ ; | ᾿ XO Bureau (100-428091) (RM) : (1 - FBI Laboratory
1 = Ghteage (13s δ SOy Ε) (AM RM) joo 2- A638
1 - New York eR HET (INV). (42)
1 - New York (100-134637) (41). | en Approved: ϑοῖὶ. ὃ Μ ει:
65 JUL
ROYTE IN ENVELOGE.
. ma SAC, New York (100-134637) 7/6/67...
Director, FBI (100-428091) 1- ir. R. C. Putnam
~ Reurairtel 7/3/67. which advised that the manager
f of 17 Battery Placa, New York City, location of plant utilized in the Solo Operation,.has inquired if there would be objections to. our moving because of the urgent need for additional space by a noighboring tenant,
In view ‘of the Iack of specific information relating to cost, the Bureau is unable to authorize a - commitment in this matter ‘at this time. As soon as: specific details are available, the Bureau should be. advised and - your request for such a move should be. fully justified.
RCP:est (4)
NOTE:
ee | of the Whitehall ὃς Building, has been most cooperative. 5 continued cooperation
τ is absolutely essential for the full security of. our operation — .
in his: building which is utilized_for the reception of radio
messages from the Soviet Union. inquired if we would
accommodate him by moving in view of a request for space for a
neighbor and what our requirements would be. [Iwas told
that we. would need similar space but on ἃ higher level, probably: the. 19th floor. He was unable to quote. prices, lease, moving. expenses, and so forth, until consulting with his superior. The present location is undesirable and any location "higher in the building would add to our security and improved radio reception. The. ‘tenant who wants us to release our space has a personal interest and could become an unpleasant, neighbor . Our present location has been in operation for several years [and a move to another office could provide adequate security. No definite commitment ‘can be made until specific details are folson = -available within the next month or so.
a [06 - 42 J 504, / ἀξ 42
Contad ΒΒΌΝΒΝΌΟΝ * Belt πες 100 ‘Gale anv 1967 Rosen Sulliven 6 JUL 6 Tavel mae. . Trotter eee Jele. Room ... τι
ἘΞ: 1 1 “86 TELETYPE unit],
lng
ΤΩ ,
" δος ἀκ,
7a
SAC, New York (100-134687), 3 1/6/67
Director, FBI (100-428091) 1--Me. R. C. Putnan
for -CG 5824~S%* hag been considered under numerous prograns and has been the subject of considerable. correspondence
over the years. In order’ to afford this vital matter the ‘meticulous attention it deserves, the following 4 instructions are being placed in effect.
fi The matter’ of locating 8 suitable: replacenent
1. New York and Chicago are to submit a. concise, succinct sunmary of all steps taken to. develop a suitable. a eer for CG. 4824-S* during the month of July by 1/67. .
2. At the same timd, each office is, to set. forth additional activity to ba undertaken during August , 1967, - to ‘attain the same end,
3. Similar communications ‘are to be submitted monthly until instructions to the contrary are issued, by _ “the Bureau,
These communications are not to. be wordy documents of explanation but factual, descriptions: of results. Assign sufficient, competent personnel to this. project to insure ᾿ at is afforded continuous, imaginative, aggressive attention.
Since Chicago covers the residence of CG 582449%, it is being designated conrdinator of this project. Thé" ‘ipurpose of this project is. to centralize our efforts to zidevelop ἃ possible replacemont for CG 5824-S* under one -
Sieaption, in one letter. REC. 100 20 ὃ - “2.7672.-- μ3 δ.
As an initial step, Chicago is formulating a pian of action directed toward enlisting the cooperation of © ~selected major offices in this endeavor. Chicago has noted ᾿
that ‘there sso but a limited number of national leaders. of
2———2 = Chicago (134-46 Sub B):
6 JUL 6 1867
Alosen Sulllyven, -
Tavel —_ Te
Trotter —____
Tels. Room — ‘ Hoine SUL Gandy “MAIL Qi
SEE Ne@E PAGE fer
TELETYPE unit]
Letter to SAC,. New York RE: SOLO L00~-428091
the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), in the IlZinois District,
while the preponderance of national leaders is: located in | New York City, and it is fron such leadots that the eventual repincement for CG 5824-S* will cone.
While this statement is ‘valid, our horizons should not be narrowed to utilizing only national leaders as eventual replacements. It could ba that there are alternatives, ‘Tha assignments of CG 5824-§* are many; varied, and complicnted. ‘The informant, himself, is a most unusual individual, It may well be necessary to Locate several individunis who each have some of CG 5824-s*'s attributes and utilize éach in separate spheres of our infornant's activities.
In instituting this projdct, wo aro making ἃ fresh start and -wd are searching for fresh 6668, new imaginative approaches, and sophisticated techniques. Each office should concentrate on developing some means which WiLL. enable ud to locate the individual or individuals who can be used to keep this operation on 2 continuing basis.
NOTE: -
Plagued by: problems of i11 heaith and advancing : years, CG 5824-S* must be replaced or the Solo Operation will come to an end at least from the political intelligence standpoint. The problem of locating a suitable replacement has been given attention in. the past under. various ‘captions. . The project set forth above should insure: that this matter is given continuous guidance, both in the field and at Seat of Government. Chicago has previously been advised: of: institution of this program by letters dated 6/10 and 6/19/67.
CLASSIPLCATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FRO:
-AUTOMATIC «DECLASS EPICKTPON CR ir) ἣν
ART
g 03-08-0012
4 IN ENVELOPE
. Tevel
ΕΝ Κι _ - ys QO Spsect Q yo 1 = Liaison
(? Salo
i end Mir, R. Ὁ, Putnan
BY TEA TS08 we if Date: duly 5, 1967 & To: Director ot ς Bureau of Intelligence and Research ‘Department of State αὐ Δ Sat
Fron: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA ANTERNATIONAL ‘RELATIONS
A. source who has furnished. reliable infornation an the past has advised as follows.
As part’ of thé celebration of the 50th Anniversary of ‘the Great Octobor Revolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union intends to print a Russian-language edition of the book boing published in the United States by International Publishers, 2 Communist Party, USA; publishing house. The hook, entitled "Attitudes of Americans Toward the Soviet
elie Ὁ ts being assembled by Phillip. Honors a communist Q ' Writer.
- Foner reportedly is collecting. -moterial concerning: - reactions to: the Russian Revolution of 1917 of such prominent. Americans as Lincoln Steffens, Willian C. Bullitt,
Raynond, Robins, and General Willian S, Graves.
According to this source; the-American dition of ‘this book will contain an introduction by Foner. The Soviets, however, want the Russian edition t6 contain an Entroduction by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, in addition to Bis 77
0a- 1 lis J. Walter YeagiebA Kei ‘ [00 -VAE OY ~(3%9 Assistant Attorney General
1 ~ Director Ar 4 S JULY? 1967 Central Intelligence Ageticy
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
ἐς ~100-428091 SEEINOTE PAGE 'TWO. Gon CREB est μ ;
ait a , J a ἡ ᾿ ἢ
δον (7) oe δ 1
Se μπμπκλάνανν δ >
Sullivan Le aaa
Trotter
Tele, Rgom — “Wr } Ὁ 3 . " ; . ‘ be 6 aan L 12,19 cRoomL_! τευ ετυρε ἀνα th
Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research
NOTE:
Classified “Specet" sitice unauthorized disclosure of this information cOuld réveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-8). who is of continuing value and such. revelation, could result in grave damage to the nation.
information contained in this Ietter was extracted from Chicago airtel to the Bureau dated 6/27/67, captioned "Solo,. 1s " Cc. ‘19
FQ-36 (Rev. vases ΕΝ ROUTE IN ENVELQPE.
᾿-
᾿ FBI Date: 7/3/67
Transmit the following in -
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7 AIRTEL Via coe τς : ms (Priority) 7 Ν TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) | a ° ᾿ ὔ ft ΝΕ | FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) - | supsEés; (C4 τ
~TS-C
ReBuairtel, 6/30/67.
SAC HOWELL and. SA ALEXANDER C, BURLINSON, case agent, will attend conférence on 7/18,19/67.
Bureau is also requested to approve the. attendance of Supervisor JOHN J, KEARNEY. SAC’ HOWELL has just arrived in: the NYO and has instituted a program to familiarize himself ; with all aspects of the Solo. operations. However, this is a most involved: and complicated operation, particularly as regards thé apparatus. work of ‘Solo, which: is’ based, in thé NYC? area. Decisions will be madé which..will bear on. the overall operation for a long period of time. Supervisor KEARNEY has
i? been ‘most familiar with ‘the operation for an extended period
|: of years as Supervisor of the CPUSA, and has. beén the immediate supervisor of thé Solo opération ‘for nine months... It is félt he will be able to materially contribute to this conférence, Further, it is felt that since’ he participates: in the day to day problems of the apparatus, it would be most deSirable to have him present and the NYO. would materially kenefit thereby.
biveau (400-428091) { ΓΝ ͵ἐύύ- “Τάξοζ.- 63 % a
“= New York (100- 138637) ¢ jax: ena 6 JUL ἢ 1967
bo
ιν
58 .- - Mo Per
τις ---- . aso e woe κων ‘
M
F.D-36-(P»va3:22-64 : : i] = . }
. QUTE IN ENVEIQPE
= =
ΕΝ
FBI Date: 7/3/67
Transmit the following in
(Type in plointext.or code):
J} { Ι
ε Ϊ i
; ( [ - Ἵ | i
Vi AIRTEL id = ἢ (Priority) ᾿ ᾿ { -...-..-.... meme See a —_ TO: | DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) " FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) ᾿ς SUBJECT: Chow» - oe δῷ 15-0 β
| on 6/29/67, Mr.P ot the Whitehall Building, 17 Battery Place, New York City, the location of our plant, under the name of WARREN THOMAS, for ib use of the Solo apparatus, advised that his corporation has ΤΟ a eritical space, problem and requested: that we move our office _ to another lodation i jilding. He stated he. realizes . we have a lease, Mr, stated that the occupant of the suite of rooms adjoining our plant has. an immediate and critical need for expansion. This tenant has, been with the a building for a long time and the manageinent feels an. = obligation to that ténant. He said he rellizes that we have ' @ very important operation and it must remain discreet. He would’ not have asked “us to move except ds a last resort, but he has no. alternative but to seek our assistance.
‘By way. of background, owing is noted. When bg we first obtained our plant, i a) extremely "pte cooperative and afforded us first consideration in obtaining
Space. He has: remained most cooperative ever since. His continued cooperation is: absolutely essential for full security |.
of: our operation. He provides our necessary backup for ail questions and acts as a buffer to: situations which may apise.
pm Gob third
~ | i Bureau (100-428091) RM REG W/O - 07. , :
- New York (100-134637 ex-108.
JUL ἢ i867
Sent .. ΜἉἍἩ θεοὶ
NY 100+134637
Mr. has stated the occupant who desires the space has not at he has néver personally seén WARREN THOMAS but inows that THOMAS uses the office infrequently.
Tn addition, ‘one of iy: pepeees of thé plant is = Bee for the use of monitoring the: hedule. Our present “ location for monitoring purposés 43 described by the monitor as one of the worst jiocations in the: building.
Mr. was advised that we are most appreciative of his problem and the fact that he: would. not ‘ask us, to mové unless it was deemed éssential to his successful management.
He was. advised that because ‘of our relationship — over the.
years:y we would like. to be of assistancé to him.at. this time,,. . _ but no firm commitment could: bé madé until we- received ' be
authorization from our superiors. It was explained: that we bie
would need space. similar to our present, facilities; that we could ᾿
not accept space on a floor Lower’ than our present office
(ith Floor), that the safe in our office has become a
hee tem (Mr. originally gave us this safe).
Mr, advised that Hetelievés that an office may be
avallable within. aomonth or two. on the 19th floor which ‘should:
be suitable to our needs. He was unable. to quote prices ,;: lease, |
hoving experises, ΚΝ ‘until he consults. with a Vice-President
Of the Sheraton-Whitehal ‘Corporation, owners of the building.
His Jdine of request was to determine only if: 1. wi1L we
accommodate him; and 2. what aré our requirements.
No firm: commitment ‘has been given to Mr, [Jan IC this matter, however, weemust consider. the following: - ᾿
1. Without the fuia cooperation: of management the Solo operation as redafing to: our plant could. become _ compromised, ᾿ ᾿
2, Our present. location for monitoring ‘tug is undesirable and a move to any location Several floors. higher. is desirable and will add to our security in this phase,
NY 100.33}}637
3. The tenant who wants. us to release our space
now has. a personal intérest in the activity of WARREN THOMAS.
He. could: become ἃ most unpléasant neighbor and ‘conduct inquiry
through usual credit sources available.
ἢ, We have béen in oir plant. location for- several years: and a. move: to: another office in: the building could.
“prove behefictal.
' fn ΤΕ ds reconinended that we accommodate σα 010
in this: matter if possible, New. office space may be stightly
more. expensive, ‘however, it will benefit our operation and
provide. additional security: When détails become available a
Specific request will be madé ‘of the Bureau.
LBASSTETCATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
my OO
i Ξ
It AUTOMATIC DECLASSTRICATIOW ΙΤΕΒΕ
ἄν β δουτειν ENVROPE
A, S O Lo BY LIAISON
Date: duly 5, 1967 1 - Liaison (je ys 1 ~ Me. R. C. Putnam Tot Director . Central Intelligence Agency ZZ
Attention; Deputy Director, Plans. 4 From: John Edgar Woover, Director : Va Subject: INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS NOVEMENT
Reference is made to ny Lotter dated June 8, 1967, captioned as above, (your file CSCI-316/02416-67), which advised that sources vero being contacted in connection with your request for additional information regarding individuals connected with captioned organization. The following was
supplied by sources which have furnished reliabic information in the past.
τάχ Tinofeyev.
Tinofeyev was born Novenbor 30, 1928, in ivanova, Union of Soviat Socialist Ropublics (USSR) » the con of the late Eugene Dennis, former Chairnan of the
Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Pogry Donnis, currently
ἃ CPUSA funetionary. He was left by hig parents in the
Soviet Union in 1936.‘0%"1937 as a state ward, He was
educated in Soviet schools which were attended by the
chiidron of top-level Communist Party of the Soviet Union | γ΄ leadors, After conupleting hig academic oducation, he chose
work in the international field as 2 speciality with -
enphasis on the North Amcrican area. For six years, he |
worked in nattors relating to radio usage in the Ts
) North Anoriont area, and hoe bacamo εἰ eee ast
JUL” g Tinefeyey algo taught Nareicn-Lonini Soviet univorsity ands 1 the "StaTL-of Ὁ Talson . Marxist Review," officd
᾿ς DeLoach wen
Mohr —— international comuunist noverodt, at its headquarters in a oe Prague, Cacchoslovakin,' fora year and one half. a — RCP:est ον SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR. Gote στ (5) ; Sullivan -τττττσς 100~428091 Tikes ||US ἐν
sags " 131969 ὙΕΓΈΤΥΡΕ unttL J
ik.
tk . lee κ᾿ es ee a - ' - a a * - Cj - -
Director ΝΕ Central Intelligence Agancy
'
. In February, 1960, Timofeyev becane a top-level executive of the World Institute of Hunan Affairs, a department of the Contral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and he. traveled extensively in the. conmunist countries, He has a reputation as an author and has written articles for “Prayda," a newspaper published™ in the Soviet Union.
In Octobor, 1960, Timofeyev cane to the United States as a member of the entourage of then Prenier Nikita. Khrushchev when Khrushchev attended the 15th Session of the United Nations Assembly in New York City,
_,, ΤῸ 1962, Tinofeyev becand- Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs
of the Acadeny of Scionce of the USSR, Timofeyev's.
curront association with captioned organization has been
previousiy furnished to you.
Tinofeyey is described as baving black hair, ‘brown eyes, and beitig five feat, eight inches tall. He is also known as "ΜΡ πον, Dennis."
Eduard. Arturovich Arab-eOgly |
_, Avrab-Ogly was born October 13, 1925, Thilisi; USSR. He studied at the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow and was expelicd in his ‘third yenr for having. returned late from vacation. He is known to have been a very ambitious young man, He completed his. educagion as ἃ correspondence student at Noscow University. After graduation, ho studied: philosophical science and, subsequently, held a position in the “Philosophical Department" of the Foreign Literature Publishing House.
Later he bacana associated with the Institute of
Philosophy and eventually was appointed to the editorial
board of the "World Marxist Review" in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Ho is known to have visited Paris, Trance, and London, England,
=~ 2 =
: τὰ - τιν κ eye τ. yo a ray Pe στο a oF eed a - - - . ‘ - τ 4 = ” wos ' ' 1 . a a - pot
we " τ-
Ξ
Marat Viktorovich Baglay ; τς
Director . Central’ Intelligence Agatcy _ -
_ Botwoon August 91, 1962, ‘and, Septenbor 16, 1962,. ho wis in tha United States as one of a group of Soviet — citizens who attended the International. Sociological Congress,
At that, ting, ‘he desordbed hinsolf aa "a sciontific: worker,"
~~
Baglay' was born March 13, 1930, in Baku, USSR. in. October, 1960, ho was a lawyér ompldyod δὲ the Institute. τ on State and Law in Moscow. In October; 1960, lie applied for a visa to visit. the United States ag ἃ member of a Soviet dologation ποι was to come ἐδ the United States upon tho invitation. of tha Couricil on. Student Travel. He. was. not listed among. the Soviet delegatés who arrived in tho United States on. October 26, 1960.
Mord. Alcksandrovick Zanoshiin - Yanoshicin, a gédiologist, was. in tha United stated
botwoon, duly 8, 1958, and August 26, 1958, as a Soviat -Gelégate to the American Friends Sorvice Convention.
Between Harch 29,. 1061, and Saptehber 26,. 1962; he wis’ Ohployed at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations ao @ Sclontific worker, At, this timg; hd resided at 80 Wost 77th. Street, New York City,
He. attended an. International Sociological Congress | in. tha United States betwoon August 31; 1962; and Septembor 12, 1962, and was ah East-West cxchanga Student in the United States bétwoon Moy 23, 1966, and June 13, 1966, Αὐτοῦ his 1958. Visit to the United Statds, Zamoshikin way. highly: ‘evitical of
᾿ς gil phasés Ὁ Lifo in the United States. Ho constantly
assertdd that the Soviet Union was far more advonced than ‘the ‘United States in 411 vospécts. Zamoshkin is deseribed ag follcys s
Diractor Central Intelligence Agency
Birth: Born. in Moscow, USSR, . September 10, 1927
Hair: fair
Eyos:. Gray
Height; 5*9"
. Weight: 160
Build: Modiun
Complexion: Mediun
Nikolay Aleksandrovich ‘Kovalskiy
Kovalskiy, a Section Chiof of captioned organization, was in. thé United States between Harch 6, 1967, and March 39, 1967, as ἃ Sovict delegate to the 18th Session of the - United Nations Commission on Social. Development, He had Soviet Diplomatic Passport: Humber 016551;. His deseription is as follows:
Birth; Born in ‘yeninernd, USSR, October 12, 1925 ᾿ Holy; Brown
Byes: . Brown,
Enclosed for your information are two. photographs of Timur Timofeyev and one each of Eduard Arab-Ogly, Yurd Zamoshkin, and Nikolay Kovalekiy.
In tho dvent other information concerning indivi~ duals connected with captioned organization is developed, _ you will ‘be pronptly advised.
- Enclosures (5)
NOTE: . Classified Wavegt™ since unauthorized disclosure of this information could réveal the identity of the sources
(CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S*) who are of continuing ‘value ‘and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.
Data ‘extracted from New York airtel 6/26/67 + ‘captioned "Solo, IS -- σι,"
na TE — — sam —
eae mi mer ROU TE TN. ὯΝ ἄχ. ΩΡ Ἢ abet
Memorandum :
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
᾿ς ταφαρμαυσπανν mated, guano
i. wu Ἂς ὦ
Ἰ
DATE: 6/30/67
FROM : SAC, ἢ
SUBJECT? Gon» |
δι
" (134-46. Sub. Β)
ReBulet dated Jie 6,. “1967: CGlet dated Juie 8, 1967; and Bu'let: dated June 19. "1967, abl captioned “SOLO, " and ait. concerned with: the task of securing a replacement for CG. 5824-S* in the’ ‘Solo. operation. Bulet, dated June 6, 1967; specifically: instructed that ‘Chicago ‘submit on June 30, 1967, and. monthly théreafter, ἃ concise, succinct sum- _mary of steps taken, to developing suitable replacement for CG .5824- ~§* during, the preceding month and additional acti-. vity to “be-undertaken dur ing the- succeeding ‘month,
1, Steps. taken dur itig Tine ; 1967 ; Lh. - ay During the month. of June), 1967. Doerr — woo | Was reinterv iewed; bringing these eontacts. to ΝΕ
seven siich interviews during thé past year’ (see CGairtel to δ΄ "
Bureau Juhe 21, 1967, captioned "High’ ‘Level. Informant Development, CP, USA). Chicago advised the Bureau that it
nion of this office that further interviews of | lat -this time. would not be fruitful. Chicago is. presently considering ald.iaSpects of an appropriate counter- intelligence program oe an ἢ the purpose of itiona
further softening him-up for ἃ intervi ae = “~~noted . that, .development, attempts directed. towarc are... _ wn Pf. stant ΤΌΣ |
. for the purpose of making him a Iegman or assi:
- CG 5824- S* rather ‘than a replacement for Which he is not "qualified. °
} | sdb, AS the Bufeatl is aware, the “interview sey [τ ' ΠΝ, temporarily postponed to po ‘the events i
- East to have maximim impact upo and. at ‘the most ‘oppor tune, moment he would: be ERD viewed. pO Δ
" On June 31, rt 67, ὡς aoe Ao od tna " is: suffering serious. ne ith probieiis , is ‘exper iéne.ing severe pain, and.may ‘soon ehter the héspital for examination, Sis, and treatment, In: light act, the’ ‘ititeryiew ὁ ‘has been postponed ot ae oo problens, have been ὄπ resolved. ὥστ στα terme teem GK δῶσε CD :
vA. (2-Bureau. (RM) _ ὁ {WUE 10 1967"
{ ἱ es
Buy t OS. Savings Bonds Regularly ὃ on ihe Payee! Seen Pim *
; CG 134-46 Sub Β
2. Activities to be undertaken during July, 1967
a, AS ὦ , counterintelligence recommen- dations regardin ill be submitted to the Bureau im order tosoften “Him ΤΊ reinterview.
b. As noted abord will be interviewed providing his health permits*
c. In light of the broad responsibilities for field-wide coordination and direction of this program deéle- gated to Chicago in reBulet dated June 19, 1967, Chicago is currently conducting file reviews in appropriate files wherein activity in this program has taken place and will direct communications to those offices where it is believed . further action is indicated with specific instructions as to programs to be undertaken. The Bureau will be furnished copies of all such communications,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FPOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION sHEET
Mo Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheets).
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